This review appeared in War in History,
1995, vol.2 (3), p.359. It is displayed here with the permission of War
in History and its publisher, Edward Arnold. Copyright Edward Arnold,
1994. All rights reserved.
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Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain
and America 18151845. By Christopher Bassford. New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 1994. x + 293pp. £32.50
ISBN 0-19-508383-0.
A study of Clausewitz's influence and of the way he was interpreted
by later generations must be based on a sound understanding both of what
Clausewitz meant to say and of the general historical background of those
who interpreted him. Clausewitz in English, growing out of a doctoral
dissertation, falls short on both counts.
The introductory chapter intended to present Clausewitz's ideas relies
apart from On War itself, only on his The Principles of War, and ignores the continuous and highly important sequence of writings,
from 1804 on, in which he developed his views on the theory of war. Bassford's
presentation is thus confined to the same narrow source material which
always hindered English readers of Clausewitz; indeed, it duplicates their
`misconceptions', especially of the kind popular since the mid1950s.
Apparently, some time during the course of his work Bassford became aware
of the more recent scholarly attention to the fact that before the crucial
shift which had taken place in Clausewitz's thought from 1827 onward,
he had exalted allout war as the only legitimate type of war. When
Clausewitz began to qualify and amend this earlier view he was already
halfway through his work on On War, which he never lived to
complete. All the same, although Bassford recognizes at one point that On War is an incomplete draft and is `essentially two very different
books superimposed' (p. 14), in the rest of this chapter he none the less
repeats his predecessors' attempts to explain the book's ideas as a coherent
whole, reproducing their muchworn cliches. In addition, he takes
no account of the very real nature of the predicament of readers
of On War ever since, who were obliged to make sense of these `two
very different books' under one cover.
In respect to Clausewitz's influence or reception in Britain and the United
States, the subjectmatter of most of the book, Clausewitz in English faces the problem that there was scarcely any such influence in Britain
until the late 1890s, and even less in the United States until the interwar
period or even the Second World War. The author thus often resorts to
peculiar assertions and speculations, and exhibits dubious historical
judgement, in order to keep his subject alive and interesting. He cites,
for example, Clausewitz's campaign histories, a couple of standard, insignificant
reviews of On War in British journals (as well as John Mitchell's
exceptional Germanophile case, which has been treated by others) as evidence
that Clausewitz was not entirely unknown in Britain before 1873,
the year On War was translated. He then claims that there is no
evidence that the translation, appearing at that particular time rather
than at any other during the preceding forty years, was prompted by Prussia's
triumphs in 1866 and 18701, notwithstanding the fact that the whole
British defence system was then undergoing major reform (Cardwell's) in
response to the Prussian achievement. He suggests that Clausewitz was
known, and influential, in America through Jomini's criticism of him in
the former's highly influential books. And he toys with the speculation
that Lincoln himself was familiar with, and influenced by, Clausewitz's
teaching.
During the twenty years preceding the First World War, Clausewitz and
German military ideas finally became fairly well known and influential
in Britain. Bassford meticulously catalogues references to Clausewitz,
but his discussion of their significance rarely goes beyond the trivial
and is poorly integrated into the wider historical picture. He fails to
make use of books which bear directly on his subject, such as Tim Travers' The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence
of Modern Warfare 1900-1918 (1987). There is nothing new in his
discussion of Fuller and Liddell Hart during the interwar period, and
the only interesting stuff is the details on the life stories of the German
expatriates (mostly of Jewish origin) who emigrated to the United States
during the Nazi period. As Bassford writes correctly, they were instrumental
in bringing about the `Clausewitz renaissance' in the West from the 1950s
onwards. But this period falls beyond the chronological scope of Clausewitz
in English.
AZAR GAT
Tel Aviv University
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