CLAUSEWITZ
and
HIS WORKS
by Christopher Bassford

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A very different version of this 1992 paper was published as Chapter 2 of Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). This version was written as courseware for the Army War College, 1996, then somewhat modified in 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2008. ©Christopher Bassford.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Short Biography

On War

Clausewitz on History and Military History

Three Competing Theorists

Clausewitz and the Nature of War

Conclusions

Notes 

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This is not the first time Clausewitz has been in fashion. Indeed, On War has been the bible of many thoughtful soldiers ever since Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke attributed to its guidance his stunning victories in the wars of German unification (1864, 1866, 1870-71). Nor is it the first time that individual American soldiers and military thinkers have been attracted by his ideas: George Patton, Albert Wedemeyer, and—especially—Dwight Eisenhower were intensely interested in what he had to say.

It is, however, the first time that the American armed forces as institutions have turned to Clausewitz. While the philosopher had insisted that war was "simply the expression of politics by other means," the traditional attitude of American soldiers had been that "politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics end. All that soldiers ask is that once the policy is settled, strategy and command shall be regarded as being in a sphere apart from politics."*2 The sudden acceptability of Clausewitz in the wake of Vietnam is not difficult to account for, for among the major military theorists only Clausewitz seriously struggled with the sort of dilemma that American military leaders faced in the aftermath of their defeat. Clearly, in what had come to be called in scathing terms a "political war," the political and military components of the American war effort had come unstuck. It ran against the grain of America's military men to criticize elected civilian leaders, but it was just as difficult to take the blame upon themselves. Clausewitz's analysis could not have been more relevant:

The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war,... the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.*3

When people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right—that is, successful—any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong.*4

Many of America's soldiers found unacceptable any suggestion that they had failed on the battlefield, but they were willing to admit that policy had been badly made and that they had misunderstood their role in making it. By clarifying the interplay among the armed forces, government, and people, and by clearly describing the two sides of the civil-military relationship, Clausewitz offered a way out of this dilemma and into the future. This is why Clausewitz's ideas underlie the most influential statements of the military "lessons learned" from the Vietnam debacle: Colonel Harry Summers's seminal On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War and the "Weinberger doctrine," first expressed by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984.

With the West victorious in the Cold War and the superb showing of the American military in the 1990-91 Gulf War, some of the steam went out of the American military reform movement. There was a natural tendency for soldiers not only to suggest that these victories showed that the problems had been fixed, but to imply that there really hadn't been much of a problem in the first place. Correspondingly, the study of Clausewitz started to wane somewhat, and all the usual arguments for his obsolescence resurfaced. The failure of much of the new, "non-Clausewitzian" military thinking in the wake of American offensives after the atrocity of 11 September 2001 led, however, to the customary re-revisions. Clausewitz is very much back in style—with new attention to his thoughts on "people's war," etc.

Such recent developments help to justify the study of Clausewitz to the contemporary American military professional, but there are far deeper reasons. Clausewitz was much more than a strategist: he was a historian and a historical philosopher, a political theorist, and a practical soldier of wide experience. His thought runs like a subterranean river through all modern military thought. We find it in the Marxist-Leninists and in Mao Zedong, in Colin Powell, among political scientists like Samuel Huntington and Robert Osgood, in the writings of military historians like Hans Delbrück and Julian Corbett, as well as in the doctrines of AirLand Battle and Warfighting. As the German general Jacob Meckel said well before World War One, "everyone who nowadays either makes or teaches war in a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not conscious of it."*5 This is even truer now than it was then.

National security professionals are obliged to become familiar with the concepts of this most influential of military thinkers. Given the admitted difficulties of digesting Clausewitz's massive and sometimes overpowering tome, however, most of us are forced to look for some more cost-effective method of accessing his insights. The bibliographies of books on military history and theory are full of works that seek to explain or condense Clausewitz's theories. Some are more successful than others. A few are brilliant. Nonetheless, a word of warning is necessary here: No second-hand description of Clausewitz's ideas is really acceptable as a substitute for his own work, for none can capture the richness and complexity of his great theoretical work, On War. Its form and method are at least as important as its content. Even honest attempts to condense or capsulize it (including the one you have before you) are distorted by the impact of transient contemporary events, concerns, and concepts, and by the idiosyncracies and personal interpretations of their writers.*6 And a great many treatments of Clausewitz have not been honest, being written by competitors, propagandists, or arm-chair strategists with no practical understanding of war.

The present article provides a short survey of the man and his works, with an emphasis on those that have been translated into English. The discussion is molded by an acute awareness of the widespread confusion regarding both the man and his concepts. Hopefully, it will aid the reader in understanding and evaluating the many references made to Clausewitz in military literature. (Quotations from On War given in this section are in most cases taken from the 1976 Howard/Paret translation, since that is the version most accessible to most readers.)

A Short Biography

Clausewitz's personality has been treated in a great many different ways. To the British military historian Michael Howard he was a "soldier's soldier" who wrote a practical military philosophy aimed at practical military men. Peter Paret, a German emigré to America who has emerged as one of the most prominent of contemporary Clausewitz scholars, presents him as a brilliant but somewhat dry intellectual. Clausewitz's detractors have portrayed him as a bloodthirsty military dilettante, while generations of bored soldier-students in Germany as well as Britain and America have treated him as a stuffy old pedant, author of a dry and tiresome tome best left to college professors.

In fact, Clausewitz was a complicated man both of action and of thought, and he left a complicated legacy by no means easy to describe. Sensitive, shy, and bookish by nature, he could also be passionate in his politics, his love for his wife Marie, and his longing for military glory. Frequently in combat, he regularly displayed coolness and physical courage. He was untouched by scandal in his personal life. His intellectual integrity was remarkable: he was ruthless in his examination of any idea, including his own. His keen analytical intelligence was accompanied, perhaps unavoidably, by a certain intellectual arrogance. The latter quality is amply demonstrated by the many sarcastic comments that appear in On War. Such characteristics may account for the fact that, while he rose to high rank in the Prussian service, he served almost always in staff positions rather than in command, for which he was considered to be temperamentally (and politically) unsuited. His assignments, however, frequently put him near the center of military-political events.

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz was born on 1 June 1780, near Magdeburg. Although the name has been alleged by some writers (mostly British) to have had Polish origins, the family was German and patriotically Prussian. Despite their pretensions to nobility, however, the Clausewitzs were in fact of middle­class origins. The elder Clausewitz had obtained a commission in the army of Frederick the Great, but was forcibly retired during Frederick's purge of non­noble officers after the Seven Years War (1756­63). On the basis of his sons' achievements, the family's nobility was finally confirmed by King Friedrich Wilhelm III in 1827. The ambiguity of Clausewitz's social position does not, however, appear to have blocked his advancement.

Clausewitz entered the Prussian army as a cadet at the age of twelve; he first saw combat at thirteen. After Prussia withdrew from the wars of the French Revolution in 1795, he spent five years in rather dreary garrison duties. There, he applied himself to his own education. Beyond strictly military subjects, Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging set of interests in art, science, and education. All of these interests were to have an impact on his later philosophical work. So successful were his efforts that in 1801 he was able to gain admission to the Institute for Young Officers in Berlin (which would eventually evolve into the famous Kriegsakademie). He quickly came to the attention of the new director, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a key figure in the Prussian state during the upheavals of the Napoleonic wars and Chief of the General Staff in 1806.*7 Impressed by Clausewitz's ability, Scharnhorst was to become his sponsor, mentor, and close friend.*8 Clausewitz graduated first in his class in 1803 and was rewarded with the position of military adjutant to the young Prince August, bringing him into close contact with the royal family.

Many of Clausewitz's basic historical, political, and military views derived from the influence of Scharnhorst and other Prussian military reformers. In broad terms, their argument was that the French Revolution had achieved its astounding successes because it had tapped the energies of the French people. If the Prussian state was to survive, much less prosper, it had to do the same. This would require sweeping social and political reforms in the Prussian state and army, both of which had dry-rotted under the successors of Frederick the Great. Clausewitz's works therefore reflect a strong impulse towards social and military reform. However, neither he nor his mentors desired a social or political revolution, only such changes as were necessary to preserve Prussia's independence and power. This political position made him suspect to both conservatives and revolutionaries. His "insistence on what would one day be called `the primacy of foreign policy' set him at odds with those liberals and radicals who believed constitutional government was a political goal surpassing all others. It also made his point of view anathema to those [of the traditional ruling classes] who considered the preservation of the social hierarchy an objective rivaling the safety of the state."*9 Many subsequent writers have tried to cast Clausewitz as a political hero or villain in order to serve their own political agendas, but trying to place Clausewitz and his theories somewhere on an anachronistic left-right political spectrum is a futile exercise. His politics can only be understood with reference to the specific situation of Prussia in the Napoleonic period and in the post-Napoleonic era of conservative reaction.*10

Alarmed at the devastating French victories over Austria and Russia in 1805, Prussia mobilized for war in 1806. Confident in the legacy of Frederick the Great, Clausewitz and most other Prussian officers looked forward to a struggle with France. The timing and the implementation of Prussian mobilization were poor, however, and the nation was ill­prepared psychologically. The Prussian forces were shattered in humiliating defeats in battles at Jena and Auerstadt. After some hard fighting, Clausewitz and Prince August were captured. In the peace settlement, Prussia lost half of its population and territory and became a French satellite. (See maps.)

Defeat was both a shock and an eye­opener for Clausewitz. He recorded his impressions, both of the war and of the dismal socio-political condition of Prussia, in several short articles. Later (in the 1820s), he composed a detailed critique of 1806 Prussia—so incisive that it could not be published in Germany until the 1880s—called "Observations on Prussia in its Great Catastrophe."*11

When he returned from internment in 1808, he joined energetically with Scharnhorst and other members of the reform movement, helping to restructure both Prussian society and the army in preparation for what he felt to be an inevitable new struggle with the French. His enthusiasm was not, however, shared by the King, who was more concerned with maintaining his position in the much­reduced Prussian state than with any nationalistic crusade. Clausewitz's disillusionment reached a peak when Prussia, allied with France, agreed to provide an army corps to Napoleon to assist in the 1812 invasion of Russia. Along with many other officers, he resigned from the Prussian service.*12 He then accepted a commission in the Russian army.

Before he left for Russia, however, he prepared an essay on war to leave with the sixteen year-old Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, r.1840-1858), whose military tutor he had become in 1810. This essay was called "The most important principles of the art of war to complete my course of instruction for his Royal Highness the Crown Prince" (usually referred to as the "Principles of War").*13 This essay represented Clausewitz's theoretical development up to that point, but was only a rather primitive precursor to his later magnum opus, On War. Its subject matter was largely tactical. While some of the more important theoretical concepts of On War were fairly well-developed ("friction," for example), many were embryonic and others entirely absent. In particular, and in great contrast to the later work, "Principles of War" is not notably sophisticated in historical terms. It is based almost entirely on the experience of Frederick the Great and the early wars with revolutionary France and Napoleon. Unfortunately, it has often been treated as a summary of Clausewitz's mature theory.

In the Russian service, Clausewitz was somewhat hobbled by his ignorance of the Russian language. He nonetheless participated in the drawn-out Russian retreat, fought in the slaughterhouse battle at Borodino, and witnessed the disastrous French retreat from Moscow, including the catastrophic crossing of the Beresina river. Slipping through the French lines, he played a key role in negotiating the "Convention of Tauroggen," which infuriated the King, brought about the defection of General H.D.L. Yorck von Wartenburg's Prussian corps from the French army, and eventually forced Prussia into the anti-French coalition.

None of this won him any affection at court in Berlin, where he was referred to on at least one occasion as "Louse­witz."*14 Still, Prussia's change of sides led, after some delay, to his reinstatement as a colonel in the Prussian army. Clausewitz participated in many key events of the War of Liberation (1813-1814), but bad luck and the lingering resentment of the King prevented him from obtaining any significant command. He served instead as an aide to General August von Gneisenau, Field Marshal G.L. von Blücher's chief of staff 1813-1815 and one of the principal leaders of Prussia's military rebirth. He sometimes found himself in the thick of combat, as at Lützen (Grossgörschen) in 1813, where he led several cavalry charges and was wounded. (Scharnhorst died of wounds received in the same battle.)

During the campaign of 1815, Clausewitz served as chief of staff to Prussia's 3rd Corps commander, General J.A. von Thielmann. The corps fought at Ligny, successfully extricating itself from the Prussian defeat there. Then, outnumbered two to one, it played a crucial if often uncelebrated rear-guard action at Wavre. This action prevented Marshal Grouchy's detached forces from rejoining Napoleon at Waterloo.*15

In 1818, Clausewitz was promoted to general and became administrative head of the General War College in Berlin. Perhaps because of the conservative reaction in Prussia after 1819, during which many of the liberal reforms of the war years were weakened or rescinded, this position offered him little opportunity to try out his educational theories or to influence national policy. He had nothing to do with actual instruction at the school. Clausewitz therefore spent his abundant leisure time quietly, writing studies of various campaigns and preparing the theoretical work which eventually became On War.

Clausewitz returned to active duty with the army in 1830, when he was appointed commander of a group of artillery brigades stationed in eastern Prussia. When revolutions in Paris and Poland seemed to presage a new general European war, he was appointed chief of staff to Field Marshal Gneisenau and the Army of Observation sent to the Polish border.

Before leaving, he sealed his unfinished manuscripts. He never opened them again. Just what the book might have looked like, had he completed it to his own satisfaction, is an entertaining but usually fruitless subject of speculation for military scholars. In any case, it was evidently Clausewitz's intention never to publish it in his own lifetime. In part, this reluctance to publish was due to his innate shyness. His conscious and convincing reasoning, however, was that it freed him of concerns that his own ego or career concerns would affect his style and conclusions.

Although war was averted, Clausewitz remained in the east, organizing a sanitary cordon to stop the spread of a cholera epidemic from Poland. His friend Gneisenau died of that disease. Clausewitz took temporary command of the army, but was soon replaced by a politically more acceptable choice. Clausewitz himself returned home to Breslau, depressed though seemingly healthy, but shortly fell ill with cholera himself and died on 16 November 1831. He was fifty­one years old.

On War

Clausewitz's wife Marie edited his unfinished manuscripts and published them as his collected works. The first three volumes, On War, appeared in 1832.*16 In subsequent editions, its ideas sometimes fell prey to the revisionist impulses of its various editors. The most scholarly reconstruction of the original work was undertaken by the German scholar Werner Hahlweg during the 1950s and 1960s. His editions provided the basis for the fourth and most scholarly English translation, that prepared by Michael Howard and Peter Paret and published in 1976.

The works most important in Clausewitz's reception in the English-speaking world are On War itself,  its distant precursor Principles of War, and two campaign studies: The Campaign of 1812 in Russia and The Campaign of 1815 in France. (The latter work has never been published in English, but an abridged translation was prepared for the Duke of Wellington, who responded with a famous and influential memorandum. That controversy will soon be published in a book edited by myself, Daniel Moran, and Gregory Pedlow.) The two campaign studies represent intermediate steps in the evolution of Clausewitz's ideas; they contain or reflect important elements of his mature theories but are basically straightforward studies of Napoleonic campaigns in which Clausewitz had himself participated. (Link to bibliographies of Clausewitz's writings in German and in English.)

On War is a hefty work. It is difficult reading, not because Clausewitz was a poor or disorganized writer but because the subject is a difficult one and his drafts unfinished. It has often been printed in three separate volumes, and the newest single-volume English-language edition runs about 580 pages (not counting the accompanying commentaries). It is internally divided into eight books:

I. On the Nature of War.
II. On the Theory of War.
III. On Strategy in General.
IV. The Engagement.
V. Military Forces.
VI. Defense.
VII. The Attack.
VIII. War Plans.

To be understood, On War really has to be approached as a whole. Books One, Two, and Eight are generally considered the most important and the most nearly "finished," while older parts sometimes fail to connect with Clausewitz's most mature ideas. Some sections are often left out of abridged versions, especially Books Five, Six, and Seven, allegedly because they are tactical in nature and thus obsolete. This sometimes leads to serious misunderstandings of Clausewitz's arguments, for it is precisely in these books that he works out the practical implications of his ideas. For those who prefer to paint Clausewitz as the "apostle of the offensive," it is especially convenient to leave out Book Six, "Defense," by far the largest.

One of the main sources of confusion about Clausewitz's approach lies in his dialectical method of presentation. For example, Clausewitz's famous line that "War is merely a continuation of politics," while accurate as far as it goes, was not intended as a statement of fact. It is the antithesis in a dialectical argument whose thesis is the point—made earlier in the analysis—that "war is nothing but a duel [or wrestling match, a better translation of the German Zweikampf] on a larger scale." His synthesis, which resolves the deficiencies of these two bald statements, says that war is neither "nothing but" an act of brute force nor "merely" a rational act of politics or policy. This synthesis lies in his "fascinating trinity" [wunderliche dreifaltigkeit]: a dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation.

Identifying precisely who was to benefit from reading On War is perplexing. Clausewitz's practical purpose in writing it was to provide "military analysts" with a clear conceptual scheme for understanding war, in hopes of improving both its actual conduct and the literature discussing it. He hoped that such an understanding would improve the judgement of military commanders, but he also believed that "military genius" was more a matter of character, personality, and temperament than of intellect. Perhaps because of his awareness of his own character, he felt that intellectuals generally made poor commanders. Only a self-conscious intellectual, however, was likely to wrestle with a book like On War.

On War certainly was not intended to provide a practical "cookbook" for commanders in the field. That approach, common in military doctrinal writing, was alien to Clausewitz's concept of military theory. "Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time." Since theory could not be a guide to action, it must be a guide to study. It is meant to assist the student in his efforts at self-education and to help him develop his own judgement, "just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life." Clausewitz's studies of educational theory had convinced him of the limits of intellectualizing: Knowledge, he knew, was not ability, and abstract education must always be accompanied by practical experience. "[T]hese truths certainly need to be authenticated by experience. No theory, no general, should have anything to do with psychological and philosophical sophistries."*20 Indeed, one distinguishing characteristic of Clausewitz's approach to philosophy is his acceptance of practical realities. Actual experience always took precedence over the kind of abstract "truth" that can be transmitted by mere writing. Theory must never conflict with reality, and thus must be essentially descriptive of war, never prescriptive of action. There is of course a place for prescriptive doctrine, but that is only useful within a particular political/military context.

Clausewitz on History and Military History

To understand On War, to distinguish it from Clausewitz's earlier works, and to differentiate his ideas from those of other theorists, one must understand Clausewitz's evolving attitude towards history. Alone, his historical studies of Napoleonic campaigns would probably not have altered his approach to theory. As time went on, however, he also made detailed studies of earlier and quite different wars. These included seventeenth century campaigns like those of Gustavus Adolphus and Turenne, the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), and eastern European wars with the Turks. Thus On War reflects a much wider range of historical experience and a much more sophisticated approach to history as a discipline than did the earlier "Principles of War." Much of the misappreciation of his basic theories derives from the fact that he generally worked out their practical implications in a contemporary European context, but the underlying theory has universal implications.

Clausewitz saw history in relative terms, rejecting absolute categories, standards, and values. The past has to be accepted on its own terms. The historian must attempt to enter into the mindsets and attitudes of any given period, the "spirit of the age." History is a dynamic process of change, driven by forces beyond the control and often beyond the comprehension of any individual or group. This attitude is particularly obvious in two key themes of On War that are missing in the Principles. These are the famous notion that "War is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means" (i.e., organized violence) and the recognition that war can vary in its forms depending on the changing nature of policy and of the society within which it is waged.

Both insights derived from Clausewitz's relentless criticism of his own evolving ideas. Clausewitz's earlier ideas were based on the experience of the French Revolution and the wars against Napoleon, and they emphasized the quest for "decisiveness" in warfare. This approach could not, however, explain the relatively indecisive and limited warfare of earlier periods, unless earlier generations of soldiers were to be dismissed as fools—a solution Clausewitz ultimately rejected. He therefore determined that war could legitimately take on either the quasi-absolute form in which it had been waged by the revolutionary armies and Napoleon, or assume a much more limited character, depending on its causes. Writing in the context of the politics of eighteenth-century Western Europe, he said that

most former wars were waged largely in [a] state of equilibrium, or at least expressed tensions that were so limited, so infrequent, and feeble, that the fighting that did occur during these periods was seldom followed by important results. Instead a battle might be fought to celebrate the birthday of a monarch (Hochkirch), to satisfy military honor (Kunersdorf), or to assuage a commander's vanity (Freiberg). In our opinion it is essential that a commander should recognize these circumstances and act in concert with their spirit.*21

Clausewitz saw the possibility that post-Napoleonic European wars would revert—or evolve—into forms more closely resembling those of the pre-revolutionary era. He called these weaker forms wars of limited objective and characterized them in various ways: "wars in which no decision is sought"; wars of limited aims; wars to seize a slice of enemy territory (either for its own sake or as a bargaining chip for use in attaining some other end).*22 Although the concept of limited war is clearly present and clearly important, it is by no means fully developed. That may be an advantage, of course. Leaving the concept open-ended makes it easy to adapt to changing circumstances.

On the other hand, Clausewitz also suspected that the Napoleonic wars would provide a model for future conflicts. Much of On War is therefore concerned with hard-fought struggles aimed at achieving a real political decision, and thus with military strategies aimed at actually disarming the enemy through the destruction (physical and/or moral) of his armed forces. This was not "limited" war, but neither was it "absolute" war in the theoretical sense described in his most evolved writing.

Clausewitz's rewriting of his draft manuscript for On War was largely a matter of reworking it to incorporate these insights. This process was never completed, cut short by his untimely death. It is therefore, in essence, two very different books superimposed. In some sections the earlier contempt for the limited form still shines through,*23 but the theoretical justification for waging such wars, while not fully explored, is undeniably present. The historian and political analyst in Clausewitz had triumphed over the purely empirical soldier.*24

Much of On War is devoted to discussions of the place of war in history, the practical uses of military history to the soldier, and the difficulties involved both in reading and in writing it. Clausewitz's most important technical contribution to the field of military history was his discussion of "critical analysis."*25 Clausewitz distinguished carefully between the functions of the historian and those of the military critic, even though he recognized that the two roles often went together. He maintained that historical research has nothing to do with either theory or criticism. It is the discovery, interpretation, and arrangement of "equivocal" facts (that is, facts that can then be interpreted in varying ways). Critical analysis is the tracing of effects back to their causes. "Criticism" proper is the investigation and evaluation of actions taken (or "means employed"), the consideration of alternative courses of action, the realm of praise and censure. In such evaluation, actions must be analyzed not only on their own level (i.e., tactical, operational,*26 strategic, political) but also as they interact at other levels. Theory provides the framework for analysis and judgement.

In using historical sources in this way, Clausewitz insisted that they not be abused. The sources available to the historian are, after all, inherently fragmentary. Often the most critical factors in any particular event are lost to us. There were four ways in which historical examples could be used in conjunction with theory:

1. To explain an idea, i.e., to give dimension to an abstract concept.

2. To show the application of an idea.

3. To demonstrate the mere possibility of some phenomenon.

4. To deduce a doctrine (this being by far the most difficult).

He was highly skeptical of any attempt to deduce any reliable doctrine from historical case studies and doubted that it could often be achieved. He therefore demanded the most exacting rules of evidence. Very little of the existing literature met these requirements, especially in the case of ancient history, where so much of the detail and context had been lost.

Given the difficulty of producing a truly useful historical study, and the ease with which shallower efforts could mislead students, Clausewitz advocated that military educators rely on the in-depth examination of one campaign (the more recent the better) rather than on broader but less exacting histories. While it may contribute to a staff officer's technical virtuousity, however, this insistence on depth rather than breadth may constitute a weakness in Clausewitz's educational argument. The  kind of depth he advocated is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in practice, so any curriculum based on his argument is likely to fall well short of his goals. In any case, now matter how deep a single study may go, unless it deals with the problem of contextual change, it must inevitably leave the student less sensitive to the changeability of the "spirit of the age." Such a narrowly doctrinal approach tended to characterize the historical researches of the German General Staff, and German strategy typically suffered severely from such insensitivities. Hans Delbruck, on the other hand, emphasized the wider implications of Clausewitz's theories and avoided the narrow approach. His great work is the multivolume History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History.*27 Delbruck is considered the founder of modern, professional, "scientific" military history, but his work was never popular with the German General Staff. While Clausewitz's original narrow argument may make sense for a small state like Prussia, whose likely enemies are well known and well understood, it is not applicable to a power like the United States, whose potential opponents offer infinite variety. 

Three Competing Theorists

Before discussing further the actual content of Clausewitz's theories, it is useful to take note of three other important writers with whom his ideas are often contrasted. All of these writers differ from Clausewitz in noteworthy aspects, though none is truly his antithesis.

The ancient Chinese sage Sun Tzu lived, if he existed at all, sometime during the "Warring States" period of Chinese history (453-221 B.C.).*28 His book is generally considered the most important of the Chinese military classics and has had a significant if unmeasurable impact on the modern Japanese as well as on the military theories of Mao Zedong, subsequent writers on revolutionary warfare, and the United States Marine Corps.

If there is in fact any fundamental difference between the two writers (beyond Sun Tzu's extreme brevity, which most readers applaud), it can probably be traced to their differing approaches to the balance of power mechanism. Sun Tzu accepted the traditional Chinese ideal of uniting "all under heaven," despite the fact that the China of his era was split into warring states in many respects as unique as those of modern Europe. The Warring States period ended, in fact, in the unification of China. Clausewitz thought the idea of unifying Europe's diverse peoples to be an absurdity, as one might expect in an opponent of Napoleon. Thus Sun Tzu's warfare tends, despite all his cleverness, to be of the total, "winner take all" variety, while Clausewitz recognizes the legitimacy of more limited objectives.

Antoine-Henri Jomini, later Baron de Jomini, was a French-speaking Swiss (1779-1869).*31 Originally headed for a career in banking, young Jomini got carried away by the excitement of the French Revolution and joined the French army in 1798. He returned to business in Switzerland after the Peace of Amiens (1802) and began writing on military subjects. His Traité de grande tactique was first published in 1803. He continually revised, enlarged, and reissued it into the 1850s.*32

During his actual military career, "Jomini ... [had been] a very minor figure, seldom mentioned in orders or dispatches, practically ignored in the memoirs of the officers who had served with him."*34 Nonetheless, he became by far the best known military commentator of his day, and maintained that position through zealous self-promotion. His most famous work, Summary of the Art of War, was written, like Clausewitz's Principles of War, for a royal prince to whom he was military tutor. Although long since retired, he advised Czar Nicholas during the Crimean War (1853-56) and Napoleon III during his Italian campaign (1859). Even during Jomini's lifetime, there were many prominent military men who viewed him with great skepticism. The Duke of Wellington considered him a pompous charlatan.*35 Napoleon himself is alleged to have said to his marshals, "You all think you understand war because you have read Jomini's book! Is it likely that I should have permitted its publication if it could accomplish that?"*36

In his maturity, Jomini grew wary of the revolutionary passions that had originally inspired him to take up the sword himself. Perhaps his dependence on the czar, one of the most conservative rulers in Europe, had some influence on his attitude. In any case, it is one of the ironies of history that Clausewitz, an officer of the conservative king of Prussia, should be the one to base his theories on the most radical legacies of the revolutionary period, while Napoleon's own staff officer and interpreter, Jomini, should aim his theories at the professional officer corps of essentially eighteenth century­style armies.

Jomini's military writings are easy to unfairly caricature: they were characterized by a highly didactic and prescriptive approach, conveyed in an extensive self-defined, geometric vocabulary of strategic lines, bases, and key points.*37 His fundamental prescription was simple: place superior power at the decisive point. In the theoretical work for which he was most famous, chapter XXXV of the Traité de grande tactique, he repeatedly emphasized the advantages of interior lines to the exclusion of other possibilities. Clausewitz's own sweeping critique of the state of military theory appears to have been aimed in large part at Jomini's approach:

It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless.

They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities.

They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects.

They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites.... Anything that could not be reached by the meager wisdom of such one-sided points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of genius, which rises above all rules.

Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules, not good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No; what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case.*38

Jomini was no fool, however. His intelligence, facile pen, and wide experience of war made his writings a great deal more credible and useful than so brief a description can imply. Once he left Napoleon's service, he maintained himself and his reputation primarily through prose. His writing style—unlike Clausewitz's—reflected his constant search for an audience. He dealt at length with a number of practical subjects (logistics, seapower) that Clausewitz had largely ignored. Elements of his discussion (his remarks on Great Britain and seapower, for instance, and his sycophantic treatment of Austria's Archduke Charles) are clearly aimed at protecting his political position or expanding his readership. And, one might add, at minimizing Clausewitz's. He evidently perceived the Prussian writer—whose death thirty-eight years prior to his own was a piece of rare good fortune—as his chief competitor.

The fundamental differences between Clausewitz and Jomini are rooted in their differing concepts of the historical process and of the nature and role of military theory. Essentially, Jomini saw war as a stage for heroes, a "great drama." He saw the revolutionary warfare in which he himself had participated as merely the technical near-perfection of a fundamentally unchanging phenomenon. This static art could be modified only by superficial matters like the list of actors, technology, and transient political motivations. He drew his theoretical and practical prescriptions from his experiences in the Napoleonic wars. The purpose of his theory was to teach practical lessons: His target audience is not in doubt, being explicitly "designed for officers of a superior grade." Accordingly, Jomini's aim was utilitarian and his tone instructional. His writing thus appealed more readily to military educators, and his key work, Summary of the Art of War (Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838), became, in various translations, popularizations, and commentaries, the premier military-educational text of the mid-nineteenth century.*39

Much of the oft-noted contrast between Jomini and Clausewitz*40 can be traced to such philosophical factors—and to the frequent abridgement of On War, which makes it appear much more abstract than Jomini's work when in fact they often discussed the same practical subject matter. Despite his insistence that theory must be descriptive rather than prescriptive in nature, Clausewitz frequently lapsed into instructive discussions of common military problems like contested river crossings, the defense of mountainous areas, etc.

It is also important to remember—but frequently forgotten—that the Summary was written after Jomini had read On War. Clausewitz's comments therefore do not reflect the modifications Jomini made afterwards to his original argument, for the Summary contains many adjustments clearly attributable to Clausewitz's influence. Jomini's essay on the state of military theory comments on the importance of morale; the impossibility of fixed rules (save perhaps in tactics); the need to assign limits to the role of theory; skepticism of mathematical calculations (and a denial that Jomini's own work—despite all the geometrical terminology and diagrams—was based on mathematics); the disclaimer of any belief that war is "a positive science"; and the clear differentiation between mere military knowledge and actual battlefield skill.*41

Jomini's recognition of the validity of many of Clausewitz's points did not lead him to adopt the Prussian philosopher's methods, for at least three reasons. First, he correctly distinguished his own work from Clausewitz's by pointing to its explicitly instructional purposes. Despite his agreement that war was essentially a political act, he pointed to the practical implications of this different focus: "History at once political and military offers more attractions, but is also much more difficult to treat and does not accord easily with the didactic species...."

Second, and in common with a number of Clausewitz's later detractors, he found the Prussian's approach intellectually arrogant, overly metaphysical, and simply too difficult to digest. Jomini stressed simplicity and clarity over a "pretentious" search for deeper truths. Further, he objected to what he saw as Clausewitz's extreme skepticism ("incrédulité") of all military theory—save that in On War. For Clausewitz to reject Jomini's approach to theory while defending his own seemed somehow hypocritical.

Third, there was a personal element in Jomini's critique of Clausewitz. Clearly, he did on some level greatly admire Clausewitz's work. He regretted that the Prussian had not been able to read his own Summary, "persuaded that he would have rendered to it some justice." He was thus deeply wounded by the criticisms in On War. He expressed his bitterness in a number of sneers ("The works of Clausewitz have been incontestably useful, although it is often less by the ideas of the author, than by the contrary ideas to which he gives birth") and in accusations of plagiarism ("There is not one of my reflections [on the campaign of 1799] which he has not repeated"). These insults, because they refer to the Prussian by name, have more meaning to readers unfamiliar with On War than do the Summary's many concessions on theoretical issues. Thus it is often assumed that Jomini and Clausewitz are opposites. In fact, their differences are as often stylistic as real.
 

Quite unlike Jomini, the great German soldier Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) was a self-confessed disciple of Clausewitz. Austere but remarkably tactful, Moltke was that rarity, an intellectual and a staff officer who made his mark as a great commander.*42 He was selected as Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1857 and remained in the job until 1888. It is for his work in this position that he is chiefly remembered today. Before Moltke brought it to prominence by masterminding the great Prussian victory at Königgrätz (1866), so obscure was the position of Chief of the General Staff that one general, upon receiving his orders, is said to have asked, "Who is this Moltke?" Working (not always harmoniously) with Otto von Bismarck as chancellor and Albrecht von Roon as minister of war, Moltke did a great deal to create the German military model that came to dominate military organizations throughout the world. Moltke's military behavior and his explicit discussions of military theory reveal a mind thoroughly grounded in the concepts of On War, but much more concerned with practical organizational matters than with strategic abstractions. He left an intellectual and organizational legacy, however, that seems to many to contradict that of his master.

On the issue of the political control of war, Moltke argued that "Strategy can direct its efforts only toward the highest goal that the available means make practically possible. It best supports policy in working solely to further political aims, but as far as possible in operating independent of policy. Policy dare not intrude itself in[to] operations."*43 In other words, the political leadership could dominate only at the beginning and end of a war. In the meantime, the role of the military leadership was to reduce the enemy to helpless acquiescence in the political goals of the victorious state. Military leaders must be allowed to do their jobs without political interference. Moltke evidently believed that his views on this matter were in complete accordance with Clausewitz, quoting one of the latter's letters: "The role and right of military science, as regards policy, is principally to take care that policy does not demand things contrary to the nature of warfare, nor, through ignorance of the operation of the instrument commit errors in the utilization thereof."

During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, a classic clash between the military and political spheres occurred. In late 1870, after the destruction of the French field armies at Sedan and Metz, Moltke's army moved on Paris. Bismarck, the Kaiser's chancellor and chief political officer, wanted Paris brought under attack as soon as possible. His concern was not so much the conduct of the war itself as worries that a protracted war might lead to some outside intervention disastrous to Prussian policy. Moltke resisted Bismarck's demands, citing technical military reasons. There was doubtless some truth to these, but Moltke was also motivated to resist the chancellor by institutional concerns. He had perhaps a political motive as well: Like many Germans, Moltke wanted to see the power of France—the incorrigible aggressor—permanently smashed. He feared that Bismarck was aiming at a less-than-maximized victory of the sort he had imposed on Austria in 1866. (This even though Bismarck's generosity in that case had resulted in huge political benefits—notably Austria's acquiescence in Prussia's domination of Germany and its neutrality during the war with France.) The Kaiser eventually overruled Moltke and placed the control of war policy in Bismarck's hands, but the constitutional issue outlasted Bismarck's tenure in office.

Moltke's attitude concerning the relationship of the military commander to the political leadership actually reflected not so much a disagreement with Clausewitz as a fundamental problem in the Prussian—and later the German Empire's—constitution. Under Napoleon, political and military responsibility had been collocated, and in parliamentary governments the dominance of the political leadership was largely uncontested. In Prussia, however, the relationship was unclear. Bismarck was not an elected political leader like the prime minister of England: He was a servant of the ruler. As Moltke wrote to the Kaiser, the political and military chiefs were two parallel, "mutually independent agencies under the command of your majesty."*44 Also, the evolution of both the army and the Prusso-German state apparatus meant that they came to represent distinct (and sometimes antagonistic) social classes rather than the German nation. Unfortunately, Moltke's argument is easily taken out of this specific context. 

Clausewitz and the Nature of War

In seeking out the fundamental nature of Clausewitz's own mature theories, perhaps the best place to start is with some of the most common misconceptions of his argument. Such misconceptions are usually the product of writers who either never read On War (or read only the opening paragraphs or perhaps a condensation) or who sought intentionally (for propaganda purposes) to distort its content. The book's specific arguments are very clearly stated and rarely difficult to comprehend. The first of these misconceptions is the notion that Clausewitz considered war to be a "science."*45 Another (and related) misconception is that he considered war to be entirely a rational tool of state policy. The first idea is drastically wrong, the second only one side of a very important coin.

To Clausewitz, war (as opposed to strategy or tactics) was neither an art nor a science. Those two terms often mark the parameters of theoretical debate on the subject, however, and Clausewitz's most ardent critics (Jomini, Liddell Hart, the early J.F.C. Fuller) tended to be those who treated war as a science. As Clausewitz argued, the object of science is knowledge and certainty, while the object of art is creative ability. Of course, all art involves some science (the mathematical sources of harmony, for example) and good science always involves creativity. Clausewitz saw tactics as more scientific in character and strategy as something of an art, but the conscious, rational exercise of "military strategy," a term much beloved by theorists and military historians, is a relatively rare occurrence in the real world. "It has become our general conviction," he said, "that ideas in war are generally so simple, and lie so near the surface, that the merit of their invention can seldom substantiate the talent of the commander who adopts them."*46 Most real events are driven by incomprehensible forces like chance, emotion, bureaucratic irrationalities, and intra­organizational politics, and a great many "strategic" decisions are made unconsciously, often long before the outbreak of hostilities. If pressed, Clausewitz would have placed war-making closer to the domain of the arts, but neither definition was really satisfactory.

Instead, war is a form of social intercourse. The Prussian writer occasionally likened it to commerce or litigation, but more usually to politics.*47 The distinction is crucial. In both art and science, the actor is working on inanimate matter (or, in art, the passive and yielding emotions of the audience), whereas in business, politics, and war the actor's will is directed at an animate object that not only reacts but takes independent actions of its own. War is thus permeated by "intelligent forces." War is also "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will," but it is never unilateral. It is a wrestling match—a contest between independent wills, in which skill and creativity are no more important than personality, chance, emotion, and the various dynamics that characterize any human interaction. When Clausewitz wrote that war may have a grammar of its own, but not its own logic, he meant that the logic of war, like politics, is the logic of social intercourse, not that of art or science.

This approach may seem to violate our usual concept of war, with its focus on clearly defined forms of "victory" and "defeat," but it corresponds well to our actual experience. For example, which of the following provides a better metaphor for the outcome of the war with Iraq?

1. Finishing a long, grueling, dangerous engineering project.
2. Completing a great painting or symphony.
3. "Winning" an argument with one's spouse.

The first few pages of On War set up a rather confusing (but ultimately quite necessary) model of war that Clausewitz called absolute, or ideal, war. This term represents Clausewitz's exploration of his initial thesis that "war is nothing but a wrestling match on a larger scale." Absolute war is a philosophical abstraction, a "logical fantasy" that is impossible to achieve in reality. It is war in a "pure" form, violence at its most extreme, unrestrained by intelligent forces or by the frictional effects of time, space, and human nature. It occurs for no particular reason and takes place in one near-instantaneous maximum effort by both warring parties. It aims at the utter overthrow of the enemy through the destruction of his physical means to resist. Exploring this notion of war as an act of pure force, Clausewitz demonstrates the flaws in that not-uncommon notion. While it is true that war is an act of force to compel our enemies to do our will, it is clearly much more than that. Its violence alone cannot account for our actual experience of the phenomena of war.

Unfortunately, it is clear that most would-be readers of On War have been stopped dead in their tracks by this discussion of absolute war. Most make it no further than half-way through the first chapter, giving up on what seems to be a terribly abstract philosophical treatment of the problem—or, in some cases, thinking they have divined from it the whole of Clausewitz's bloodthirsty intent.*17 However, this discussion of war in the abstract takes up only a small section of the first chapter (about five out of fifteen pages) and is atypical of the overall work. In the rest of the book, Clausewitz deals with "real war," i.e., the gritty reality of war as we actually experience it. He explores why real war is so different from his own abstract model, from the faulty constructs of other intellectuals, and from the pontifications of pedantic ivory-tower theorists. Real war is constrained by the ever-present social and political context, by human nature, and by the restrictions imposed by time and space. These factors forbid that the absolute should ever actually occur. While some aspects of absolute war can be approximated in reality, others cannot.

Clausewitz's classification of the varieties of war is very often misunderstood, owing not least to the fact that Clausewitz himself was sometimes careless with his own term, "absolute war."  In a kind of rhetorical overkill (or as a relic of earlier drafts), he occasionally used it to describe actual Napoleonic campaigns, even though in his final conception of the idea he argued that the absolute could never exist in concrete reality. It is therefore necessary to nail this point home. The spectrum of war does not run smoothly from "absolute" to "limited." Rather, we have on the one hand absolute war, an abstraction that never happens. On the other we have "real" war, which is always constrained by practical factors. Real war occurs along a spectrum from the mere threat of force to conflicts which are unlimited in the sense that at least one of the antagonists is unwilling to accept any outcome other than the complete military and then political overthrow of his adversary.

While the primary purpose of introducing the concept of absolute war is to set up Clausewitz's dialectical argument, other purposes (or at least functions) are 1) to demonstrate the dangers of using pure logic to approach this complex subject, and 2) to provide a fixed benchmark—one which cannot be made obsolete by evolving events—against which to measure actual developments in warfare. Of all real-world possibilities only thermonuclear war, which Clausewitz naturally did not envision, could closely match the absolute concept. Such a war has, of course, never occurred—probably because it is equally unrealistic. That is, while it may have become technologically feasible, there seems to be no comprehensible political motive that would impel a state to begin one (and only states have sufficient resources to pursue such a war to its mutually suicidal extremes). The Cold War's nuclear strategists were unable to provide a credible political scenario to explain the nuclear exchanges they envisioned, and the nuclear powers were always careful to avoid creating a situation that might make such mutual suicide seem either desirable or necessary.*18

It is also important to note that Clausewitz's concept of absolute war is quite distinct from the later concept of "total war." Total war was a prescription for the actual waging of war typified by the ideas of General Erich von Ludendorff, who actually assumed control of the German war effort during World War One. Total war in this sense involved the total subordination of politics to the war effort—an idea Clausewitz emphatically rejected—and the assumption that total victory or total defeat were the only options. Total war involved no suspension of the effects of time and space, as did Clausewitz's concept of the absolute.*19

Having rejected his initial thesis that war is nothing but an act of untrammelled force, Clausewitz turned to the apparently more reasonable notion that war is a purely rational instrument of state policy. Writing in German, Clausewitz used the word Politik, and his most famous phrase has been variously translated as "War is a continuation of `policy'—or of `politics'—by other means." For the purpose of argument, he assumed that state policy would be rational, that is, aimed at improving the situation of the society it represented. He was quite aware, however, that in reality policy may be driven by very different motives. He also believed along with most people of his era that war was a legitimate means for a state's advancement of its interests. Because his discussion of war as an instrument of policy is usually read in isolation (if at all), Clausewitz is frequently convicted of advocating the resort to war as a routine extension of unilateral state policy. In fact, of course, Clausewitz's famous line is not meant to be an argument in itself. Rather, it is the antithesis to his earlier argument. Like any such dialectical discussion, it exposes contradictions or inadequacies in the given concepts, and tensions between them, which can only be resolved in some synthesis of the two. Clausewitz normally seeks to maintain the tensions—as they are maintained in the world in which we actually operate—rather than to resolve them philosophically.

It is nevertheless possible to derive much of Clausewitz's message from the discussion of war as an act of policy (or politics). In fact, the choice of translation for Politik—"policy" or "politics"—indicates crucially differing emphases on the part of the translator, for the two concepts are quite different in English. "Policy" may be defined as rational action, undertaken unilaterally by a group which already has power, in order to maintain and extend that power. Politics, in contrast, is simply the process (comprising an inchoate mix of rational, irrational, and non-rational elements) by which power is distributed within a given society.*48 (These are my definitions—Clausewitz never defines Politik.) And war is an expression of—not a substitute for—politics. Thus, in calling war a "continuation" of politics, Clausewitz was advocating nothing. In accordance with his belief that theory must be descriptive rather than prescriptive, he was merely recognizing an existing reality. War is an expression of both policy and politics (see relevant cartoon), but "politics" is the interplay of conflicting forces, not the execution of one-sided policy initiatives.*49

The actual word Clausewitz used in his famous formulation is Fortsetzung—literally a "setting forth." Translating this word as "continuation," while technically correct, evidently implies to many that politics changes its essential nature when it metamorphoses into war.*50 This impression is contrary to Clausewitz's argument. War remains politics in all its complexity, with the added element of violence. The irrational and non-rational forces that affect and often drive politics have the same impact on war.

On the side of rationality, it is true that Clausewitz argued that a party resorting to war should do so with a clear idea as to what it means to accomplish and how it intends to proceed toward that goal. The connection of war to rational political goals meant that wars could not be made to follow some fixed pattern. Rather, the conduct of wars would have to vary in accordance with their political purposes. His definition of "strategy"—that it was "the use of combats for the purpose of the war"—has been criticized for overemphasizing the need for bloody battle, but its key point is "the [political] purpose of the war."

If war was to be an extension of policy, that is, a tool of policy, then military leaders must be subordinate to political leaders and strategy must be subordinate to policy. As the Moltke-Bismarck clash demonstrated, this poses practical organizational problems. Like many of Clausewitz's teachings, his solution was not a simple prescription but a dualism: The military instrument must be subordinated to the political leadership, but political leaders must understand its nature and limitations. Politicians must not attempt to use the instrument of war to achieve purposes for which it is unsuited. It is the responsibility of military leaders to ensure that the political leadership understands the character and limitations of the military instrument.

There is thus a gray area between soldiers' subordination to political leaders and their professional responsibility to educate those leaders in military realities. Exactly whose responsibility it is to sort out that ambiguity is a constitutional matter of some importance. Clausewitz did little to clarify it. In his original manuscript, Clausewitz said "If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war,... the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities." This was altered in the second German edition (1853) to say "so that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions."*51 Whether the change resulted from well intentioned editorial intervention (for the original edition is full of inconsistencies, obscurities, and obvious editorial errors) or more sinister motivations is unclear. This minor editorial subversion certainly was not the cause of later German strategic errors, as some have implied.*52 This constitutional question aside, it is clear that Clausewitz demanded the subordination of military to political considerations throughout a conflict. As he said in 1831, "He who maintains, as is so often the case, that politics should not interfere with the conduct of a war has not grasped the ABCs of grand strategy."*53

Policy considerations also can demand actions that may seem irrational, depending on one's values. Clausewitz's desire that Prussia turn on Napoleon before the 1812 campaign would have demanded virtual state suicide in the short run, but he felt that the state's honor—and thus any hope for its future resurgence—required it. Clausewitz saw both history and policy in the long run, and he pointed out that strategic decisions are seldom final; they can often be reversed in another round of struggle. This side of Clausewitz is uncomfortable for modern Anglo-American readers because it seems to reflect a romantic view of the state as something that transcends the collective interest of its citizens. It can provide a philosophical basis for apocalyptic policies like Hitler's and Japan's in World War Two. Most modern readings of Clausewitz, including my own, tend to skate over such aspects of On War. They are simply too alien to the spirit of our age to have much meaning.

So much for the rational control of war. On the other hand, Clausewitz lived during the transition from the 18th-century intellectual period called the Enlightenment (which stressed a rational approach to human problems) to the age of Romanticism (which was ushered in by the disasters of the French Revolution and stressed the irrational, emotional aspects of man's make-up—including nationalism). His world view reflected elements of each. Clausewitz understood very well that there is much more to war than cool, rational calculation. So, after laying out the argument that war is "merely a continuation of policy," he begins to work towards the synthesis of his overall argument. This synthesis will reconcile the rational calculation of policy with the domain of the non-rational and even the irrational, "in which strictly logical reasoning often plays no part at all and is always apt to be a most unsuitable and awkward intellectual tool."*54

One of the most important requirements of strategy in Clausewitz's view is that the leadership correctly "establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking."*55 This is often understood to mean that leaders should rationally decide the kind of war that will be undertaken. In fact, the nature of any given war is beyond rational control: It is inherent in the situation and in the "spirit of the age." Good leaders, avoiding error and self-deception, can at best merely comprehend the real implications of a resort to violence and act accordingly.

Further, a war often takes on a dynamic beyond the intentions of those who launched it. The conduct of war always rests—in unpredictable proportions—on the variable energies, interests, abilities, and character of the peoples, the fighting forces, and the governments involved. Political leaders may easily misjudge or lose control of passions on their own side. Further, their opponents have similar such uncertainties as well as wills and creativity of their own. Because the flow of military events is uniquely shaped by the specifics of every situation, from its politics and personalities to the terrain and even the weather, the course of war is never predictable.

In 1976, Russell Weigley—one of the most creative, interesting, and influential of modern American military historians—attacked Clausewitz for missing this very point. Weigley had clearly developed his own recognition that war tends to escape rational control, but denied Clausewitz any understanding of that fact, so central to the Prussian's argument. Quoting Gerhard Ritter, he wrote that "what Clausewitz failed to see or at least to acknowledge is that war, once set off, may very well develop a logic of its own because the war events themselves may react on and alter the guiding will,... that it may roll on like an avalanche, burying all the initial aims, all the aspirations of statesmen." In fact, the Prussian writer had noted very clearly that "the original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences."*56 Like so many of Clausewitz's critics, Weigley—via Ritter—was engaged in reinventing the wheel. It is clear that Clausewitz's war is, despite all that intellect and reason can do to modify it, a game of chance and skill outside the bounds of rational control.

Would Prussia in 1792 have dared to invade France with 70,000 men if she had had an inkling that the repercussions in case of failure would be strong enough to overthrow the old European balance of power? Would she, in 1806, have risked war with France with 100,000 men, if she had suspected that the first shot would set off a mine that was to blow her to the skies?*57

Another source of unpredictability was what Clausewitz called "friction," stemming from war's uncertainty, chance, suffering, confusion, exhaustion, and fear. Friction stems from the effects of time, space, and human nature. It is the fundamental and unavoidable force that makes war in reality differ from the abstract model of "absolute war." Events take time to unfold, with all that that implies. Purely military or political courses of action are deflected by countless delays and distractions. Strategic intelligence and battlefield information are often misleading or flatly wrong, and even the wisest order is subject to loss, delay, misinterpretation, poor execution, or willful disobedience. Every individual human being is a friction-producing cog in the machine of war, producing a delicate machine of endless complexity and unreliability. "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.... Action in war is like movement in a resistant element. Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results."*58 It is perhaps no accident that slang terms like SNAFU and FUBAR originated in a military context. Much of what Clausewitz called "military genius" revolved around willpower. An iron will and a powerful sense of purpose are indispensable in overcoming the forces of friction. To some extent, of course, the causes of this difficulty are inherent in any large organization. Clausewitz saw it as unique to war because European armies were the first truly large, modern organizations.

Much of what Clausewitz called friction was, however, peculiar to war. This is particularly true of something that may seem obvious but escapes many theorists and armchair war planners: War is dangerous, and danger (either physical or moral) has an impact on the behavior of the participants. Under the influence of physical danger, "the light of reason is refracted in a manner quite different from that which is normal in academic speculation.... the ordinary man can never achieve a state of perfect unconcern in which his mind can work with normal flexibility."*59 Physical courage, however, is much more common than moral courage. It is lack of the latter that explains the frequent failure of men who have been successful—even dashing and heroic—as junior officers, but who become indecisive under the weight of real responsibility.

Jomini, whose practical military experience approximated Clausewitz's, understood perfectly well the practical importance of such factors. To him, however, they were unpredictable and therefore extrinsic to theory, while to Clausewitz they were so much a part of the fabric of war that theory must consider them as intrinsic.

Clausewitz's insistence on the unpredictability of war raises some important issues. His writings are sometimes cited in support of various attempts at mathematically modeling war.*60 However, while much of Clausewitz's logic sounds vaguely mathematical and many of his individual propositions could no doubt be expressed in numbers, Clausewitz pointedly refrained from doing so. In essence, his explanation for this restraint is very similar to that of modern Complexity theory and nonlinear analysis as it is applied in such varied fields as physics, biology, and economics.*61 In demonstrating why long-range weather prediction is bound to fail, for instance, nonlinear theorists cite the so-called "Butterfly Effect": "a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can transform storm systems next month in New York." Tiny differences in input may quickly become overwhelming differences in output. (A more dignified term for this effect is "sensitive dependence on initial conditions.")*62 Complexity theorists have demonstrated how even a few variables imperfectly known can reduce a complex system to a chaotic state. In war, there is an inherently unknowable number of largely unquantifiable variables, all of which may interact with one another in an unpredictable way. The very parameters of any equation of war are indeterminable.

Most natural phenomena are nonlinear. Dividing them along linear/nonlinear lines is similar to dividing the animal world into elephants and "non-elephant animals." Like the nonlinear theorists, Clausewitz insisted on keeping in view the whole phenomenon under discussion rather than attempting to draw conclusions from those few unrepresentative sub-components which might lend themselves to linear mathematical analyses. He focused on real-world experience, on concrete phenomena, rather than on simplified and inherently unrealistic models. "Just as some plants bear fruit only if they don't shoot up too high, so in the practical arts the leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil—experience."*63 Clausewitz's historicist belief that war can change its nature depending on the "spirit of the age" echoes the "phase transitions" of the nonlinear scientists. Their observations of "symmetry at different scales" parallels Clausewitz's similar "ends and means" analyses of tactics, strategy, and politics, the same phenomena expressed at different scales in terms of time and space. The Prussian theorist would agree that mathematics had a place in war, as did other kinds of arts and sciences, but using math as a basis for theory or prediction was a laughable absurdity.

The significance of butterfly-like individual inputs and unique variables is particularly clear in Clausewitz's discussion of friction, of the significance of individual actions by any of the individual participants—of whatever rank—in military and political events, and of the impact of factors like terrain, always unique.

[Military] events are proof that success is not due simply to general causes. Particular factors can often be decisive—details known only to those who were on the spot. There can also be moral factors which never come to light; while issues can be decided by chances and incidents so minute as to figure in histories simply as anecdotes.*64

Having demonstrated that we cannot adequately account for the observed phenomena of war through any of the rather simple propositions he has made thus far, Clausewitz provided his synthesis of the problem in his famous—but often misconstrued—discussion of what he called the "fascinating trinity" of war. [Note that my translation here differs somewhat from that on p.89 of the Howard/Paret translation, for reasons of grammar, clarity, and accuracy.]:

War is more than a mere chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a fascinating trinity—composed of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; (2) of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and (3) of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason.

The first of these three aspects more concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that floats among these three tendencies, like an object suspended among three magnets.

The Clausewitzian trinity is often misrepresented as comprising "the people, the army, and the government." Look more closely and you will realize that it is really made up of three categories of forces: irrational forces (violent emotion, i.e., "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity"); non-rational forces (i.e., forces not the product of human thought or intent, such as "the play of chance and probability"); and reason or rational calculation (war's subordination to reason "as an instrument of policy"). Clausewitz then connects each of those forces "more" to one of three sets of human actors: the people, the army, and the government. We should stress the word "more," because it is clear that each of the three categories that constitutes the actual trinity affects all of these human actors to some perpetually varying degree.

1. The people are paired up with irrational forces—the emotions of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (or, by implication, the lack thereof).

2. The army and its commander are paired up with the non-rational forces of chance and probability—they deal with those factors under the creative guidance of the commander (and creativity depends on something more than mere rationality, including the divine spark of talent or genius).

3. The government is paired with the rational force of calculation—policy is, ideally, driven by reason. This corresponds to the famous argument that "war is an instrument of policy."

Thus, when Clausewitz speaks of war as a "total phenomenon," he is not talking about war in the abstract ("absolute war"), nor about war "in theory." He is talking about real war, war as we actually experience it, and he is describing just why it is that war is so dynamic, so unpredictable, so kaleidoscopic in its appearance. The concluding simile in this excerpt from On War is a nearly exact analogy: Clausewitz is saying that theory must be, as war is, "like an object suspended among three magnets." He is referring to the observed scientific fact that such a pendulum, once set swinging among three centers of attraction, behaves in a nonlinear manner—it never establishes a repeating pattern. As it enters a phase of its arc in which it is more strongly affected by one force than the others, it gains a momentum which carries it on into zones where the other forces can begin to exert their powers more strongly. The actual path of the suspended object is never determined by one force alone but by the interaction between them, which is forever and unavoidably shifting.

The trinity also provides us with clues as to what Clausewitz meant by Politik, for the only element of the trinity that makes it unique to war is that the emotions discussed are those that might incline people to violence, whereas politics in general will involve the full range of human feelings. The policy aspects are those largely connected with rationality, whereas politics encompasses the whole trinity. The trinity metaphor, as given here, therefore serves to sum up Clausewitz's approach to war. An approach to theory which denies or minimizes the role of any of these forces or the interaction between them is, therefore, by definition wrong. The soldier who expects the events of war to unfold in any other way is doomed to be surprised, disappointed, and frustrated as events are forever spinning off on unpredictable trajectories.

So what, then, was Clausewitz's strategic prescription? Various writers have argued that Clausewitz was the advocate of a particular style of war, held by some to be that of "total" or "absolute" war (terms that represent quite different concepts), and by others to be that of "limited" war. In fact, the mature Clausewitz advocated neither. Rather, he called for state policy to choose a form of war, consistent with its goals and the situation, from somewhere along the limited-to-unlimited continuum of "real war." Although the younger Clausewitz of the "Instruction for the Crown Prince" tended towards a firm prescription of decisive battle, the mature Clausewitz of On War did not. To seek decisive battle did not, after all, make sense for a party who expected to lose. Readers easily detect that Clausewitz had some emotional attachment to war in its more powerful form as a result of his own experience with it, but intellectually he was quite clear on the validity of either. The philosopher's students are shown how to analyze a military problem, but left quite on their own as to what to do about the ones they actually face.

Other writers have claimed that Clausewitz was an advocate of concentric attacks, in contrast to Jomini's advocacy of "interior lines." In fact, Clausewitz spent more time discussing concentric operations in part simply because Jomini had already done so good a job explaining the opposite approach. The choice of either would depend, as always, on the specific situation.

Clausewitz did provide some guidance in choosing military objectives. Perhaps most important was the idea of focusing one's military efforts against the enemy's "center of gravity" ("Schwerpunkt"), which has become an omnipresent concept in American militarydoctrine. Clausewitz's use of this term is problematic, however. He often used it in very general terms to mean something like "the main thing" or "the key point at issue." He used it in tactical discussions to denote the main line of attack. When applied to operations or strategy, however, the term assumed a more narrow definition. Insofar as the center of gravity "belongs" to one side or the other, it is the most important source of that side's strength. Operationally, it usually appears as the key enemy field force. Strategically, it is most commonly the enemy's military forces as a whole or in part, but it can be his capital or something less concrete, like the common interest of an alliance or even public opinion.

We should remember, however, the context for Clausewitz's use of this metaphor: war as a wrestling match. This metaphor is fundamental to Clausewitz's outlook on strategy, but translation problems sometimes obscure his point, as in Clausewitz's famous characterization of war as a "duel." Used in all of the English translations, it is not a very good substitute for the original German "Zweikampf," literally "two-struggle." A duel with sword or (particularly) pistol is based more clearly on skill than on raw strength and lacks the dynamic character, the multiple points of contact, and the mutability of a wrestling match, Clausewitz's actual imagery.*73 The latter metaphor provides a much better graphic image into which to fit the famous term "center of gravity." The center of gravity may be "the hub of all power and movement," but it is created by the interaction between the wrestlers and changes as they alter their relationship.

The term center of gravity comes from Mechanics. Clausewitz was clearly trying to use a scientific metaphor to force the reader to focus on key considerations, rather than frittering away his energy on peripheral concerns. Unfortunately, Clausewitz's statement that "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely" is scientifically incorrect, and the metaphor—while useful and interesting—suffers accordingly. In any case, as usual with Clausewitz, the correct identification of any center of gravity would have to be consistent with the character of the situation and appropriate to the political purposes of military operations. To seek for an all-purpose strategic prescription in Clausewitz's discussion of the center of gravity will therefore lead to the usual frustration. The rigid prescription simply is not there. Destruction of the enemy army is not the fixed goal of "Clausewitzian strategy."

A superficial reading of On War may, however, leave the reader somewhat confused on this point. Clausewitz's definition of strategy emphasizes battle, and he states quite clearly, time after time, that "there is only one means in war: combat." The subtlety that one must be aware of here is that by "combat" Clausewitz means not only the actual bloody clash of armed men on the field of battle but also potential or merely possible clashes.*65 The distinction is crucial. Clausewitz likened actual bloodshed to the occasional cash transaction in a business normally operating on credit. He did not say that a bloodless war of maneuver (à la Sun Tzu or Maurice de Saxe) is impossible, merely that maneuver by itself is meaningless. It must be backed up with the credible threat of battlefield success. An effective maneuver may create a situation in which the enemy is convinced that, if it comes to battle, he will lose more than he is willing to risk—and will therefore concede defeat. The maneuvering party must be prepared, however, for the possibility that his bluff will be called. The battle of Blenheim, 1704, provides a good example. The Franco-Bavarian leaders thought that they had maneuvered Marlborough's army into a position from which it must, according to the fashions of the time, retreat. Instead, Marlborough attacked and inflicted one of the greatest setbacks the French army was to suffer before May 1940.*66

This argument against a one-sidedly maneuverist approach to strategy was part of a larger point. Clausewitz argued that any kind of moderation or limitation in war must be based on a realistic expectation that it will be reciprocated, and that such expectations are often unrealistic. He used an interesting metaphor to make this point: "He must always keep an eye on his opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him armed only with an ornamental rapier."*67 Dealing with "absolute" war in the abstract, he had pointed out that "To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity." This argument has much to do with Clausewitz's bloodthirsty reputation. One of the accusations made against Clausewitz is that his sanctions against "moderation" in theory led directly to the later German practice of military "Schrecklichkeit" (frightfulness). In fact, Clausewitz did not mean that moderation was absurd in practice, because the social conditions within civilized states and the relationships between them often made moderation an element of policy. He failed to develop this point very far, however, and the accusation that it served to justify later German atrocities—to say it "caused" them would certainly be going too far—is one of the hardest of all the indictments against him to evade. The theoretical point is hard to deny, but the language in which it was expressed is harsh.

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect.

Unfortunately, Clausewitz's not-unreasonable conviction that the state must always be prepared for a life-and-death struggle fed very easily into the unreasoning paranoia that led Germany's leaders to launch World War One. That Clausewitz himself was touched by such an attitude is heavily suggested in other essays he wrote.*69

Clausewitz believed, however, that the popular forces unleashed by the French Revolution, the event that had triggered his fears, were too powerful to be put back into the bottle. French successes had created a precedent that others would undoubtedly try to repeat. Clausewitz was therefore interested in the role of popular passions and public opinion in both politics and war. As a professional officer in a professional army with a venerable and glorious tradition, he was also sensitive to the quite different military virtues represented by such armies. All of these considerations fell generally under the heading of "moral factors," and Clausewitz's work is famous for its emphasis upon them: "One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade."*70 These moral factors applied at both the individual level (usually discussed under the rubric of "military genius"), the organizational, and the societal.

Curiously, despite the fact that Clausewitz's emphasis on moral factors has always been noted, many of his later critics argued that he had reduced strategy to the simplistic act of bludgeoning the enemy to death with overwhelming numbers. This accusation should not be dismissed out of hand as some modern analysts have done.*71 Clausewitz's method of argument on this point illustrates the ease with which his ideas can be distorted by sloppy reading or hostile editing. In his discussion of the armies of modern Europe, Clausewitz did indeed stress numbers:

Here we find armies much more alike in equipment, organization, and practical skill of every kind. There only remains a difference in the military virtues of Armies, and in the talent of Generals which may fluctuate with time from side to side.... From this we may infer, that it is very difficult in the present state of Europe, for the most talented General to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now if we see double numbers prove such a weight in the scale against the greatest Generals, we may be sure, that in ordinary cases, in small as well as great combats, an important superiority of numbers but which need not be over two to one, will be sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be.... The first rule is therefore to enter the field with an Army as strong as possible. This sounds very like a commonplace, but still it is really not so.

His argument was not, however, that the victor would necessarily be the side with the most men, but that there was no excuse for going into combat with less than the maximum available power. "If we strip the combat of all modifications which it may undergo according to its immediate purpose and the circumstances from which it proceeds, lastly if we set aside the valour of the troops [dem Wert der Truppen] ... there remains only the bare conception of the combat ... in which we distinguish nothing but the number of the combatants. This number will therefore determine victory. Now from the number of things above deducted to get to this point, it is shown that the superiority in numbers in a battle is only one of the factors employed to produce victory; that therefore so far from having with the superiority in number obtained all, or even only the principal thing, we have perhaps got very little by it, according as the other circumstances ... happen to vary.... There remains nothing, therefore, where an absolute superiority is not attainable, but to produce a relative one at the decisive point, by making skillful use of what we have.... to regard [numerical superiority] as a necessary condition of victory would be a complete misconception of our exposition."*74

A partial reading of Clausewitz's views on surprise can be just as misleading. His bald statements that it "would be a mistake ... to regard surprise as a key element of success in war" and that "surprise has lost its usefulness today" are confusing if taken out of context, and that often seems to be the case.*75 Also controversial is his argument that surprise often favors the defense. Overall, Clausewitz actually emphasized the concept of surprise strongly, suggesting that—defined as "the desire to surprise the enemy by our plans and dispositions, especially those concerning the distribution of forces"—it "lies at the root of all operations without exception, though in widely varying degrees depending on the nature and circumstances of the operation." He clearly appreciated its psychological impact, and felt that almost the only advantage of the attacker rested in surprise.

As a man of his times, Clausewitz obviously believed in the practical utility or necessity of war, and he was very conscious of its offer of individual "glory." As a Prussian nationalist he had little sympathy for the claims of subjugated peoples such as the Poles. He was, however, no advocate of a policy of conquest. Although he is often portrayed as the "high priest" of Napoleon, this view ignores the fact that he was both a passionate Prussian patriot and a die-hard opponent of the French emperor. He was detached enough to admire Bonaparte as a professional soldier, but his experience of the Napoleonic wars convinced him of the power of nationalism and of the balance-of-power mechanism. In his view, those forces would generally lead to the destruction of any would-be Alexander or Napoleon, at least in the European context. Thus, the wars he describes are often those of Napoleon, but his strategic biases are essentially conservative and anti-revolutionary. The approach he takes is not Napoleon's but that of the Emperor's most capable enemy, Scharnhorst. To call Clausewitz the "codifier of Napoleonic warfare" as his critics (and some of his supporters) often have, is to miss this important point.*76

The clearest evidence of Clausewitz's faith in the balance-of-power mechanism lies in his analysis of the dynamic relationship betwen the offense and the defense.*77 He has been portrayed by various writers as a proponent of one form or the other, but as in so many important aspects of his theory, his actual approach was instead to set up a dualism: defense is the stronger form of war, but it has a negative object (self-preservation); offense is the weaker form, but it alone has a positive purpose (increasing one's strength through conquest). Any realistic military theory must embrace both.

The sources of the fundamentally greater strength of the defense are many. In a sense, the defensive form's superiority is self-evident: Why else does the weaker party so often resort to it? At the tactical level, Clausewitz was impressed by the power of entrenchments—and alarmed at the tendency of some fashionable and generally inexperienced theorists to dismiss them. He was also interested in fixed fortifications, although he warned against over-reliance upon them and made some careful observations upon their correct use. He was impressed as well by the defender's frequent ability to choose his own ground. In most battles, however, both sides use both offensive and defensive methods, and losses tend to be fairly equal until one side or the other breaks. Therefore he strongly emphasized the pursuit, which permits the infliction of disproportionate losses on the loser.

Much more important were the strategic aspects of defense. However strongly an offensive may start out, it inevitably weakens as it advances from its original base. The need to provide garrisons, to maintain the lines of supply and communications, the greater physical strain on troops in the attack, all degrade the aggressor's force. Meanwhile, the defender falls back upon the sources of his strength. Every offensive, however victorious, has a "culminating point." If the defender has enough time and space in which to recover (and Russia offered an excellent example, which Clausewitz noted long before Napoleon's disaster there in 1812-13), the aggressor inevitably reaches a point at which he must himself take up the defense. If he pushes too far, the equilibrium will shift against him. The aggressor, in his own retreat (often through devastated territory), cannot draw on the defender's usual sources of strength—physical or psychological.

Moreover, public opinion is more likely to favor the strategic defender, since significant conquests by one contender will threaten the rest. Eventually, the conqueror will reach a "culminating point of victory" at which his successes provoke sufficient counteraction to defeat him.

The essence of the defense is waiting: waiting until the attacker clarifies his own intentions; waiting until the balance of forces shifts; waiting for any improvement in the defender's situation, whether from the culminating process described above, from outside intervention, from mobilization of his own resources, or from some chance development. Time is almost always on the side of the defender.

Waiting, however, does not imply mere passivity, and a passive defense is not at all what Clausewitz was describing. His vision of any effective defense was profoundly active. If the defense functions essentially as a shield, it is best "a shield made up of well-directed blows."*78 Defense must shift at some point to the offense, the "flashing sword of vengeance." Thus it is easy to find in On War isolated quotations which seem to glorify the offensive. It is nonetheless the interaction of the two forms that concerned Clausewitz.

The dynamic relationship between defense and offense is just one of a larger group of concepts which might collectively be labeled the "dynamics of war." These would include the emphases on friction and morale, the diminishing force of the offensive, the "culminating point of victory"; in short, all of the factors that prevent war from being a linear process, that create the unpredictable see-sawing between opposing wills and powers that characterizes our real-world experience of war. 

Conclusions

It was Clausewitz's great goal to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Unfortunately, his work has often fallen into the crack it sought to span, perceived as being too concrete and pragmatic for the intellectual, too complex and ambiguous for the active politician, and too ethereal for the practical soldier. Too many people on all sides of the chasm have simply failed to read On War.*79 More fundamentally, the gap represents a real dichotomy between the values and perceptions of scholars and soldiers, with their sometimes well-founded suspicions of one another. Perhaps inevitably, perhaps as the result of correctable failings in their education, practical soldiers tend to lack the broad historical understanding that is so helpful in internalizing Clausewitz's historicist argument, understanding his dialectical approach, and distinguishing the practical utility of his concepts.

There are, however, a great many other factors which tend to block our appreciation of Clausewitz. These range from national prejudice and personal ego to fundamental problems of human perception. The reader's personal experience has a great deal to do with how he or she comprehends On War: To say that readers accept—or even perceive—only what they are able to recognize as restatements of their own views or experiences is almost certainly going too far, but not by much. The book is often less a window into reality than a mirror for its reader, perhaps necessarily so. This has been my own experience with it. When I first read it as an undergraduate at the College of William and Mary, it was the abstract discussion of "absolute war" and the idea of war as a rational continuation of policy that seemed to me to be its essence. When I read it during my military service, it was the discussion of friction, chance, and moral factors that most struck me. When I was working purely as a historian, it was Clausewitz's historicist philosophy that provided the key to understanding. As a military educator and doctrine writer, I came to focus on those operational concepts that have worked their way into U.S. doctrine, like the "center of gravity" and the "culminating point." Every time I have read On War, it has seemed a different book, but it is only myself who has changed.

Thus it is little wonder if survivors of the trench warfare of 1914-1918 saw their experiences in On War's pages, just as Vietnam veterans tend to see in it a textbook on what went wrong in their war. That this is the case would not have surprised Clausewitz, who insisted that personal experience (or a lack of it) was essential to any understanding of the phenomena of war.

These lessons certainly do not justify the complaint of many academics and soldiers that Clausewitz's theories are valueless because they are so endlessly flexible.*80 Clausewitzian theory is like any fine tool available to artists, scientists, or soldiers. The qualities of its product depend on the peculiarities of the mind that wields it. However the predispositions of the reader may affect his view of war, the lens offered by Clausewitz provides for a much more distinct vision.

And that lens is very important, not only for its own sake but because of the role Clausewitz's theories have come to play in the American national security community. On War gave shape to the most important formulations of the final "lessons learned" from the Vietnam experience, as expressed in Harry Summers's work and in the Weinberger Doctrine. The impressive "jointness" with which the American armed forces and connected agencies waged the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 and since is traceable to a very significant, if unquantifiable, extent to the common conceptual base that this study has engendered. Clausewitz has provided the intellectual common ground that formal doctrine has always sought but—because of its unavoidably narrow focus, usually single-service orientation, and prescriptive intent—failed to provide. The value of that common ground lies in the very flexibility of Clausewitzian theory that many have found so frustrating: It provides a common set of concepts and intellectual tools, greatly facilitating analysis and discussion while leaving the conclusions to be reached as open as ever to creativity and to differing goals and points of view.

The dominance that Clausewitz has exercised in American military intellectual circles over the last thirty-plus years has bored or outraged many students unable or unwilling to probe its complexities, and provoked a reaction on the part of would-be competitors like Martin van Creveld and John Keegan. Nonetheless, if Clausewitz's works at some point become relegated to the same dusty bookshelves as those of most of his contemporaries, it will probably be because, at long last, his key insights have been thoroughly absorbed and his own expression of them superseded.*81 If not, we can look forward to another Clausewitzian revival—after the next military disaster. 

NOTES

1. Especially the "capstone" series: MCDP 1: Warfighting; MCDP 1-1, Strategy; MCDP 1-2, Campaigning; and MCDP 1-3, Tactics (all 1997). FMFM 1 (1989) and its successsor, MCDP 1, both drafted by John Schmitt, also have a substantial flavoring of Sun Tzu.

2. Command and General Staff School, Principles of Strategy for an Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff School Press, 1936), 19.

3. Carl von Clausewitz, eds./trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book One, Chapter 1, section 25.

4. On War, Book Eight, Chapter 6.

5. General Jakob Meckel, quoted in Stewart L. Murray, The Reality of War: An Introduction to Clausewitz (London: Hugh Rees, 1909), 7.

6. On War itself is often misleading for much the same reason: Clausewitz placed great stress on some points simply because they were antagonistic to the fashions of his own time, leaving later readers somewhat confused about those points' importance to his overall scheme. The issue of moderation in war, or his comments on the idea of the "bloodless victory," are examples. Clausewitz's sometimes contradictory comments on the value of intelligence and surprise probably owe something to this factor also.

7. The latter position, however, was not then nearly so important a position as it became later, under the stewardship of Helmuth von Moltke.

8. On Scharnhorst's ideas and influence, see Charles Edward White, [Graduate, USMA, at last report Command Historian, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning], The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Military Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801­1805 (New York: Praeger, 1989).

9. Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, eds./trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 231.

10. Ibid. Moran's treatment of Clausewitz's politics is excellent. See also C.B.A. Behrens, "Which Side was Clausewitz on?" New York Review of Books, October 14, 1976, 41­44.

11. Clausewitz, Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner grossen Katastroph (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1888). Partial English translations of this study can be found in Paret and Moran, Historical and Political Writings, and Carl von Clausewitz, "Notes on the Jena Campaign," Ed./trans, Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, FA/USA, in Jena Campaign Sourcebook (Fort Leavenworth: The General Service Schools Press, 1922).

12. Clausewitz made a rather passionate statement of his principles and motives for resigning. Part of this is available in English in Karl von Clausewitz, ed./trans. Edward M. Collins [Colonel, USAF], War, Politics, and Power: Selections from On War, and I Believe and Profess (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962).

13. "Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Ergänzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen," often published as an appendix to On War. It is available in two English translations: J.J. Graham's (1873) and Hans Gatzke's (1942). It is generally referred to as Principles of War or "Instruction for the Crown Prince."

14. "Lausewitz." Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 232.

15. Clausewitz's experience at Wavre is analyzed in Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 247-250; Parkinson, Clausewitz: A Biography, chapters 13 and 14; Raymond Aron, trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice­Hall, 1985), 30­31.

16. The next seven volumes of Clausewitz's collected work, mostly campaign studies, appeared over the next few years. Other bits and pieces of his writing were published over the remainder of the century, and a considerable literature grew up in Germany around his life and views. The most accessible bibliography of Clausewitz's original writings and of the German literature can be found in Paret's Clausewitz and the State.

17. Clausewitz's approach has some connections to Plato, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. See esp. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, and W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), emphasizes the differing influences of the Enlightenment, Aufklärung, and Romantic intellectual movements. These connections are real but should not be over-stressed. Clausewitz was well (if self- ) educated and was certainly familiar with these writers, but the only philosopher to whom he made direct reference in discussing On War was Montesquieu. Although On War's approach is essentially dialectical, overt references to any formal dialectical model rarely appear, and Clausewitz's approach appears closer to Ficte's than to Hegel's. Clausewitz's philosophical methods are his own and appear to be quite empirical in origin.

18. See Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 1-12.

19. Clausewitz sometimes wrote as if Napoleon had approached or even achieved the absolute, but this is mere rhetorical excess and clearly inconsistent with his careful definition.

20. On War, Book Two, Chapter 2, section 15.

21. Book Three, Chapter 18, On War.

22. See esp. Book Eight, Chapter 5, "Closer Definition of the Military Objective—Continued: Limited Aims."

23. E.g., On War, Book Three, Chapter 16.

24. This view of Clausewitz's use of history is not universally held. See, for example, John Gooch, "Clio and Mars: The Use and Abuse of History," Journal of Strategic Studies, v.3, no.3 (1980), 21­36. Gooch argued (although his points were somewhat inconsistent) that Clausewitz had used history to support his theories, rather than deriving his theories from history. In fact, he did neither: he derived his theories from experience (both his own and historical) and tested them against history. What makes Clausewitz remarkable as a military theorist is that he actually allowed the test results to modify his argument, sometimes in a radical manner. Gooch's view seems to be based on a rather purist idea of the historian's mission. This aspect of On War will no doubt remain a source of controversy, involving as it does fundamental disputes over the nature of history as a discipline and the values of professional historians.

25. See particularly Book Two, Chapters 5 ("Critical Analysis") and 6 ("On Historical Examples"), and Book Eight, Chapter 3.B. ("Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort to be made").

26. The "Operational" level of thinking is a modern construction encompassing much of what Clausewitz discussed as "strategic"—the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war.

27. Hans Delbrück, trans. [Brigadier General, USA] Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, 4 vols. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975­85).

28. Sun Tzu has been translated into English many times. Sun Tzu, trans. Samuel B. Griffith [Brigadier General, USMC], The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) provides much of the basis for the present discussion.

29. A detailed comparison of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu is outside the boundaries of this study. See, however, Michael I. Handel, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991), which generally accords with my argument.

30. Winning an interstate struggle without combat might be desirable from Clausewitz's point of view but, while war is a continuation of politics, by Clausewitz's definition it involves the admixture of violence. Much of Clausewitz's emphatic rejection of the idea was prompted by the fanciful musings of earlier theorists of a warfare based exclusively on bloodless maneuver. There may be a direct connection of sorts here, for Sun Tzu's work was translated into French in 1772 [Jean Joseph Marie Amiot, Art militaire des Chinois (Paris: Didot l'ainé)] and was popular with writers of the late Enlightenment. The idea also appears, however, in earlier European works like those of Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750), who has likewise been contrasted to Clausewitz.

31. On Jomini, see Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944); Michael Howard, "Jomini and the Classical Tradition," in Michael Howard, ed., The Theory and Practice of War (New York: Praeger, 1966); John Shy, "Jomini," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

32. Henri Jomini, Traité de grande tactique (Paris: Giguet et Michaud, 1805).

33. The best English-language discussion of Jomini's military career can be found in John R. Elting, "Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon?" Military Affairs, Spring 1964, 17-26. Unlike most biographical discussions of the Swiss, which are based on his own highly colored reminiscences to people he wished to impress, Elting's study is based on Xavier de Courville, Jomini, ou de le Devin de Napoleon (Paris: Plon, 1935): "Written by Jomini's descendants, from his personal papers, it is the most impartial of his biographies."

34. Elting, "Jomini."

35. [Francis Egerton, Lord Ellesmere], "Marmont, Siborne, and Alison," Quarterly Review, v.LXXVI (June and September 1845), 204­247, a joint venture of John Gurwood, Egerton, and Wellington himself. See Archives of the John Murray Company, manuscript index to v.LXXVI, Quarterly Review; J.H. Stocqueler (pseud.), The Life of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington (London: Ingram, Cooke, and Company, 1853), v.II, 330.

36. Quoted in Robert M. Johnston, Clausewitz to Date (Cambridge, Mass.: The Military Historian and Economist, 1917), 9­11.

37. See, for example, Articles XVIII-XXII of the Summary.

38. On War, Book Two, Chapter 2.

39. For Jomini's theoretical writings in English translation, see Antoine­Henri Jomini, trans. Col. S.B. Holabird, U.S.A., Treatise on Grand Military Operations: or A Critical and Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great as Contrasted with the Modern System, 2 vols. (New York: D. van Nostrand, 1865); Baron de Jomini, trans. Major O.F. Winship and Lieut. E.E. McLean, The Art of War (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1854). Important derivative works include Dennis Hart Mahan's instructional works for West Point; Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1846); Edward Bruce Hamley (1824­93), The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1866).

40. Most discussions of Jomini compare him to Clausewitz. For explicit efforts to do so, see Department of Military Art and Engineering, USMA, Clausewitz, Jomini, Schlieffen (West Point, 1951 [rewritten, in part, by Colonel [USA] John R. Elting, 1964]); J.E. Edmonds, "Jomini and Clausewitz" [a treatment extremely hostile to the German], Canadian Army Journal, v.V, no.2 (May 1951), 64­69; Joseph L. Harsh, "Battlesword and Rapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil War," Military Affairs, December 1974, 133­138; Major [USAF] Francis S. Jones, "Analysis and Comparison of the Ideas and Later Influences of Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz," Paper, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1985; Colonel [USA] Richard M. Swain, "`The Hedgehog and the Fox': Jomini, Clausewitz, and History," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1990, 98-109.

41. These points are most easily found in the bibliographical essay which opened the original French edition of the Summary, "Notice: sur la théorie actuelle de la guerre et sur son utilité" ("On the Present Theory of War and of Its Utility"). This essay is missing from (or severely edited in) most English language editions, although it is present in the 1854 American translation.

42. On Moltke, see Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (1986), 296-325; Lieut.-Colonel F.E. Whitton, Moltke (New York: H. Holt, 1921). Daniel J. Hughes [USAF School for Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Field, Al.], has prepared a translation, unpublished at this writing, of several of Moltke's works.

43. Grand [German] General Staff, trans. Commander (USN) A.G. Zimmerman, Moltke's Military Works: Precepts of War (Newport: Department of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Naval War College, 1935), Part II, p1.

44. Quoted in Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, v.1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 479.

45. E.g., William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), v.2, 135: "If Clausewitz saw war as a science, the chancellor [Neville Chamberlain] saw it as a business...."

46. Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia (London: J. Murray, 1843), 185.

47. On War, Book Six, Chapter 1.

48. My definitions; Clausewitz does not distinguish the two concepts.

49. For an example of the latter interpretation, see David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 415.

50. See for example Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (New York: Knopf, 1986). Kaufman, 150.

51. See Howard/Paret, eds., On War, fn., p608.

52. E.g., Arnold H. Price, "Clausewitz," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed. (1985).

53. Clausewitz, "Betrachtungen über einen künftigen Kriegsplan gegen Frankreich" (written c.1830), first published by the Historical Section of the General Staff as an appendix to Moltkes Militärische Werke, Teil I: Militärische Korrespondenz, Teil 4 (Berlin, 1902), 181­197.

54. On War, Book Eight, Chapter 2.

55. On War, p88.

56. Russell F. Weigley, "Military Strategy and Civilian Leadership," Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 70, citing Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969-1973), v.1, p65; cf. On War, Book One, Chapter 2.

57. On War, Book Eight, Chapter 2.

58. On War, Book One, Chapter 7.

59. On War, Book One, Chapter 4.

60. E.g., Colonel T.N. Dupuy [USA, ret.], Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House, 1987).

61. Alan D. Beyerchen of Ohio State University was kind enough to let me read his then-unpublished paper, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," International Security, Winter 1992/1993, 59-90. My treatment accordingly reflects some of his insights.

62. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin, 1987), 8.

63. On War, author's preface.

64. On War, Book Eight, Chapter 4.

65. See On War, Book One, Chapter 2, "Purpose and Means in War" and Book Three, Chapter 1.

66. My example, not Clausewitz's.

67. On War, Book One, Chapter 2.

68. On War, Book Four, Chapter 11.

69. See esp. "On the Basic Question of Germany's Existence," in Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, 377-384.

70. On War, Book Three, Chapter 3.

71. As is pointed out by Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 21­22.

72. Book One, Chapter 1, On War.

73. I owe this observation to Alan Beyerchen. For a creative misperception based on the use of the word "duel," see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), fn, 25.

74. On War, Book Three, Chapter 8 (from the 1908 Graham/Maude version).

75. On War, Book Three, Chapter 9; Book Four, Chapter 8.

76. William McElwee, The Art of War from Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 29: "Essentially their work was imitative, based on the profound studies of Carl von Clausewitz into the system and methods which had enabled Napoleon almost to subjugate the whole of Europe." McElwee was speaking of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, Clausewitz's mentors, not his disciples.

77. For example, Bradley S. Klein, "The Politics of the Unstable Balance of Power in Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, and Clausewitz: Citizenship as Armed Virtue and the Evolution of Warfare" (Ph.D. dissertation [political science]: University of Massachusetts, 1984), sees the balance of power mechanism and the nation-state system as inevitably sources of war, a model "intolerable" given the total war experience and the existence of nuclear weapons.

78. On War, Book Six, Chapter 1.

79. It is impossible, of course, to draw a truly accurate picture of Clausewitz's readership. People like William Sloane of Rutger's University Press, Robert Hutchins (president of the University of Chicago), and possibly George Orwell, Nathaniel Wright Stephenson, and Carl Sandburg seem to have had some familiarity with his work. They might be total aberrations or the tip of some significant iceberg.

80. A point also made frequently in print. See for example Joseph Caldwell Wylie [Rear Admiral, USN], Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 1967), 53.

81. Bernard Brodie often made puzzled references, e.g., in his closing essay in the Howard/Paret version of On War, "The Continuing Relevance of On War," 50, to the failure of modern military thought to incorporate and supersede Clausewitz, in the manner in which it has absorbed, say, Adam Smith's contribution to economics.