On the Pedagogical Intent of Clausewitz's *On War*

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**Abstract:** Jon Sumida provides a novel interpretation of *On War* that has implications for military education. Clausewitz, he argues, proposes a pedagogical theory of how to enhance the decision-making capacities of officers through an unconventional approach to the study of history. To support his case that *On War* is a theory of practice, Sumida demonstrates several affinities between Carl von Clausewitz and twentieth-century thinkers rather than late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century ones. But there is also evidence that suggests that Clausewitz’s contemporary, Friedrich Schleiermacher, influenced the pedagogical intent of *On War.*

**Keywords:** Clausewitz, *On War*, officer education, professional military education, PME, pedagogy, Jon Sumida, historical reenactment, critical analysis, intuition, Azar Gat, Peter Paret, Friedrich Schleiermacher

While the need to read *On War* seems undisputed, the same cannot be said of its completeness, meaning, and intent. For some scholars, the work is incomplete. Its meaning and intent are not simply abstruse but nonexistent. For others, *On War* is sufficiently finished, but they disagree with how its concepts and dictums about friction, fog, and politics fit together to explain the nature of war. Still others argue that *On War* is not a theory of a phenomenon at all, but rather one of practice, an interpretation first

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suggested by G. B. Gallie that was fully developed by Jon Sumida, who argues that *On War* “is about the how of learning to do something rather than the what of something’s general nature,” the aim of which is to provide a more effective method for officer education to enhance decision-making capacities.1 Introducing a new interpretation of *On War* is not the purpose of this article. Rather, it is to strengthen the case for Sumida’s pedagogical one, an interpretation that has implications for military education. As with most scholarship, Sumida addresses the ongoing debate about the philosophical character of Clausewitz’s thought, but he adopts another unconventional approach. To support his case that *On War* is a theory of practice, Sumida turns to twentieth-century thinkers rather than late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century ones. While his findings certainly reveal numerous affinities between Clausewitz and these later thinkers, there is also evidence that suggests that one of Clausewitz’s contemporaries influenced the pedagogical intent of *On War*. But in lieu of the usual German suspects, such as Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Schleiermacher emerges as the philosopher who shaped Clausewitz’s attempt to design a novel method of self-education for military officers.

The Question of Clausewitz’s Philosophic Roots

Few military history scholars have failed to acknowledge Clausewitz’s intellectual ambitions, and *On War* is widely regarded as a highly philosophical work. Thus, identifying the intellectual sources of his thought has been an integral, persistent, and contested component of Clausewitz scholarship. According to the more-or-less traditional view, the philosophic language, substance, and methodology of *On War* suggest that Clausewitz was decidedly influenced by the German idealists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, namely Kant and Hegel, whose system of categories or dialectical method of analysis, for example, profoundly shaped several of his key ideas, such as absolute versus limited war and the relationship between attack and defense. In a frequently quoted passage, an early commentator describes Clausewitz as the “most German of Germans. . . . In reading him one constantly has the feeling of being in a metaphysical fog.”2 Though this emphasis on Kant and Hegel is, generally speaking, more characteristic of earlier scholarship on Clausewitz, it has not entirely disappeared.3

This traditional approach to the philosophic origins of Clausewitz’s thought was challenged by a number of seminal works published during the last few decades, although a new consensus has hardly emerged. The significance of German idealism, especially that of Kant and Hegel, was increasingly questioned. Numerous new philosophic sources and contexts were considered or stressed. There was also a greater insistence that Clausewitz is best understood as an original thinker in his own right and that his experiences on the battlefield are as
important to understanding his thought as is his speculative education. Finally, the question concerning the extent to which Clausewitz was influenced by earlier philosophers gave way to the extent to which he anticipated later ones. While the following five authors hardly exhaust the scholarship on Clausewitz during this period, their novel lines of inquiry adequately represent the key themes and arguments necessary for the present study.

Two of these seminal works appeared in 1976. The first was Raymond Aron’s *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War.* In no uncertain terms, Aron argues that recourse to Kant and Hegel does not significantly enhance our understanding of *On War.* He concedes that a number of Clausewitz’s concepts are dialectic and that several of his expressions have “a Kantian ring,” but such affinities are too superficial and require too many qualifications to be helpful. Aron further maintains that “the conceptualization of Clausewitz resembles that of Montesquieu far more closely than anybody has ever suggested, and far more than any similarity it may bear to the works of Hegel or Kant.” Nonetheless, he concludes, “I do not think the influence of [Charles-Louis de Secondat] Montesquieu matters very much.” Instead of emphasizing possible philosophic sources, Aron emphasizes Clausewitz’s distinctiveness. *On War,* he writes, “is a study, by Clausewitz himself, of problems that arose from his own conception of things. . . . From the start, the dialectic of material and moral set Clausewitz. . . . against the great builders of systems.”

The other seminal work of 1976 came from Peter Paret’s *Clausewitz and the State.* To explore the genesis of his theory, Paret discusses Clausewitz’s “social and intellectual antecedents, his surroundings, his experiences, and the ways in which they influenced his attempts to understand and explain politics and war.” However, Paret recognizes that Clausewitz’s concepts and method owe much to the German idealists and romantics of his day—not only Kant, Hegel, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte but also Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Schilling, Alexander von Humboldt, and Friedrich and August Schlegel. “Clausewitz’s debt to the philosophy and science of his time is obvious,” he writes. “From Kant and his successors he acquired his tools of speculative reasoning, and learned to have confidence in their power.” Paret also examines the influences of non-German thinkers, such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Montesquieu.

But like Aron, Paret cautions against ascribing too much significance to these thinkers, let alone one of them, also noting the novelty of Clausewitz’s thought. “German philosophy,” he writes, “gave him the means of subjecting war to logical inquiry, and no doubt contributed to his desire to do so, but it did less to shape the result than might be assumed.” In an earlier essay, Paret decidedly argues that relating “Clausewitz to Kant or Hegel almost necessarily results in forced and unconvincing historical constructions.”
ponents of Clausewitz’s analytic system are perhaps derivative, his “originality lay in the manner in which he combined separate analytic strands and applied their integrated force to the issues of conflict. Perhaps for this reason we cannot point to any single ancestor of his theoretical method among German philosophers.”12 Paret further challenges the significance of Clausewitz’s predecessors on the grounds that his analysis of war “was as much the result of action and experience as it was of speculative effort.”13 What Clausewitz witnessed on the battlefield influenced On War as much as, and perhaps more than, what he heard in any lecture hall.

Another thorough treatment of Clausewitz appears in Azar Gat’s The History of Military Thought, which builds on the work of Aron and Paret while taking some issue with certain aspects of their work. Gat, too, denies to Kant or Hegel a singular or decisive influence, and he applauds the extensive material that Paret brings to bear on Clausewitz. Nevertheless, Gat faults them for failing to appreciate some of his major influences and for too readily brushing aside Kant and Hegel; Gat devotes some attention to Kant’s theory of art and Hegel’s philosophic idealism.14 Moreover, according to Gat, Aron and Paret, among others, fail to recognize the broader intellectual and cultural context that shaped Clausewitz.15 Clausewitz responded to military thinkers who sought to formulate a theory that would reduce war “to rules and principles of universal validity and possibly even mathematical certainty.” But these thinkers were not “curious eccentrics with peculiar ideas.” They were pupils of the Enlightenment, which equated humans and nature in their susceptibility to scientific analysis. Likewise, “Clausewitz’s ideas did not appear out of thin air.” He was part of the German Movement, a diverse intellectual response to the Enlightenment that included historicism, romanticism, and idealism. Clausewitz, Gat contends, cannot be understood apart from this complicated conflict between the Enlightenment and the German Movement.16

Despite their different emphases with respect to who or what influenced Clausewitz, and to what extent such influence is significant, Aron, Paret, and Gat all agree that On War is a theory of a phenomenon. That is to say, all agree that On War is a description of the nature of war. Paret argues, for example, that the “purpose of Clausewitz’s theoretical writings was to develop not a new doctrine but a truer understanding of the phenomenon of war,” a purpose that Paret describes as “phenomenological in the modern, Husserlian sense of the term.”17 For Gat’s Clausewitz, the surface of war is always in flux but war itself has “an immutable core,” a spirit, essence, or nature. “Above historical study and crude rules,” Gat writes of Clausewitz’s approach, “there exists a universal theory which reflects the lasting nature of war, transcends the diversity and transformations of past experience, and is both generally valid and instructive.”18 To be sure, these scholars disagree considerably about how Clausewitz describes the
nature of war, as well as the extent to which that description has prescriptive implications for the conduct of war. But that Clausewitz is attempting to describe a particular phenomenon is generally accepted.

The position that *On War* is a theory of a phenomenon was first questioned by W. B. Gallie, who published his *Philosophers of Peace and War* shortly after the release of Aron and Paret’s major works. In the single chapter devoted to Clausewitz, Gallie levels a number of deep criticisms at *On War*. Nonetheless, Gallie upholds the judgment of Aron and Paret by insisting on the philosophical achievement and significance of *On War*. “No one with the slightest acquaintance with philosophy,” he writes, “could fail to suspect that [Clausewitz] was a man of marked philosophical ability,” whose contributions to philosophy, though limited, “would have been much appreciated by Aristotle.” Gallie departs from Aron and Paret somewhat, however, by arguing that Clausewitz’s methodology, particularly his distinction between absolute and real war, was influenced by Kant’s principle of division.Clausewitz’s conception of absolute war, as well as the fact that he attended J. G. Kiesewetter’s lectures on Kant in 1803 while at the Berlin War School, led Gallie to conclude that it “therefore seems to me highly probable that this idea is Kantian in origin or at least in inspiration.” But more importantly, Gallie also makes a few passing remarks that introduce a different approach to understanding *On War*’s philosophical character. He suggests that Clausewitz’s philosophical contributions “were centered on the idea of practice” and that aspects of his thought, far from being derivative, actually anticipate a later philosopher, R. G. Collingwood.

These two final suggestions were developed almost three decades later by Jon Sumida, in *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War*. With respect to Kant and Hegel, Sumida argues alongside Aron and Paret, and against Gat and Gallie, that their influence was significant. As a consequence of *On War*’s philosophical character, Sumida argues, “much—indeed, perhaps too much—has been made of Clausewitz’s use of Kant’s principle of division or Hegel’s dialectical form of argument.” This misguided reliance on Kant and Hegel, according to Sumida, is the result of interpreting *On War* as a theory of a phenomenon rather than a theory of practice. Clausewitzian theory, he contends, “embodies ideas that anticipated those of later philosophers and the findings of twentieth-century mathematics and cognitive science.” *On War* is therefore “a philosophically and scientifically creative achievement rather than a mere adaptation of certain well-known philosophical approaches of his day.” Accordingly, Sumida examines the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Collingwood.

This brief survey of somewhat recent Clausewitz scholarship brings to light three relevant questions. The first is the extent to which Clausewitz was influenced by the philosophers of his age. Aron best illustrates the challenge to the
conventional view that superficially portrays Clausewitz as a Kantian or Hegelian, but he too readily disregards such influence altogether. Paret and Gat exemplify the approach that acknowledges Clausewitz’s highly eclectic approach to contemporary thinkers, though they place different emphasis on different sources. The second question is whether On War should be understood as a theory of a phenomenon or a theory of practice. Although their interpretations differ considerably, Aron, Paret, and Gat argue that On War is a theory regarding the nature of war. Sumida, and to a lesser extent Gallie, depart from this traditional view and argue that On War is a theory of practice. This disagreement leads to the final question: To what extent should Clausewitz be understood with the help of his contemporaries at all? Sumida, and to a lesser extent Gallie, argue that Clausewitz is better understood as a thinker who anticipated later thinkers rather than followed past ones. Thus, the contention that On War is a theory of practice rests, in part, on the case against understanding Clausewitz by reference to his contemporaries, let alone to Kant and Hegel. The rest of this article attempts to show that Sumida’s case for reinterpreting the intent of On War can be further strengthened by following the traditional approach to its philosophic character.

Clausewitz and Schleiermacher

Despite the persistent interest in the philosophic origins of Clausewitz’s thought, Germanic or otherwise, little consideration has been given to the possibility that Clausewitz was influenced by another contemporary of his, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), a German theologian, philosopher, and classical scholar. Though usually not placed in the same philosophic class as Kant and Hegel, Schleiermacher made important contributions to a number of fields, such as hermeneutics and liberal theology. Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that sheds light on the extent to which Clausewitz may have been familiar with Schleiermacher’s work and thought.

Lack of conclusive evidence notwithstanding, Paret, Clausewitz’s preeminent biographer, argues that “it is safe to assume that the two men knew each other.”25 Schleiermacher confirmed Clausewitz’s wife, Marie von Brühl, who also had a broad familiarity with the philosophic ideas of the age.26 In 1807, Schleiermacher returned to Berlin after serving as a professor of theology at the University of Halle for several years, whereupon the two resumed their acquaintance; Clausewitz and Brühl had begun their official courtship in 1806 and Clausewitz returned from internment in France to occupied Berlin in 1807.27 In 1811, Achim von Arnim and other frequenters of the salon of Luise von Voss invited Clausewitz to the gatherings of the Christlich-Deutsche Tischgesellschaft, a group that met every second Tuesday throughout Berlin to discuss literature and politics. Its members included both Fichte and Schleiermacher.28
Schleiermacher was also a friend of Gerhard Scharnhorst, whose “influence on
the young Clausewitz, his pupil and closest protégé,” according to Gat, “cannot
be exaggerated.”

An objection could be made that social relations hardly constitute evidence
that Clausewitz read the work of Schleiermacher, let alone closely. But this
objection is no more damaging with respect to Schleiermacher than it is with
respect to other thinkers who may have influenced Clausewitz. In most cases,
there is little evidence that Clausewitz was directly familiar with the philosophic
works of Kant or Hegel. In discussing Clausewitz’s conception of absolute war,
for example, Gallie argues that it is “highly probable that this idea is Kantian
in origin or at least in inspiration: which is not of course to claim that Clause-
witz had any detailed or even first hand [sic] knowledge of Kant’s writings, or
any great insight into his philosophy.” As many scholars note, Clausewitz was
introduced to Kant through the lectures of a well-known Kant popularizer,
Kiesewetter. And despite all that has been made of their apparent similarities,
there is also scant evidence that Clausewitz actually read Hegel.

When it comes to proving Clausewitz’s influences, emphasis is usually
placed on his general interest in philosophic matters and the environment in
which his thought developed. Despite the variety of interpretations regarding
his influences, there is a consensus that Clausewitz was an incredibly erudite
man who associated with Prussia’s intellectual elite, in part thanks to his mar-
rriage to Marie von Brühl. Paret describes Clausewitz as “a typical educated
representative of his generation, who attended lectures on logic and ethics de-
signed for the general public, read relevant nonprofessional books and articles,
and drew scraps of ideas at second and third hand from his cultural environ-
ment.” For his part, Gat repeatedly stresses the importance of looking at the
German intellectual environment in which Clausewitz operated, as well as the
social circles in which he moved, to understand his thought. However deep
their personal acquaintance may have run, then, it seems unlikely that Clause-
witz would have been entirely unfamiliar with the thoughts of Schleiermacher,
one of the most prominent philosophers of the time.

Taken together, these biographical details have already helped Paret and Gat
to take note of the apparent similarities between Schleiermacher and Clause-
witz. In a passing footnote, Paret remarks that “certain features of Clausewitz’s
mature theoretical work show similarities with Schleiermacher’s writings—for
example, the nondescriptive function of theory, the absolute concept of the
subject studied, which is modified in reality, and the concern with the acting
individual.” In particular, Paret and Gat both note that many of Clausewitz’s
statements on religion reflect ideas that were articulated in the lectures that
Schleiermacher published in Berlin shortly before Clausewitz’s arrival there.
After citing a passage written by Clausewitz on positive religion, Gat writes
that “Schleiermacher’s influence here is all too apparent.” More generally, Gat suggests that Schleiermacher’s ideas on the historical character of all positive religions in contrast to a universal religious feeling was one of the many intellectual sources that influenced Clausewitz’s attempt to “formulate a universal theory of war which would be valid despite and within the great diversity of historical experience.”

But these suggestions are scarcely more than passing remarks, and they are made in the context of interpreting *On War* as a theory of a phenomenon. The rest of this article explores the possibility that Schleiermacher played an important role in Clausewitz’s attempt to provide a theory of practice by drawing upon the novel interpretation developed by Sumida in *Decoding Clausewitz*. If Sumida’s interpretation is correct, then he rightly depreciates the influence of Kant and Hegel, and he judiciously makes use of later thinkers. However, neither step excludes the possibility of identifying another contemporary who influenced Clausewitz’s pedagogy. Indeed, both the problem and solution that Sumida believes Clausewitz to be laying out in *On War* bear a number of similarities with Schleiermacher’s work on hermeneutics, especially his translations of Plato.

**Clausewitz and the Problem of Language**

In large part, according to Sumida, *On War* was meant to address a pressing national security concern: preparing Prussia for a likely war with France. The most important element of this preparation for Clausewitz was the training and education of military leadership. A competent military commander possesses three fundamental attributes: intellect, temperament, and experience. The third and final element, arguably the most important, presented a particular problem; following a decade of peace, Prussia’s young military commanders lacked any practical experience in war. Teaching the dynamics and dilemmas of high command to individuals with no recourse to practical experience became Clausewitz’s preeminent concern. This endeavor was further complicated when he discovered the inability of the written word to teach properly.

Disparaging comments about the limited capacity of language to convey meaning permeate *On War*. When describing strategy, Clausewitz uses such words as “cheap,” and “the most common means of creating false impressions.” When describing the errors committed by prevailing military theories, he condemns “the retinue of jargon, technicalities, and metaphors, that attends these systems. They swarm everywhere—a lawless rabble of camp followers.” Despite the futility and vanity of these “technical expressions and metaphors,” military theorists cannot help but use them, leading to content without meaning. He also casts doubt about the possibility of providing proper and reliable
definitions for terms, concepts, and other expressions. “The very nature of the question,” he writes, “makes it impossible to give an accurate definition of these different factors of space, mass, and time.”45 Expressions such as “a dominating area,” “a covering position,” and “key to the country” are . . . for the most part hollow shells lacking any sound core.”46

The weakness of language is particularly evident with respect to Clausewitz’s primary concern: the nature of high command. This concern separates Clausewitz’s thought from the conventional military theories of his day, which focused on “material factors” or the maintenance of military forces, tactical engagement on the battlefield, numerical superiority, supply, and interior lines.47 But in war, these “material factors” are rendered irrelevant by the role of chance, the uncertainty of all information, and the unpredictable interplay of two opposing sides.48 Accordingly, the “moral factors” become paramount, the most important of which is the intuition, or genius, of the military commander. Complex, strategic dilemmas are solved by intuition, not theoretical, dogmatic propositions.49 However, the importance of these moral factors is equaled only by their ineffability. “Theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the realm of moral values,” Clausewitz writes.50 Despite their paramountcy and permeation, the moral factors “will not yield to academic wisdom. They cannot be classified or counted.”51

Clausewitz’s remarks regarding the unreliability of language constitute a critical component of Sumida’s novel interpretation of On War. Sumida argues that these remarks help to demonstrate that Clausewitz is best understood in light of later philosophers, such as Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Collingwood, as opposed to Kant and Hegel. After providing a brief overview of these three thinkers, Sumida writes:

These brief glimpses into the thought of Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Collingwood provide ample evidence for Gallie’s contention that Clausewitz anticipated important later philosophical work and possessed original philosophical talent of a very high order. Like Clausewitz, all three thinkers problematized language with respect to the communication of meaning about matters involving human behavior, distrusted the invention of technical vocabularies, were skeptical of the utility of theory that was based upon rules, and believed that experience can convey meaning in ways that language cannot.52

We cannot argue that Clausewitz expressed serious reservations about the value of language and that these reservations were similarly expressed by Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Collingwood. However, the latter three men are hardly the first
thinkers to write about the deficiencies and unreliability of language, in general, and the written word, in particular. In fact, these very same themes are clearly discussed by Schleiermacher.

To understand how Schleiermacher might have influenced Clausewitz, we must consider one of Schleiermacher’s major philosophic projects: his translation and interpretation of Plato’s dialogues. The substance of Schleiermacher’s work on Plato not only offers a likely source for his influence on Clausewitz but the timing and notoriety of that project strengthens the case that Clausewitz was exposed to relevant material. It is hard to imagine, in light of Clausewitz’s relationship to the intellectual milieu of his time, that he would have been unaware of Schleiermacher’s work on Plato.

According to Schleiermacher, no other thinker affected him as much as Plato. More importantly, Schleiermacher was the first scholar to translate Plato into German. Though the project to translate the Platonic corpus was originally conceived of by Schleiermacher’s friend, Friedrich Schlegel, and while it was Schlegel who invited Schleiermacher on board, Schleiermacher would become solely responsible for the project. Platonis Werke was eventually published in six volumes. The first volume appeared in 1804, which included the Phaedrus, Lysis, Protagoras, and Laches, as well as Schleiermacher’s “General Introduction.” Another five volumes would appear during the next six years.

The importance of Schleiermacher’s translations and interpretations is beyond dispute, and it did not take long for the quality of that work to be recognized. In a published review of Platonis Werke shortly after its release, the philologist August Böckh wrote that “no one has so fully understood Plato and has taught others to understand Plato as this man.” According to a contemporary scholar of Schleiermacher, Julia A. Lamm, “Schleiermacher’s translation of Plato’s dialogues, along with his accompanying ‘Introductions,’ was a momentous event in the philosophical, philological, and literary world. . . . His interpretation of Plato’s dialogues, as explicated in his ‘Introductions,’ changed the entire course of Plato studies and continues to reverberate even now, two centuries later.” Some of the preeminent Platonic scholars of the twentieth century, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Leo Strauss, and Jacob Klein, also recognized the significance of Schleiermacher’s work on Plato.

The intention here is not to provide a thorough examination of Schleiermacher’s approach to the study of Plato, let alone a critical assessment of that study; after all, most of Schleiermacher’s interpretation of Plato is irrelevant for studying Clausewitz. Instead, it is to identify particular aspects of that interpretation that Clausewitz might have applied to his own work. And one salient aspect of that interpretation concerns the problem of language. Schleiermacher’s “General Introduction” begins by dismissing the usefulness of Plato’s biographical details when interpreting the dialogues. Examining the status of
the study of language during Plato’s lifetime is a more suitable starting point. Schleiermacher writes,

    And in like manner, also, whoever does not possess a competent knowledge of the deficient state of the language for philosophical purposes, to feel where and how Plato is cramped by it, and where he himself laboriously extends its grasp, must necessarily misunderstand his author, and that, for the most part, in the most remarkable passages.58

But Schleiermacher’s most interesting and relevant comments regarding the problem of language arise when he turns to the *Phaedrus*. And the dialogue that most clearly reveals one of the great ironies of Plato’s work: a Platonic dialogue is a written text, a mode of communication disparaged by Socrates himself, both in speech and in deed. It is also arguably the most important dialogue for Schleiermacher’s overall interpretation of Plato.

Toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates tells Phaedrus a story about the Egyptian god, Theuth, who founded many arts, including that of “written letters.”59 When describing the benefits of these various arts to the Egyptian king, Thamos, Theuth depicts writing as a drug that “will make the Egyptians wiser and provide them with better memory.”60 Thamos, however, demurs:

For this [writing] will provide forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it, through neglect of memory, seeing that, through trust in writing, they recollect from outside with alien markings, not reminding themselves from inside, by themselves. You have therefore found a drug not for memory, but for reminding. You are supplying the opinion of wisdom to the students, not truth. For you’ll see that, having become hearers of much without teaching, they will seem to be sensible judges in much, while being for the most part senseless, and hard to be with, since they’ve become wise in their own opinion instead of wise.61

Shortly thereafter, Socrates describes the simpleminded as anyone who thinks one can receive “something distinct and solid from writings.”62 He also makes a disparaging comparison between writing and a type of farming that is only appropriate “for the sake of play and festivity.”63 There is, Socrates insists, “of necessity much playfulness in the written speech about each thing and that no speech has ever been written, in meter or without meter, that is worthy of great seriousness.”64 He concludes that written speeches are “powerless . . . to teach true things competently.”65

The *Phaedrus* occupies a position of extreme importance in Schleiermacher’s
interpretation of Plato’s dialogues. According to his ordering of the dialogues, which is itself crucial for his interpretation as a whole, the *Phaedrus* is positioned first, and it contains “the germs of nearly the whole of [Plato’s] system.” When Schleiermacher explains the method by which Plato’s dialogues can be understood, he himself makes the following comments regarding the *Phaedrus*:

> Treating the subject in a somewhat trifling manner, [Plato] complains of the uncertainty which always attaches to written communication of thoughts, as to whether the mind also of the reader has spontaneously conformed to such communication, and in reality appropriated it to itself, or whether, with the mere ocular apprehension of the words and letters a vain conceit is excited in the mind that it understands what it does not understand. Hence, that it is folly to build too much upon this, and that true reliance can be placed only upon oral and living instruction.

This juxtaposition of disparaging statements regarding language and writing is not intended to argue that Plato, Schleiermacher, and Clausewitz are presenting identical arguments or concerns. For example, we make no effort here to distinguish between language, writing, and speaking. But to focus on such nuances with regard to Clausewitz is to miss the forest for the trees. Clausewitz does not develop a philosophy of language, nor did he intend to. But he nonetheless arrives at a conclusion similar to that of Plato and conveyed by Schleiermacher; that language, in whatever form, is a questionable instrument when it comes to learning.

In his analysis of the *Phaedrus*, Jacob Klein, a Platonic scholar who greatly admired Schleiermacher’s work, concludes that “a written text is necessarily incomplete and cannot teach properly.” In almost full agreement, Clausewitz writes, “A book cannot really teach us how to do anything.” What, then, are we to conclude concerning the works of Clausewitz and Schleiermacher’s Plato? Can we argue that neither one of them presents any sort of teaching? This accusation has been leveled at both *On War* and the dialogues. Both Sumida and Schleiermacher argue that this idea is wrong.

### Clausewitz’s Theory of Practice

The absence of armed conflict renders the need for an effective, palliative substitute for the development of proper and effective military leadership. But the conventional, pedagogical practices of Clausewitz’s time were inadequate because, in part, the nature of high command, and the moral factors that constitute military genius, cannot be conveyed by the written word. Clausewitz’s approach to officer education must therefore fulfill two requirements: first, the
approach must serve as an appropriate substitute for actual experience; second, that approach had to be free from the defects of the written word.

The core of Clausewitz’s new approach to pedagogy is critical analysis, or what Sumida calls *historical reenactment*. Critical analysis is the thorough and rigorous examination of a single historical event, the focus of which is the high-ranking commander who participated in the event. Engaging in critical analysis means to taste, swallow, and digest everything the commander knew, considered, and did, to say nothing of the when, where, why, and how. The pupil must try, Clausewitz writes, “to put himself exactly in the position of the commander; in other words, he must assemble everything the commander knew and all the motives that affected his decision, and ignore all that he could not or did not know, especially the outcome.”

Sumida describes this process as “an imagined replication of past decision-making of a commander-in-chief,” the purpose of which is to feel, or experience, the moral, emotional, and psychological elements of high command. The most important outcome of critical analysis is not an evaluation of, but rather an appreciation for, the dynamics and dilemmas of high command. Its purpose is to understand “why decisions were hard, rather than whether they had been right or wrong.” Sumida explains:

> In Clausewitzian reenactment, historical authenticity is less important than intellectual and emotional verisimilitude. This is because the aim of reenactment is not imitation of the behavior of the historical actor, but replication of conditions of decision-making that pose comparable, if not the actual, intellectual and moral challenges of the historical case.

In contrast to the conventional methods of Clausewitz’s time, critical analysis is not about examining particular cases in the past to formulate universal principles that could, in turn, be applied to particular cases in the future. Clausewitz considered such an approach flawed given the uniqueness of past and future events. Instead, critical analysis, by providing a substitute for actual war, is meant to develop the qualities that constitute military genius or, in this case, intuition. History, Clausewitz writes, provides no basis for “principles, rules, or methods,” though it is useful to study history nonetheless. “While history may yield no formula,” Clausewitz explains, “it does provide an *exercise for judgment* here as everywhere else.”

Clausewitz’s innovative use of history for critical analysis is complicated by the inability to document and authenticate the entire historical record; gaps will invariably exist. For Sumida, this complication is the foundation of, and impetus for, Clausewitz’s theory. “In short,” Clausewitz writes, “a working theory is an essential basis for criticism. Without such a theory it is generally impossible
for criticism to reach that point at which it becomes truly instructive.”81 To meet
the requirements of critical analysis, Sumida argues that Clausewitz “establishes
the validity of certain general propositions, which are then used to generate
additions to the historical record in order to provide what could be regarded as
a more complete representation of the dynamics of command decision.”82 These
much-debated propositions include the concepts of friction, absolute war, and
the relationship between war and politics. Critical analysis is thus a combina-
tion of history and theory that makes possible the appropriate application of
military theory to the study of history for the sake of experiencing the moral
dynamics of high command and developing an officer’s intuition.

For Sumida, equating Clausewitz’s famous propositions with the teaching
of On War is a misreading of the text, a position that represents a significant
departure from most scholarship on Clausewitz. The most egregious example of
this misreading is reducing On War to Clausewitz’s most famous statement that
“war is merely a continuation of policy by other means.”83 While Clausewitz
“recognizes the existence of principles of war,” Sumida explains, “he uses them
as points of reference rather than standards of measure.”84 Those propositions, in
other words, are critical components of the education process. They are not pos-
itive doctrines; they are hardly even descriptive statements. Clausewitz writes,

Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn
about war from books. . . . It is meant to educate the mind of
the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his
self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as
a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual
development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for
the rest of his life.85

Sumida’s insistence on the pedagogical purpose of Clausewitz’s famous
propositions more or less constitutes his argument that On War is to be un-
derstood as a theory of a practice as opposed to a theory of a phenomenon;
it is neither descriptive nor prescriptive in the conventional sense. “A theory
of practice,” Sumida writes, “is about the how of learning to do something
rather than the what of something’s general nature.”86 In contradistinction to
all previous studies, with the slight exception of Gallie, Sumida regards “On
War as a set of instructions on how to engage in serious learning of a highly personal
nature rather than an impersonal representation of the totality of that which is to
be learned.”87 And again, Sumida (and Gallie) argue that Clausewitz’s concept
of critical analysis anticipated the ideas of the aforementioned philosophers,
particularly Collingwood and his concept of reenactment.88 However, it is again
worth considering the possibility that Schleiermacher influenced Clausewitz’s
ideas regarding critical analysis.
The irony notwithstanding, Plato’s solution to the problem of writing is the Platonic dialogue, according to Schleiermacher. Having written the dialogues himself, and having demonstrated in those dialogues his awareness of writing’s defects, we can safely presume that the Platonic dialogue is composed in such a way so as to overcome those defects. The starting point for understanding how the composition of the Platonic dialogue accomplishes this task is to state the obvious; although a written text, the Platonic dialogue is not a treatise or essay. For Schleiermacher, the Platonic dialogue is a work of art. Accordingly, it is necessary “to know Plato more strictly as a Philosophical Artist, than, certainly, has been hitherto the case.”

Schleiermacher begins his “General Introduction” by lamenting the then shortcomings in Platonic studies. No other philosopher has as much right as Plato to complain about being misunderstood. Schleiermacher identifies two prevalent yet erroneous opinions about Plato and his writings: first, that one will search in vain for anything in Plato’s writings that resembles a consistent and comprehensive doctrine; second, that the dialogues primarily represent Plato’s exoteric teaching, in contrast to his esoteric teaching that must be sought elsewhere. But Schleiermacher is somewhat sympathetic to these shortcomings for, in addition to the usual difficulties inherent to the study of philosophy, there is an additional and peculiar one in the case of Plato: “his utter deviation from the ordinary forms of philosophical communication.” But it is precisely this peculiarity that provides the key to understanding Plato.

Understanding Plato requires that the reader of a Platonic dialogue not be a passive spectator. The reader ceases to be a passive spectator when they examine not only the content of a dialogue but the form in which the content is presented as well, for in the philosophy of Plato “form and content are inseparable, and no proposition is to be rightly understood, except in its own place, and with the combinations and limitations which Plato has assigned to it.” Everything depends not only on what is said but also how, when, where, by whom, to whom, and among whom, something is said, to say nothing of what is not said. It is the brilliance of the Platonic dialogue “that nothing is without its use, and that [Plato] leaves nothing for chance or blind caprice to determine, but with him everything is proportionate and co-operative according to his subjects’ range.” The reader must attach importance to every detail, however trivial it may appear. By associating the content of a conversation to the context in which it takes place, the reader is transformed from a passive spectator into an active interlocutor. They imitate the only proper method of teaching and learning—a conversation between teacher and pupil. “Lacking such participation,” Klein writes in a particularly apt passage, “all that is before us is indeed nothing but a book.”

In contrast to his remarks regarding the problem of language, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of the Platonic dialogue does not readily lend itself
to comparison with Clausewitz’s critical analysis. Instructive similarities exist, nonetheless. Schleiermacher’s approach to the study of Plato and Clausewitz’s approach to the study of history encourages the student to engage in an incredibly painstaking and attentive reading exercise, where the concern for reading widely and extensively is replaced with the concern for reading closely and carefully. For Clausewitz, the meticulous and proper scrutiny of a single battle is more valuable to an officer’s education than a cursory familiarity with 10.97 Likewise, contemplating the complete context of a single Socratic statement is more important to the education of a potential philosopher than memorizing an assortment of Socratic dictums, such as “virtue is knowledge” or “I know that I know nothing.”

The principal purpose of these pedagogical devices is to compel the pupil to engage in a solitary form of education designed to induce understanding from within him rather than introduce it from without. In Sumida’s words, *On War* does not, therefore, teach its reader how to acquire a skill as such, but rather how to explore realms of personal thought that included emotional elements in relation to the sorts of difficult problem-solving likely to arise in the course of decision-making in war. The intended product of this process is a sensibility . . . [that] can provide a measure of sound understanding and a platform for further learning. Clausewitz’s method of learning thus involved a process of inducing a form of self-knowledge, as opposed to the importation of technical knowledge.98

There is little doubt that Schleiermacher shares this sentiment with respect to the Platonic dialogue. In describing the “Platonic form,” he writes that every part of its composition flows from the “purpose of compelling the mind of the reader to the spontaneous production of ideas.”99 Plato’s “chief object” was to construct the dialogue in such a way that the reader is driven either to “an inward and self-originated creation of the thought in view, or submitting to surrender himself most decisively to the feeling of not having discovered or understood anything.” To this end, Plato drops hints that appear accidental and contrives contradictions that seem irreconcilable. The argument is never spelled out explicitly, leaving the reader to discover it on their own.100 And so, doubtful of the utility of books when it comes to teaching, and suspicious of timeless formulations, Sumida’s Clausewitz and Schleiermacher’s Plato designed distinct methods of instruction that share a common aim of self-education. If critical analysis is a palliative substitute for actual war, then the Platonic dialogue is a palliative substitute for a proper teacher.
Schleiermacher and the Art of Understanding

Before considering what, ultimately, to make of these similarities, we must briefly explore one more aspect of Schleiermacher’s work, for his interpretation of Plato does not exhaust the possible origins of his influence; indeed, it may only be a beginning point. While space prohibits a thorough exploration, Schleiermacher’s work in hermeneutics is directly related to his work on Plato, and it shares several interesting affinities with Clausewitz’s critical analysis. Although Schleiermacher never published anything in a final version that he approved, his work on hermeneutics, or what he calls “the art of understanding,” appears in a variety of notes and lectures as early as 1805 and as late as 1833 or while Clausewitz was writing On War. Whereas Schleiermacher primarily applied this art of understanding to religious texts, he insists that it is applicable when interpreting a variety of texts and situations, and thus applicable to a variety of disciplines. It must suffice to mention a few aspects of this art that are especially evocative of Clausewitz’s critical analysis.

The task of hermeneutics is to provide the means by which an utterance made in the past can be understood in the present; indeed, the interpreter’s task is “to understand the utterance at first well and then better than its author.” This understanding is achieved by reconstructing the author’s thought and intention, or what Richard Palmer describes as “the reexperiencing of the mental processes of the text’s author.” This reconstructive process has two components. The first is grammatical interpretation, which includes a complex set of canons that demands a profound understanding of linguistic nuances, etymologies, historical context, and the reciprocal relationship between sentences and paragraphs. But the more relevant component is psychological, which includes reconstructing the “individuality” of the author: their will, motivation, intention, tone, mood, development, and procedure. It requires “putting oneself in the place of the author.” It makes use of what Schleiermacher calls “the divinatory method,” where “one, so to speak, transforms oneself into the other person and tries to understand the individual element directly.” Hans-Georg Gadamer describes this process “as a placing of oneself within the mind of the author, an apprehension of the ‘inner origin’ of the composition of a work, a recreation of the creative act.” Schleiermacher’s work in hermeneutics had a lasting impact on the field. According to Palmer, his “contribution to hermeneutics marks a turning point in its history,” and he is “properly regarded as the father of modern hermeneutics as a general study.”

This cursory presentation of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is significant for two reasons. The first concerns the similarities between Schleiermacher’s psychological component of reconstructing a past author’s thought and Clausewitz’s critical analysis. To repeat, the purpose of critical analysis is not to reconstruct a historical event with a view to formulating laws of warfare; it is
to reenact the decision-making experience of high command in its moral and psychological dimensions. The unattainable ideal is “to place [oneself] exactly in the situation of the man in command.” The purpose is to appreciate why a commander made the decision they did, not to evaluate whether or not it was the right one. For his part, Sumida describes historical reenactment as “a form of personal psychological experiment.” Clausewitz’s theory, he writes, is “an integral part of the reconstructed reality being observed,” which helps to “recreate a past psychological reality.”

The second reason concerns the history of hermeneutics. Following the death of Schleiermacher in 1834, the next major figure in the field of hermeneutics was Schleiermacher’s own biographer, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911). Of particular interest, Gadamer argues that Schleiermacher’s “psychological interpretation became the main influence on the theorists of the nineteenth century, Savigny, Boeckh, Steinthal and, above all, Dilthey.” In agreement, Palmer writes that Dilthey’s “thinking on the hermeneutical problem started very much in the shadow of Schleiermacher’s psychologism” and that his work “renewed the project of a general hermeneutics and significantly advanced it.” Among the theorists whom Dilthey influenced is R. G. Collingwood, the thinker on whom Sumida most relies to elucidate Clausewitz’s understanding of critical analysis. In his final and perhaps most well-known work, *The Idea of History*, Collingwood describes Dilthey as “the lonely and neglected genius,” for whom “genuine historical knowledge is an inward experience (Erlebnis) of its own object.” He further argues that Dilthey’s “conception of the historian as living in his object, or rather making his object live in him, is a great advance on anything achieved by any of [his] German contemporaries.” Collingwood ultimately dismisses the psychological component of Dilthey’s approach to re-living the past, but the intellectual links and affinities between Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Collingwood seem sufficiently strong to render Sumida’s recourse to Collingwood all the more tenable. Indeed, they suggest that the entire discipline and history of hermeneutics might be an important, if not necessary, source in any attempt to determine the intent of Clausewitz’s *On War*.

**Conclusion**

It is tempting to make much out of the similarities discussed above. There surely seems to be a comparable pedagogical concern in Sumida’s Clausewitz and Schleiermacher’s Plato, which stems, in part, from a dissatisfaction with the capacity of the written word to teach properly. Accordingly, both attempt to provide a means by which a student—whether an inexperienced officer or a potential philosopher—can engage in a method of self-instruction that depreciates the memorization of superficial formulations. More generally, Clausewitz’s
conception of critical analysis as the historical reenactment of command decisions resembles Schleiermacher’s conception of hermeneutics as the psychological reconstruction of an author’s thought and intention. But these analogies are hardly perfect. The differences between historical reenactment and a Platonic dialogue are obvious enough. Schleiermacher’s Plato had more to teach than intuition. And Schleiermacher’s conviction that an interpreter can understand an author better than the author understood themselves conflicts with Clausewitz’s conviction that perfect reenactment is impossible, that “the critic will always lack much that was present in the mind of the commander.”

Above all, however, even if they were perfect, these analogies do not prove that Schleiermacher influenced Clausewitz, and such influence does not necessarily illuminate his thought. The significance of these similarities, then, should not be exaggerated.

But neither should it be dismissed. The imperfect analogies suggest that Clausewitz was influenced by Schleiermacher in the same way that he was influenced by other German philosophers of his time. He was familiar with a great variety of ideas associated with German philosophy at the turn of the century, ideas that he often adopted and adapted to suit his practical purposes. To paraphrase Gat, the question of whether Clausewitz’s critical analysis is exactly like Plato’s dialogues or Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics misses the point. “Clausewitz adapted scraps of ideas to his needs,” Gat aptly remarks in discussing the influence of Hegel. Similarly, Paret concludes that Clausewitz “freely used concepts learned from other writers, together with ideas that were the common property of his generation.” It would be foolish to presume that Schleiermacher’s work on Plato or hermeneutics provides a master key for unlocking the meaning or intent of *On War*. However, it is unnecessary to consider their affinities irrelevant or unhelpful on account of their discrepancies.

As to the value of identifying the origins of Clausewitz’s thought, we cannot deny that the primary task of interpreting Clausewitz is to determine what Clausewitz actually said and whether what he said is true. But this does not render the question of his sources meaningless, for their identification can be an aid to interpretation. Thus, the principal value of casting light on the possible influence of Schleiermacher is to strengthen Sumida’s interpretation of *On War*. Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Collingwood may very well help us to understand *On War* as a theory of practice rather than a theory of a phenomenon. The possibility of Schleiermacher’s influence permits us to consider, perhaps even accept, Sumida’s interpretation of *On War* as a theory of practice; this disputes the decisive significance of Kant and Hegel without omitting the longstanding belief that Clausewitz was greatly influenced by the notable German philosophers of his day. Such a possibility, in other words, permits us to combine Sumida’s pedagogical approach to *On War*—which, according to Sumida, challenges
the prevalent approach to military education today—with Paret’s and Gat’s sensible conclusions regarding the eclectic character of Clausewitz’s thought.

**Notes**

25. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, 167n34.
34. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, 151.
36. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, 167n34.
42. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 98.
52. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 101–11.
74. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 189.
75. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 19, 178, 189; and Clausewitz, *On War*, 149.
77. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz*, 178.
78. Clausewitz, On War, 516–17, emphasis in original.
79. Clausewitz, On War, 156; and Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 177.
80. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 45.
81. Clausewitz, On War, 146; and Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 146–47.
82. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 136.
83. Clausewitz, On War, 87.
84. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, xii, 19, 32; and Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, 195.
85. Clausewitz, On War, 141.
86. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 2, emphasis in original.
87. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 5, emphasis in original.
88. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 106–12; and Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, 46.
89. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 4; and Klein, A Commentary, 3.
90. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 4.
91. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 7–12.
92. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 5.
93. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 14. Dobson actually translates Inhalt as “subject” rather than “content.” This is the only change made in the translations.
94. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 8, 14; Klein, A Commentary, 18; and Strauss, The City and Man, 52.
95. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 57.
97. Clausewitz, On War, 173.
99. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 37.
100. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 17–18.
103. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism, 23.
105. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism, 90, 107–8, 110, 135, 139, 147.
107. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism, 92.
110. Clausewitz, On War, 164.
111. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz, 45, 100, 178.
117. Gat, The History of Military Thought, 236.
118. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 84.