This article originally appeared in Defense Analysis, Vol 11, No. 3, (1995): 229-240. It is displayed here with the permission of Brassey's (UK) Ltd


by Antulio J. Echevarria II

Concerned that an early death might prematurely terminate his masterwork, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote a number of introductory notes describing the purpose of his manuscript and the direction he intended to take with future revisions. Four such notes inform our understanding of On War and Clausewitz's intent: the "Author's Preface" written between 1816-18;*1 the "Author's Comment" written in 1818; the note of 10 July 1827; and the undated, unfinished note "presumably written in 1830."*2 Thanks to the work of historian Azar Gat, the dating of the last note has recently become problematic for Clausewitzian scholars. Gat has argued that the undated note was written not in 1830, but prior to the note of 10 July 1827, perhaps earlier in the same year. In his opinion, the undated note reflects the "crisis" that Clausewitz encountered when he realized that his theory of war failed to account for the fact that limited wars have occurred more frequently in history than wars aimed at completely defeating the enemy.*3 It is the note of 10 July 1827 which, Gat believes, contains the solution to this crisis in the form of Clausewitz's new ideas concerning the primacy of politics in war. On the other hand, Clausewitz's widow, Marie, wrote that the undated note appeared to be "of a very recent date."*4 In it, Clausewitz states that he regarded only Chapter 1 of Book I as finished. This disclosure, combined with the fact that Clausewitz's brother-in-law, Count Friedrich von Brühl, found among Clausewitz's papers a series of revisions intended for Book I, seems to support what we know of his plan to revise On War according to the steps outlined in the note of 1827.*5 Thus, the undated note appears to complement the note of 1827, and for these reasons, Clausewitzian scholars such as Michael Howard and Peter Paret had previously concluded that it was probably written in the spring of 1830, as Clausewitz sealed and packed his papers in preparation for his assignment to Breslau to command the artillery inspection located there.*6

While we may never know for certain whether the undated note was written before or after the note of 1827, its contents still remain important to our understanding of Clausewitz as a military thinker. Although the note of 1827 contains the essential elements of Clausewitz's ideas as we know them today (e.g., the distinction between absolute and limited war, and his belief that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means"), the undated note, whether placed before or after the note of 1827, adds another dimension to Clausewitz's military thought. In short, it suggests that he was on the verge of developing a theory of applied strategy, or an operational-level theory for the conduct of war. In particular, the last paragraph of the undated note reveals that Clausewitz had identified several "statements" (Sätzen), (or "secondary propositions" as Peter Paret has called them) which might be used to guide the conduct of operations:

"It is a very difficult task to construct a scientific theory for the art of war, and so many attempts have failed that most people say that it is impossible, since it deals with matters that no permanent law can provide for. One would agree and abandon the attempt were it not for the obvious fact that a whole range of propositions can be demonstrated without difficulty: that defense is the stronger form of fighting with a negative purpose, attack the weaker form with a positive purpose; that major successes help bring about minor ones, ... ; that a demonstration is a weaker use of force than a real attack, ... ; that victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces, ... ; that success is always greatest at the point where victory was gained, ... ; that a turning movement can only be justified by general superiority ... ; that flank-positions are governed by the same consideration; that every attack loses impetus as it progresses [emphasis added]."*7

As it stands, the list is certainly incomplete. Clausewitz might also have included other important operational concepts such as center of gravity, concentration, and economy of force.*8 Those that he did mention appear throughout the corpus of On War, and, based on thematic similarities between the last two paragraphs of the undated note and Chapter 1 of Book VIII, seem to have been compiled, as does the undated note itself, while Clausewitz was in the process of writing or rewriting Books VI-VIII. This essay examines each of the secondary propositions, excepting Clausewitz's statement that a "demonstration is a weaker use of force than a real attack,"*9 as it is merely a definition, and suggests that they do in fact represent principles -- as Clausewitz had defined the term -- for a theory of applied strategy.

Before proceeding further, however, we must understand that, in general, Clausewitz recognized only two levels of war: strategic -- the use of battles to achieve the military and political objective of the war; and tactical -- the art of winning battles. He saw the conduct of operations as an integral part of strategy, or the art of war, but he used the terms "art of war"--Kriegskunst, "strategy"--Strategie, and "conduct of war"--Kriegführung, almost interchangably. But, in Books VI-VIII, which reflect most of his mature theories, he focused almost exclusively on the conduct of operations, or the practical excution of strategy. These books contain a number of observations concerning "campaign plans"--Feldzugsplanen, "theaters of war"--Kriegstheater, "individual armies' zones of operations"--einzelnen Heergebiete, and "principles for the execution of strategy"--Grundsätze der Mittel und Wege as they applied to defense and attack and to limited and unlimited war--hence, the term applied strategy.

To fully understand the significance of his list of propositions, we must also review Clausewitz's concept of theory. "The primary purpose of any theory," he wrote, "is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled."*10 Theory should explain rather than prescribe. It should reflect reality or, in Clausewitz's words, the "world of action," which is governed, as he saw it, by a logical heirarchy consisting of laws, principles, rules, and prescriptions and methods.*11 Laws are universal and absolute; they reveal the cause-and-effect relationship between things, and determine action (e.g., Newton's Laws of Motion). In Clausewitz's opinion, laws did not belong in a theory of war, since the phenomenon of war consisted of "too much change and diversity" to allow action to be traced to a single cause; nonetheless, he used the term law on numerous occasions. Principles are deductions reflecting only the "spirit and sense" of a law; they may be universal but they are not absolute (e.g., all available force should be concentrated at the decisive point). Principles provide a guide for action -- they allow for the diversity common to combat situations but call upon the commander to exercise sound judgment in their application. Rules are inferences based on experience. Rules resemble principles--they are not absolute; they rest on a truth but allow for exceptions (e.g., cavalry should not be used against unbroken infantry), but they are more specific than principles. Prescriptions and methods are merely the regulations and routines which armies develop to handle their day-to-day business (e.g., standard operating procedures, drill manuals, etc.). Each of these components represents a "nucleus of truth" which theory must address.


[Figure 1 -- Clausewitz's Structure of Theory]

Clausewitz's next task was to combine these elements under a single, unifying theme -- a controlling element -- in his words, a "point at which all lines converge."*12 This controlling element, the foundation for his theory, had to maintain a balance between the "three magnets" of the remarkable trinity -- blind emotional force, chance, and reason -- which provided a framework, or model, for understanding war's changeable and diverse nature:


[Figure 2 -- Clausewitz's Remarkable Trinity]

"These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deeply-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless."*13

Although the "remarkable trinity" itself was not a theory, per se, Clausewitz believed that it provided the basis for one. Originally, the concept of battle or the engagement -- fighting itself -- supplied Clausewitz's single, unifying theme linking the various components of his theory of strategy: "Strategy is nothing without battle, for battle is the material that it applies, the very means that it employs. Just as tactics is the employment of military forces in battle, so strategy is the employment of battles . . . to achieve the object of war."*14 Fighting, including the threat of a fight, became the "essential military activity," and the destruction of the enemy's forces served as Clausewitz's "overriding principle of war."*15


[Figure 3 -- Battle as the Central Element in Clausewitz's Theory of War]

While Gat has correctly argued the Clausewitz's crisis involved the threat that limited wars posed to his overall conception of war, he overlooked the significance of the last paragraph of the undated note. A passage from Chapter 30 of Book VI, reveals Clausewitz's problem more clearly:

"Now we come to another question: whether a set of all-encompassing principles, rules, and methods may be formulated for these endeavors. Our reply must be that history has not guided us to any recurrent forms ... A war in which great decisions are involved is not only simpler but also less inconsistent ... In such a case, reason can make rules and laws, but in the type of war we have been describing this seems far more difficult. Two main principles for the conduct of major wars have evolved in our own time: Bülow's "breadth of a base" and Jomini's "interior lines." Even these, when actually applied to the defense of an operational theater, have never proved to be absolute and effective. Yet this is where, as purely formal principles, they should be at their most effective ... It is plain that circumstances exert an influence that cuts across all general principles ... We admit, in short, that in this chapter we cannot formulate any principles, rules, or methods: history does not provide a basis for them."*16

From this passage it is clear that Clausewitz's crisis involved the tri-namic tension between history (change over time), the "influence of circumstances," and the applicability of "general principles" to the conduct of war itself. The undated note, then, reflects his belief that a theory of war was possible; and that, as his list of secondary propositions suggests, it could be found at the level of applied strategy. The remainder of this essay will thus discuss the significance of each proposition.

1. The Relationship between Defense and Attack*17

By claiming that the defense was the stronger form of war, Clausewitz challenged directly the military norm of his day (and many others) which maintained that the opposite was true. He reasoned that a combatant chose the defensive form of warfare because he was not strong enough either materially or morally to attack. The advantages provided by the defensive form of war (e.g., cover and concealment, shorter lines of supply, time, choice and preparation of the terrain, etc.) compensate for the defender's material or moral weakness, at least partially. Moreover, the defender's aim is merely self-preservation, a condition which is met even before the attacker begins to move and, in some cases, can be met even if the defender's army is defeated in battle (e.g., Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army). The attacker, on the other hand, enjoys few, if any, of the advantages of the defender and, in fact, has the burden of launching and sustaining the attack, for which he generally needs a significant advantage, either moral or material, or both. Thus, the defensive form of warfare is stronger because it affords more advantages to the side that adopts it while at the same time making fewer demands. But because the characteristic feature of the defense is waiting, and its goal preservation, it possesses a negative purpose. The offensive form of warfare, on the other hand, seeks to obtain or to conquer; hence, Clausewitz assigned it a positive purpose.

Stating that one form of warfare is stronger than another is of course not the same as advocating the one over the other. Clausewitz was quick to point out that neither form of war existed independently. A well-conducted defense, he wrote, usually consisted of many offensive blows (e.g., counterattacks and spoiling attacks): "One cannot think of the defense without that necessary component of the concept, the counterattack. ... Even in a defensive position awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets take the offensive."*18 Likewise, attackers must occasionally employ defensive measures to gain time or to re-locate forces, particularly if the resources to press forward continuously and evenly across an entire front are not available (e.g., Allied defensive operations in the Ardennes in the fall of 1944). Thus, "the act of attack, particularly in strategy, is a constant alternation and combination of attack and defense."*19

2. Relationship between Major and Minor Successes

The proposition that major successes help bring about minor ones derives from Clausewitz's general assumption that war, like every real phenomenon, consisted of a number of interdependent elements, when one was affected so, too, were the others, even if only minimally. Statements like, "small things always depend on great ones," or conversely, "that great tactical successes lead to great strategic ones," reflect this belief.*20 In turn, Clausewitz's exprience as a soldier taught him that the material and moral superiority gained from large victories often led to smaller ones. For example, the defeat of the main Prussian army at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 led to a number of smaller garrisons and depots falling rather quickly into French hands. As Clausewitz wrote:

"The outcome of a major battle has a greater psychological effect on the loser than on the winner. This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of material strength, which is echoed in loss of morale; the two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the other. So one must place special emphasis on the moral effect, which works in opposite directions on each side: while sapping the strength of the loser, it raises the vigor and energy of the winner. But the defeated side is the one most affected by it, since it becomes the direct cause of additional loss. Moreover, it is closely related to the dangers, exertions, and hardships -- in brief, to all the wear and tear inseparable from war. It merges with these conditions and is nurtured by them."*21

With this passage, Clausewitz did more than anticipate the modern offensive phases of exploitation and pursuit. He in fact recognized an overall interconnectedness of events within a particular theater of war, especially in terms of morale, such that a victorious outcome in one battle might contribute to success in others as well.

3. Conditions of Victory*22

Clausewitz derived his proposition that "victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces" from the conditions of victory as he defined them for both the strategic and tactical levels of war. On the strategic level, Clausewitz wrote that victory in war required: 1) the complete or partial destruction of the enemy's armed forces; 2) the occupation of his country; and 3) the breaking of his will to fight. The political object, the original motive, for which the war was fought determines the extent to which each of these objectives is to be pursued.*23 On the tactical level, victory involves: 1) the enemy's greater loss of material strength; 2) his loss of morale; and 3) his admission of the same by abandoning his intentions.*24 The loss of the enemy's moral and physical forces, as Clausewitz pointed out, need not be actual. It can, and often is merely the threat of loss which is sufficient to bring about the surrender or capitulation of enemy forces. Moreover, for Clausewitz, breaking the enemy's morale possessed far more significance than the destruction of his material strength: "In the engagement, the loss of morale has proved the major decisive factor ... [it] becomes the means of achieving the margin of profit in the destruction of the enemy's physical forces which is the real purpose of the engagement [emphasis added]."*25 Indeed, the continued resistance of the French population after the battle of Sedan supports Clausewitz's emphasis on the psychological or irrational element of war. While the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs provides significant advantages to technology-based societies, the concept of a Peoples' War remains its Achilles heel, thereby underscoring the crucial role that cultural values, ideologies, and belief systems play in motivating a society for war.

4. Turning Movements and Flank Positions*26

Envelopments and turning movements are similar in nature. Their basic definitions have not changed since Clausewitz's day. Envelopments are maneuvers around or over the enemy's position, avoiding his strength, to strike at his flanks and rear. A turning movement is a variant of the envelopment in which the attacker avoids the defense entirely in order to seek key terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along his lines of communication, thus forcing him to abandon his position.*27 "The enveloping or turning movement," Clausewitz wrote, "may have two objectives. It may aim at disrupting, or cutting, communications, causing the army to wither and die, and thus be forced to retreat; or it may aim at cutting off the retreat itself."*28 Because such movements expose one's own lines of communication to attack, Clausewitz argued that "flanking operations, which have always been more popular in books than in the field," are rarely practicable, and "dangerous only to very long and vulnerable lines of communication."*29 Even the threat of being cut off, he maintained, should not be overrated; "experience has shown that where the troops are good and their commanders bold they are more likely to break through than be trapped."*30
Clausewitz defined a flank position as "any position that is meant to be held even though the enemy may pass it by: once he has, the only effect it can have is on his strategic flank."*31 This definition included all fortified positions since they are, in theory at least, "impregnable," and any unfortified position which happens to be cut off, regardless of whether it faces parallel or perpendicular to the enemy's line of advance (e.g., the Prussian position on the Saale during Napoleon's advance in 1806). He considered such flank positions effective if they cause the attacker to hesitate, but risky, particularly in the case of unfortified ones, if the attacker proceeded unchecked, since, as Clausewitz explained, "the defender will pretty well have lost his chances of retreat."*32

The development of rapid-firing, long-range rifles and machine guns in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made flanking operations more appealing to armies who wanted to close with the enemy while avoiding his deadly frontal fire. Moltke the Elder (Chief of Staff of the German General Staff, 1857-1888) seems to have perfected the technique of tactical envelopment in Germany's wars against Austria and France in 1866 and 1870 respectively. To Count Alfred von Schlieffen (Chief of Staff of the German General Staff, 1891-1905), however, flank attacks became something of an obsession -- they were the "essential element in all of military history."*33

Rather than treat the act of "falling on the enemy's rear" as an accomplishment in itself, "a prize exhibit," or a formula for success, Clausewitz soberly argued that flanking operations in general were most effective only under the following conditions: 1) while on the strategic defensive; 2) toward the end of a campaign, when the enemy's lines of communication have been extended; 3) especially during a retreat into the interior of the country; and 4) in conjunction with armed insurrection.*34 All of these conditions, save the last, were present in MacArthur's famous landing at Inchon during the Korean conflict, a classic turning movement that saved UN forces from defeat. As the lethality of the battlefield continues to increase, envelopments (including those vertical in nature) and turning movements are likely to gain even greater significance as forms of maneuver.

5. The Diminishing Force of the Attack, The Culminating Point of the Attack, and the Culminating Point of Victory*35

Clausewitz saw the diminishing force of the attack, the culminating point of the attack, and the culminating point of victory as related concepts. Anticipating the modern concept of strategic consumption, Clausewitz wrote: "All attackers find that their strength diminishes as they advance."*36 He then went on to identify seven factors which cause the depletion of the attackers strength: 1) occupation of the enemy's country; 2) the need to secure lines of communication; 3) losses incurred through combat and sickness; 4) the distance from replacements of both material and personnel; 5) by sieges and investment of fortresses; 6) by a reduction of effort (moral and physical); and 7) by the defection of allies. Yet, he was also quick to point out that "a weakening of the attack may be partially or completely cancelled out ... by a weakening of the defense."*37 Thus, the depletion of the attacker's strength, while demonstrably true, has no meaning unless it is considered in relation to the strength of the defender.

Drawing directly from his observations concerning the diminishing force of the attack, Clausewitz concluded that most attacks do not lead directly to the end of hostilities, but instead reach a culminating point at which the "superior strength of the attack[er] ... is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace."*38 By way of corollary, Clausewitz determined that the moral and physical superiority gained through a successful battle generally augmented the strength of the victor, adding to his superiority, but only to a certain extent, and this he called the culminating point of victory.*39 This circumstance, he pointed out, was particularly evident in wars in which it was not possible for the victor to completely defeat his opponent. The same factors that contributed to reducing the strength of the attacker also played a role in diminishing the moral and material superiority that a military force gained through victory:

"[Thus,] the utilization of a victory, a continued advance in an offensive campaign, will usually swallow up the superiority with which one began or which was gained by the victory.... This culminating point in victory is bound to recur in every future war in which the destruction of the enemy cannot be the military aim, and this will presumably be true of most wars. The natural goal of all campaign plans, therefore, is the turning point at which attack becomes defense [-- the culminating point of the attack]."*40

In short, attacks that did not result in peace must end in defense. To proceed beyond the culminating point of the attack merely invited disaster, for it was erroneous to assume "that so long as an attack progresses there must still be some superiority on its side."*41 Clausewitz continued: "It is therefore important to calculate this point correctly when planning the campaign. An attacker may otherwise take on more than he can manage ... ; a defender must be able to recognize this error if the enemy commits it, and exploit it to the full."*42 Both Napoleon's and Hitler's campaigns in Russia serve as ample illustrations of what can happen when an attacker exceeds his culminating point.

Unfortunately, Clausewitz's step toward a theory of applied strategy remained only that; and it is impossible to say precisely where he would have gone with his list of propositions. On the one hand, he might have used a triangular structure similar to that of the remarkable trinity, which explained the nature of war, to clarify applied strategy. Clausewitz might thus have set his list of principles in opposition to his elements of strategy (Book III) which, because they vary with each situation, account for the uniqueness of strategic operations in general: 1) the moral -- intellectual and psychological factors (e.g., genius of the commander and spirit of the army); 2) the physical -- army size and composition; 3) the mathematical -- geometric factors (e.g., angles of impact and flanking fires); 4) the geographical -- the influence of terrain; and 5) the statistical -- support and maintenance.*43 In addition, Clausewitz's concept of a center of gravity, Schwerpunkt, which became an integral part of his later discussions regarding the conduct of war, offers perhaps the best controlling element for a theory of applied strategy. His framework for a theory of applied strategy might thus have looked like this:


[Figure 4 -- A Possible Framework for Applied Strategy]

Clausewitz defined Schwerpunkt as 'the center of all power and movement (Zentrum der Kraft und Bewegung) ... upon which everything depends.'*44 The concept itself originated with Clausewitz's belief in the near-metaphysical interdependency of all elements and all levels of war; it also reflects the extent to which the holistic and harmonizing tendencies of German idealism had influenced him. Paradoxically, the center of gravity represents both the predominant strengths and weaknesses of the geo-political or politico-military position of each belligerent state relative to its allies and opponents: if it is removed, impaired, or destroyed, then the alliance or state that it supported would collapse. Although he argued that the 'destruction of the enemy's fighting force is the best way to begin,' Clausewitz saw moral and physical force as separate but related sources of strength; hence, he recognized more than one possibility for a center of gravity, namely, an enemy's army, his capital, alliance systems, personalities of leaders, and public opinion.*45 In general, however, these last pertain more to the level of strategy than applied strategy. We can only wonder whether in subsequent revisions of On War Clausewitz would have developed the concept further.

On the other hand, he might simply have developed his list of propositions into a more sophisticated set of principles of war to replace those that he had prepared for the Crown Prince.*46 Indeed, many of the chapters in Book III correspond to the principles of war as we know them today.*47 In any case, Clausewitz certainly needed to rewrite Book III (Strategy), formally addressing the relationship between the principles of applied strategy and strategic operations in general, paying particular attention to conflicts short of war.


Clausewitz's approach to theory itself differed from others in that his attempted to account for all the impediments to action, all the imponderables -- genius, chance, friction, uncertainty, etc. -- and all the variations in scenario that result from the particularity of individual circumstances and prevent war from becoming a science. Given the predelictions of the day, Clausewitz's response to the crisis in theory was itself rather astonishing -- he redefined the term 'theory.' Rather than using it to mean formula or established procedure, as most Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers of his time had done, he redefined it in broader terms to indicate a 'framework for study' or a 'basis for conceptualization.' In this sense, he did indeed provide the 'revolution' in the theory of war that he so desired.*48

At any rate, the undated note, whether placed before or after the note of 1827, shows us that Clausewitz was a multi-dimensional military thinker, torn between the desire to make sense of his world by systematizing it, and the need to avoid applying rigid principles to a changing and diverse phenomenon. He, like so many of his contemporaries, attempted to harness the intricacies and inconsistencies of war through the use of reason. That he was far more successful in this endeavor than most owes to the fact that he did not allow his theory to predict, but required it to explain; he did not merely search for universal principles, but sought to strike a tri-namic balance between them, historical change, and the force of circumstances.


1. According to Peter Paret, this preface actually pertained not to On War itself but to a lost collection of essays dealing with the role and limits of theory. Nevertheless, it has become a part of On War and serves to inform us about Clausewitz' approach to theory. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 360.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 70.

3. Azar Gat, "Clausewitz's final Notes," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (1/89): 45-50. The essay also appears in Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 255-63. Gat borrows heavily from Raymond Aron on this score. Raymond Aron, Penser la guerre, Clausewitz, 2 Vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1976). The English edition, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, Trans. by Christine Booker and Norman Stone (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985), is somewhat confusing due to a poor translation. A German edition is also available: Clausewitz, Den Krieg denken.

4. See Marie's "Vorrede," in Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege. Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz, 19th Ed., Ed. by Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1991), 173-181.

5. In the note of 1827, Clausewitz stated that he would undertake the revision of Books I-VI (which were already in clean copy) only after he had further clarified his ideas through the writing, or rewriting, of Books VII and VIII. Vom Kriege, 177, or On War, 70.

6. See the English translation of On War offered by Howard and Paret.

7. On War, 71.

8. Center of gravity appears most frequently in the last three books, esp., On War, VI,27, 485; VIII,4, 596; and VIII,9, 617. Concentration is refered to as a "law" of strategy, On War, III,11, 204. Economy of force is mentioned in On War, III,14, 213.

9. The last paragraph of Book VI, Chapter 24, refers to a chapter on demonstrations in which Clausewitz had intended to show the differences between an attack and a demonstration. But the chapter has either been lost or was never written. Incidentally, Clausewitz' definition of a demonstration does not agree with the US Army's FM 100-5 which states that a "demonstration is a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought ... [and which] threatens attack but does not make contact." FM 100-5 Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), 7-8.

10. On War, II,1, 132.

11. On War, II,4, 151-5. Clausewitz' definitions of law, principle, and rule appear to be drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Practical Reason, Book I, Chapter I, "Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason."

12. On War, II,2, 141.

13. These tendencies, in turn, corresponded directly with the nation's government, the passions of its populace, and the skill and prowess of its military. On War, I,1, 89.

14. Carl von Clausewitz, "Bemerkungen über die reine und angewandte Strategie des Herrn von Bülow oder Kritik der darin enthaltenen Ansichten," Verstreute kleine Schriften, Ed. Werner Hahlweg, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1979), 77.

15. On War, IV,1, pp. 225 and 258. The mere possibility of an engagement, Clausewitz believed, produced the same results as an actual one. On War, III,1, 181.

16. On War, VI,30, 516-17.

17. Discussions concerning the nature of defense and attack appear numerous places throughout On War, but the theme receives special attention in Book VI, Chapters 1-5. See also On War I,1; VII,1-2; and VIII,8.

18. On War, VII,2, 524, and VI,1, 357.

19. On War, VII,2, 524.

20. On War, VIII,4 and 9, esp. pp. 596 and 623; and IV,3, 228.

21. On War, IV,10, 253.

22. The conditions of victory appear in On War, I,1 and 2; IV,3, 227; and IV,11, 258.

23. On War, I,1 and 2, pp. 80, and 90-9.

24. On War, IV,4, 233-4.

25. On War, IV,4, 231.

26. Turning movements are discussed in Book V, Chapter 16, "Lines of Communication." Flank positions are discussed in detail in Book VI, Chapters 14, "Flank Positions," and 24, "Operations on a Flank."

27. FM 100-5, pp. 101-102.

28. On War, V,16, pp. 346-7.

29. On War, V,16, 347.

30. On War, V,16, 347.

31. On War, VI,14, 415.

32. On War, VI,14, 416.

33. Generalfeldmarschall Graf Alfred Schlieffen, Briefe, ed. Eberhard Kessel, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), 312.

34. On War, VI,24, 465.

35. All are addressed in Book VII. The diminishing force of the attack is Chapter 4; the culminating point of the attack is Chapter 5, which contains a note reflecting Clausewitz' desire to develop the idea of the culminating point of the attack further in a chapter entitled, "The Culminating Point of Victory." An essay by that title was in fact found and included as Chapter 22 of Book VII.

36. On War, VI,25, 469.

37. On War, VII,4, 527.

38. On War, VII,5, 528.

39. On War, VII,22, 566.

40. On War, VII,22, 570.

41. On War, VII,22, 571.

42. On War, VII,22, 572.

43. On War, III,2, 183.

44. On War, VIII,4, 595-6.

45. On War, VIII,4, 596.

46. "Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Erganzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen," Vom Kriege, Hahlweg, p. 1047. The English edition, Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. by Hans Gatzke, (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1942 & 1960) contains some inconsistencies.

47. For example, Chapter 6, "Boldness," resembles the principle Offensive; Chapter 8, "Superiority of Numbers," Chapter 11, "Concentration of Forces in Time," and Chapter 12, "Unification of Forces in Time," relate to Mass; Chapter 9, "Surprise," and Chapter 14, "Economy of Force," are of course their namesakes; and Chapter 10, "Cunning," has much in common with Simplicity, Security, and Surprise.

48. On War, Note of 1827, 70.

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