. (For links to papers and articles by students in PME institutions, see our Research Links.) . For reprint or other copyright permissions, contact the copyright holders listed with the individual article. See also: Writings by Clausewitz
CHRISTOPHER BASSFORD [Professor, National War College, Washington, DC] Tiptoe Through the Trinity, or, The Strange Persistance of Trinitarian Warfare. Working draft, May 2007.
The Relationship Between Political Objectives and Military Objectives in War. Co-authored with Col B.A. Andrews, USAF, as a teaching guide for faculty at the National War College. PowerPoint slideshow, September 2005. Original Draft of MCDP 1-1: Strategy, the US Marine Corps' Strategy manual. (The published version is Here.) Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). FULL TEXT John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz. War in History, November 1994. Clausewitz and His Works. An extensive introduction to the man, his key writings, and his ideas. Derived from Chapter 2 of Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), this version was written as courseware for the Army War College, 1996, then somewhat modified in 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2008. "A response to Bruce Fleming, 'Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?'" The Clausewitz Homepage, 1 March 2004. A shorter version, along with responses from Tony Echevarria and Rutgers University's Professor Michael David Rohr, is here, as is Fleming's somewhat irritated attempt at rebuttal. Last word from The Clausewitz Homepage is here. A Modest Proposal, an only partly tongue-in-cheek, radical proposal to update Clausewitz for the 3rd Millenium (1999, mod.2006). Book Review of Clausewitz's On War. Defense Analysis, June 1996. Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction. Paper presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University, 26 February 1993; slightly edited in June 2000. A Word Index to On War. Find that quote you're looking for! A computer-generated index to c.1200 words and phrases in Clausewitz's magnum opus. ROBERT F. BAUMANN [Historian at the Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College] Historical Perspectives on Future War Military Review, March-April 1997 ALAN D. BEYERCHEN [Professor, Ohio State University] "Clausewitz,
Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," International
Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90. Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery. Paper delivered at National Defense University, November 1996. [See PDF] Note: See our "Clausewitz and Complexity" section. ROBIN BROWN [Senior Lecturer, Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds] [Contact Info] "Clausewitz in the Age of Al-Jazeera: Rethinking the Military-Media Relationship," Paper, Harvard Symposium "Restless Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism," 21 August 2002. KIRSTEN CALE [a journalist specializing in international relations] Cultural Wars (from LM: THE MARXIST REVIEW OF BOOKS, later simply LM, now defunct) issue 73, November 1994. Review essay on Keegan, A History of Warfare; Pick, War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age; Porter, War and the Rise of the State; van Creveld, On Future War. CHICAGOBOYZ The Chicagoboyz Clausewitz Roundtable is a free-for-all web discussion of Clausewitz. The discussants don't claim any particular expertise, and this is not the place to start learning about Clausewitz. However, if you are familiar with Clausewitz, and particular if you are interested in teaching other people about Clausewitz, this discussion can tell you a lot about the ways in which Clausewitz comes across to intelligent, energetic seekers-after-truth who have not seriously encountered him before.
TONY CORN [US Department of State] "Clausewitz in Wonderland" (in the Hoover Institution's Policy Review, "web special," September 2006) EXCERPT: "If a Colin Gray arguably the smartest living Clausewitzian today can be so blind as to the nature of the challenges facing the West, one can easily guess the damage done by Clausewitzology on less talented minds." Despite the poor logic revealed in the excerpt above, this is an interesting
piece. For some reason, Corn has chosen to pretend that Carl von Clausewitz
is behind the scientific, historical, and anthropological ignorance, the
political naiveté, and the smothering political correctness that
underlie the remarkably dysfunctional national strategic culture that
the United States displayed throughout the era of the G.W. Bush administration. This article may be a clever critique
of that strategic culture or merely a particularly poignant example of
it. PAUL CORNISH [At that time Director, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London] "Clausewitz and the ethics of armed forces," Journal of Military Ethics, Volume 2, Number 3/November 2003. ABSTRACT: The work of Carl von Clausewitz continues to provoke heated debate. For some scholars, Clausewitz's On War remains indispensable to serious thought on the resort to war in the modern period. Others, however, see Clausewitz's work as either outdated, or a morally repellent argument for unlimited, unrestrained and brutal warfare. This essay argues not only that Clausewitz's work continues to be relevant to discussions on the use of armed force, but also that On War provides a framework for ethical reflection on war and its conduct. Two main preoccupations of western military academies and staff colleges--Clausewitz on the one hand, and the just war tradition on the other--can complement, rather than rival each other. On War creates a space for reflection on the use of armed force, and for that reason if no other, should still be considered an important resource for contemporary students and practitioners of strategy. MARTIN DUNN [CHIEF RESEARCH OFFICER, DIRECTORATE OF ARMY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS] Levels of War: Just a Set of Labels? Australia: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: NEWSLETTER OF THE DIRECTORATE OF ARMY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, No.10, Oct 1996. ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II [LTC, US Army; Ph.D., Princeton; Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA] War and Politics: The
Revolution in Military Affairs Borrowing from the
Master: Uses of Clausewitz in Clausewitz: Toward a Theory of Applied Strategy Defense Analysis, Vol 11, No. 3, (1995) Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine - Again! Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002. Over the last 30 years, the center of gravity concept has grown increasingly central to the U.S. military's warfighting doctrine. This monograph cuts through the myriad interpretations surrounding the concept and returns to the original idea as conceived by Carl von Clausewitz. In doing so, the author reveals that Clausewitz intended the center of gravity to function much as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences does - as a focal point. He argues that the Clausewitzian center of gravity is not a strength, nor a weakness, nor even a source of strength, but rather the one element within a combatant's entire structure or system that has the necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together. This is why Clausewitz wrote that a blow directed against a center of gravity will have the greatest effect. The monograph concludes with recommendations for revising Joint and Service doctrine so that they will reflect a more accurate and coherent definition of a center of gravity. [If the primary URL is unavailable, click HERE for backup copy.] Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought. Naval War College Review, Winter 2003 BRUCE FLEMING [Professor of English at the US Naval Academy] Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes? Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 62-76. An effort to expose Clausewitz's essential foolishness.
GOH TECK SENG [LTC, Singapore Armed Forces], Clausewitz and His Impact on Strategy Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, Vol.25 No.1 (Jan - Mar 1999). NIKOLAS GARDNER [Professor at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL. "Resurrecting the 'Icon': The Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz’s On War," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2009, pp.119-133. A very capable response to Phillip Meilinger's "Busting the Icon: Restoring Balance to the Influence of Clausewitz," Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall, 2007), pp.116-145 (listed below). Many thanks, Nik: You have spared The Clausewitz Homepage the task of swatting this particular fly.:-) COLIN S. GRAY [Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England] "Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past--with GPS." In Michael Cox, Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne, eds., Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 1989-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999,161-182. Defining
and Achieving Decisive Victory. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, April 2002. "Clausewitz, History, and the Future Strategic World," prepared for the Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Conference Past Futures, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 3-4 July, 2003 and Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, USA, 9-10 September, 2003. Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper No 47. T.X. HAMMES [Colonel, USMC] War Isn't a Rational Business Naval Institute Proceedings (July 1998). The information revolution notwithstanding, war will continue to be a brutish, chaotic, and emotional battle of wills. Network-centric warfare will not change that. MICHAEL I. HANDEL [Professor, US Naval War College] Who Is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz? A Guide to the Perplexed Courseware, U.S. Naval War College, 1997 BRYAN HEHIR [Counselor, Catholic Relief Services, and Professor, Harvard Divinity School] The Uses of Force in the Post-Cold War World Excerpt: "[T]here were two people who taught the Western world to think about politics, strategy, and ethics. They were a strange combination—a 19th century Prussian general and a 5th century African saint. It was Clausewitz and Augustine that helped us to relate politics, strategy, and ethics." This is a presentation delivered on June 3, 1996, at a conference at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
ANDREAS HERBERG-ROTHE [Outside lecturer in political theory and intellectual history, Institute of Social Sciences, the Humboldt University, Berlin. See his Clausewitz.com Vita and his listing on World Security Network.] "Primacy of Politics or Culture in a Modern World? John Keegan's Critique Demands a Sophisticated Interpretation." Defense Analysis, Volume 2, August 2001. "Ein Preuße in den USA." Europäische Sicherheit, October 2003. See rough translation, "A Prussian in the United States." "Carl von Clausewitz today - the primacy of politics in war and conflict." World Security Network Newsletter, reporting from Berlin, February 21, 2009. "Clausewitzs Wondrous Trinity as General Theory of War and Violent Conflict." Paper. This essay is an extended and revised version of a lecture of the same name given at the Gewaltlast (Burdens of Violence) Congress at the University of Zurich in 2005, and at the University of Hildesheim in 2003. "Clausewitz’s 'Wondrous Trinity" as a Coordinate System of War and Violent Confict." International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Vol. 3 (2) 2009, pp. 204 – 219. TERENCE M. HOLMES [Swansea University, UK] "Planning versus
Chaos in Clausewitzs On War." Holmes takes on some writers who argue that Clausewitzian theory is somehow inimical to practical military planning. This excellent exploration of the subject of planning in On War may somewhat miss the point of Alan Beyerchen's brilliant nonlinear interpretation of Clausewitz, but that's a good subject for debate. RICHARD D. HOOKER, Jr. [Colonel, U.S. Army] "Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War." Parameters, Summer 2005, 4-17. Hooker takes on the issues of whether Clausewitzian theory is limited to state-on-state warfare and, if so, whether that is a problemwhich depends to a great extent on how we define "the state." BARON ANTOINE-HENRI DE JOMINI [French-Swiss writer on military affairs, 1779-1869] The Present Theory of War and Its
Utility Jomini is frequently portrayed as Clausewitz's most influential competitor as a military theorist. This essay is reproduced (with minor changes) from the 1854 American translation of Jomini's The Artof War, trans. Major O.F. Winship and Lieut. E.E. McLean (New York: Putnam, 1854). It is a somewhat clumsy translation and a bit difficult to read, which is of course why it has been entirely superseded by the better 1862 Mendell/Craighill translation. Unfortunately, the latter translation omits this revealing essay on the state of military theory as Jomini perceived it around 1838. A close reading of this essay will reveal both overt sneers at Clausewitz and many adaptations to the arguments made in On War. MARY KALDOR [Professor and head of the Institute of Global Studies at the London School of Economics] "PURPLE PATCH: Total Wars," The Daily Times ("A new voice for a new Pakistan"), 16 JAN 2000. ILANA KASS [Professor, National War College] An Instructor's Guide to Teaching Clausewitz The faculty teaching guidance provided to instructors at the National War College, located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington DC, in teaching Clausewitz during Course 5602, "Fundamentals of Military Thought," during academic year 2000-01. KINGS OF WAR [a blog of various faculty and research students of the Department of War Studies, King's College London] Includes:
JANEEN KLINGER [Professor, USMC Command and Staff College] "The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz." Parameters, Spring 2006, pp.79-89. Overall, this is a very high quality appreciation of Clausewitzian theory. There are a few problems in detail, of course. For instance, Klinger may have misunderstood the implications of Clausewitz's actions in 1812/13. And if "social science" was really "science" in the sense of modern science, her discussion on that point would be useful as well.:-) PHILLIP S. MEILINGER [Colonel, USAF, ret.]
STEVEN METZ [Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA] Review Essay: A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century WarfareParameters, Winter 1994-95 This review essay looks foward to the replacement of Clausewitz's theories by those of recent writers like Martin van Creveld, John Keegan, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, and Ralph Peters. DANIEL MORAN Strategic Theory and the
History of War. Paper, 2001. WILLIAMSON MURRAY [Military Historian] Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris THE NATIONAL INTEREST, JUNE 01,1997RALPH PETERS [LTC US Army, (ret.), journalist] The New Strategic Trinity, Parameters, Winter 1998 Like Steve Metz's article (above), this piece seems to argue for Clausewitz's obsolescence. Instead, as some behind the scenes discussion reveals, Peters' comments on Clausewitz reflect the writer's need for a provocative "hook" assailing Clausewitz and his conviction that this is a harmless fiction, since no one understands Clausewitz properly anyway. WILLIS G. REGIER [Director, University of Illinois Press] The Essence of War: Clausewitz as Educator, review article, The Chronicle of Higher Education, August 3, 2009. "Clausewitz was a general, yes, but he spent most of his career as an educator. He was tutor to a prince, a teacher of cadets, director of a military academy, and a gifted military historian. He wanted to write a war book of a much higher order than existing maxims and manuals, a book that would combine experience, historical examples (the more recent the better), and exact analysis in a clear and emphatic fashion. A careful scholar, Clausewitz revised drafts of his books again and again, On War among them.... "Disputes about Clausewitz—Is he vicious? Contradictory? Obsolete?—heat up the scholarship about him. His attackers (like the military historians Martin van Creveld, B.H. Liddell Hart, and John Keegan) have been met with fierce defense and counterattack by younger scholars (Christopher Bassford, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Hew Strachan), who seem to be winning." CLIFFORD ROGERS (Professor, USMA) & JON SUMIDA (Professor, U. Maryland) Here's an argumentative but civilized exchange between two scholars on the meaning of some important ideas in Clausewitz's On War. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, The Relationship of History and Theory in On War: The Clausewitzian Ideal and its Implications, Journal of Military History, April 2001 Cliff Rogers, "Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules," The Journal of Military History, October 2002 Jon Sumida replies to Cliff Rogers The Journal of Military History, October 2002
SONSHI ["Sun Tzu Art of War Website for the Modern Leader and Strategist"] Here's a very interesting discussion thread on Clausewitz, initiated by the best Sun Tzu site on the web. JON SUMIDA (Professor, U. Maryland. See also his controversy with Cliff Rogers, above.) On Defense as the Stronger Form of War (draft, 15 March 2005). Paper delivered at the University of Oxford, March 2005. This key Clausewitzian concept has never been extensively described or discussed in English. In fact, in the most widely available English-language abridgement of On War, Book 6, "Defense"—by far the largest book in the entire work—has been entirely edited out. That editorial act reflects at least in part the assumption that Clausewitz, allegedly the "High Priest of Napoleon," etc., must have been kidding when he argued that the defender, all other things being equal, holds a decisive advantage. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE FMFM 1: Warfighting (1989) (HTML) [c.118Kb] Click on the button to view on-line versions of the following new publications, all of which draw heavily on Clausewitz.
See also Christopher Bassford, "Doctrinal Complexity: Nonlinearity in Marine Corps Doctrine." BARRY D. WATTS [Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments] Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (National Defense University: McNair Paper Number 52, October 1996; revised as McNair Paper Number 68, 2004) SPENSER WILKINSON [British Military Historian and Journalist, 1853-1937. Wilkinson was arguably Britain's most influential military correspondent and commentator from the 1890s to well into the interwar period.] Strategy in the Navy The Morning Post, 3 August 1909. This essay is essentially an attack on the influential British naval theorist Julian Stafford Corbett's interpretation of Clausewitz and on Corbett's influence on the Royal Navy. It serves as one demonstration that the pre-World War I debate concerning the implications of Clausewitzian theory was a good deal more energetic than most standard treatments of the issue would indicate. Wilkinson's debate with Corbett is discussed in a larger treatment of Clausewitz's role in pre-WWI British naval theory, pp.94-103 of Bassford, Clausewitz in English. Killing No Murder: An Examination
of Some New Theories of War Army Quarterly 14 (October
1927). This is a critical response to Basil Liddell Hart's book, The
Remaking of Modern Armies (London: J. Murray, 1927). BIBLIOGRAPHIES Extensive bibliographical information on books and articles, etc., on Clausewitz in English, German, French, Japanese, and other languages. Includes many links to items on-line.
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