Clausewitz, Nonlinearity
and the
Unpredictability of War

By Alan D. Beyerchen
Ohio State University
Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,"
International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90. © Copyright
1993 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Reprinted as Appendix 1 in Tom Czerwinski, Coping
With the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1998). Also reprinted in French
as "Clausewitz: Non Linéarité et
Imprévisibilité de la Guerre," in Theorie, Littérature,
Enseignement, 12 (1994), pp165-98. We've posted it here because the
NDU webmasters keep changing their URLs unpredictably [yes, how ironic],
and it's too important an article--possibly the most important piece on
Clausewitz since c.1976-- to leave unavailable. [Page background is a fractal
image by Michael
Coleman]
Introduction
What is "Nonlinearity"?
Is War Nonlinear for Clausewitz?
How Does Nonlinearity Manifest Itself in On War?
Unpredictability
From Interaction
Unpredictability From Friction
Unpredictability From Chance
The Role of Linearity
Implications
Notes
NOTE: This version of the article was
originally posted to the NDU website with a number of potentially significant
typographical errors. (Interestingly, it looked like somebody had actually
retyped and subconsciously "corrected" nonlinear imagery he/she
found intuitively "wrong.") Wecannot guarantee that these errors
have all been corrected in this file, though we've tried. EDITOR, Clausewitz.com.
Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty,
our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating.
Clausewitz, On War, Book One, Chapter 1
Despite
the frequent invocations of his name in recent years, especially during
the Gulf War, there is something deeply perplexing about the work of
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). In particular, his unfinished magnum
opus On War seems to offer a theory of war, at the same time
that it perversely denies many of the fundamental preconditions of theory
as such -simplification, generalization and prediction, among others.
(1) The book continues to draw the attention of both
soldiers and theorists of war, although soldiers often find the ideas
of Clausewitz too philosophical to appear practical, while analysts
usually find his thoughts too empirical to seem elegant. Members of
both groups sense that there is too much truth in what he writes to
ignore him. Yet, as the German historian Hans Rothfels has bluntly put
it, Clausewitz is an author "more quoted that actually read." (2)
Lofty but pragmatic, by a theorist who repudiated conventional meanings
of theory, On War endures as a compelling and enigmatic classic.
Just what is the difficulty with Clausewitz that makes his work so significant
yet so difficult to assimilate? On War's admirers have sensed that
it grapples with war's complexity more realistically than perhaps any
other work. Its difficulty, however, has prompted different explanations
even among Clausewitz partisans. Raymond Aron has spoken for those who
believe that the incomplete and unpolished nature of On War is
the primary source of misunderstanding: as Clausewitz repeatedly revises
his treatise, he comes to a deeper understanding of his own ideas, but
before his untimely death he brings his fully developed insights to bear
only upon the final revision of Chapter 1 of Book One. (3)
A second approach to the question is exemplified by Peter Paret's stress
on the changing interpretation of any significant author over time. Clausewitz's
writings have suffered more distortions than most, Paret has suggested,
because abstracting this body of work from its times does violence to
its insistence on unifying the universal with the historical particular.
Thus for Paret the literature on Clausewitz has been "fragmented and contradictory
in its findings" because of our lack of historical consciousness. (4)
A third route to explaining the difficulties encountered in coping with
On War has been typified by Michael Handel, for whom the issue
is not so much changes in our interpretations as changes in warfare itself.
Those aspects of On War that deal with human nature, uncertainty,
politics, and rational calculation "will remain eternally valid," he contended.
"In all other respects technology has permeated and irreversibly changed
every aspect of warfare." (5) For Handel, the essential
problem in understanding Clausewitz lies in our confrontation with a reality
qualitatively different from his. Each of these approaches has merit,
yet none satisfies completely. I offer a revision of our perception of
Clausewitz and his work by suggesting that Clausewitz displays an intuition
concerning war that we can better comprehend with terms and concepts newly
available to us: On War is suffused with the understanding that
every war is inherently a nonlinear phenomenon, the conduct of which changes
its character in ways that cannot be analytically predicted. I am not
arguing that reference to a few of today's "nonlinear science" concepts
would help us clarify confusion in Clausewitz's thinking. My suggestion
is more radical: in a profoundly unconfused way, he understands that seeking
exact analytical solutions does not fit the nonlinear reality of the problems
posed by war, and hence that our ability to predict the course and outcome
of any given conflict is severely limited.
The correctness of Clausewitz's perception has both kept his work relevant
and made it less accessible, for war's analytically unpredictable nature
is extremely discomfiting to those searching for a predictive theory.
An approach through nonlinearity does not make other reasons for difficulty
in understanding On War evaporate. It does, however, provide new
access to the realistic core of Clausewitz's insights and offers a correlation
of the representations of chance and complexity that characterize his
work. Furthermore, it may help us remove some unsettling blind spots that
have prevented us from seeing crucial implications of his work.
What is "Nonlinearity"?
"Nonlinearity" refers to something that is "not linear." This is obvious,
but since the implicit structure of our works often reveals hidden habits
of mind, it is useful to reflect briefly on some tacit assumptions. Like
other members of a large class of terms, "nonlinear" indicates that the
norm is what it negates. Words such as periodic or asymmetrical, disequilibrium
or nonequilibrium are deeply rooted in a cultural heritage that stems from
the classical Greeks. The underlying notion is that "truth" resides in the
simple (and thus the stable, regular, and consistent) rather than in the
complex (and therefore the unstable, irregular, and inconsistent). (6)
The result has been an authoritative guide for our Western intuition,
but one that is idealized and liable to mislead us when the surrounding
world and its messy realities do not fit this notion. An important basis
for confusion is association of the norm not only with simplicity, but
with obedience to rules and thus with expected behavior-which places blinders
on our ability to see the world around us. Nonlinear phenomena are thus
usually regarded as recalcitrant misfits in our catalog of norms, although
they are actually more prevalent than phenomena that conform to the rules
of linearity. This can seriously distort perceptions of what is central
and what is marginal-a distortion that Clausewitz as a realist understands
in On War.
"Linear" applies in mathematics to a system of equations whose variables
can be plotted against each other as a straight line. For a system to
be linear it must meet two simple conditions. The first is proportionality,
indicating that changes in system output are proportional to changes in
system input. Such systems display what in economics is called "constant
returns to scale," implying that small causes produce small effects, and
that large causes generate large effects. The second condition of linearity,
called additivity or superposition, underlies the process of analysis.
The central concept is that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts.
This allows the problem to be broken up into smaller pieces that, once
solved, can be added back together to obtain the solution to the original
problem. (7)
Nonlinear systems are those that disobey proportionality or additivity.
They may exhibit erratic behavior through disproportionately large or
disproportionately small outputs, or they may involve "synergistic" interactions
in which the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts. (8)
If the behavior of a system can appropriately be broken into parts that
can be compartmentalized, it may be classified as linear, even if it is
described by a complicated equation with many terms. If interactions are
irreducible features of the system, however, it is nonlinear even if described
by relatively simple equations.
Nonlinear phenomena have always abounded in the real world. (9)
But often the equations needed to describe the behavior of nonlinear systems
over time are very difficult or impossible to solve analytically. Systems
with feedback loops, delays, "trigger effects," and qualitative changes
over time produce surprises, often abruptly crossing a threshold into
a qualitatively different regime of behavior. The weather, fluid turbulence,
combustion, breaking or cracking, damping, biological evolution, biochemical
reactions in living organisms, and hysteresis in electronic systems offer
examples of nonlinear phenomena. Although some analytical techniques have
been generated over the centuries to cope with systems characterized by
nonlinearity, until the advent of numerical techniques offered by computers
its study has been relatively limited. (10)
In contrast, sophisticated analytical techniques for solving linear equations
have been developed over the centuries, becoming the preferred tools in
nearly all technical fields by the latter portion of the nineteenth century.
Due to the structural storability of a linear system, once we know a little
about it we can calculate and predict a great deal. The normal procedure
has thus been to find mathematical techniques or physical justification
for an idealized "linearization" of a natural or technological system.
Such an idealized version of a system is often constructed by throwing
out the nonlinear "approximation." In commonly used terms, one thus goes
from equations that "blow up" to those that are "well-behaved." In fact,
mathematician Ian Stewart has noted:
- Classical mathematics concentrated on linear equations for a sound
pragmatic reason: it could solve anything else....So docile are linear
equations that the classical mathematicians were willing to compromise
their physics to get them. So the classical theory deals with shallow
waves, low-amplitude vibrations, small temperature gradients. (11)
As is often the case, reality has been selectively addressed in order to
manipulate it with the tools available. Clausewitz pointedly contrasted
his own approach with the implicit dependence upon such selectivity among
military theorists of his era, such as Heinrich von Bulow or Antoine-Henri
de Jomini. (12)
The resort to idealized linearizations has been legitimated by the assumption,
increasingly dubious, that reality is ultimately simple and stable. This
assumption works well for linear systems, and even relatively well for
those nonlinear systems that are stable enough to be treated using the
techniques of linear analysis or control theory. But it turns out to be
misleading when applied to the many more systems that are unstable under
even small perturbations. As Stewart implied, this was understood by the
more thoughtful of the classical mathematicians and physicists. James
Clerk Maxwell, one of the greatest scientists of the nineteenth century,
displayed a keen awareness of the limitations of assuming that systems
in the real world are structurally stable:
- When the state of things is such that an infinitely small variation
of the present state will alter only by an infinitely small quantity
the state at some future time, the condition of the system, whether
at rest or in motion, is said to be stable; but when an infinitely
small variation in the present state may bring about a finite difference
in the state of the system in a finite time, the condition of the
system is said to be unstable. It is manifest that the existence of
unstable conditions renders impossible the prediction of future events,
if our knowledge of the present state is only approximate, and not
accurate....it is a metaphysical doctrine that from the same antecedents
follow the same consequents. No one can gainsay this. But it is not
of much use in a world like this, in which the same antecedents never
again concur, and nothing ever happens twice...The physical axiom
which has a somewhat similar aspect is "That from like antecedents
follow like consequents." But here we have passed from sameness to
likeness, from absolute accuracy to a more or less rough approximation.
(13)
Thus Maxwell held that analytical mathematical rules are not always reliable
guides to the real world. We must often rely on statistical probabilities
or approximate solutions reached by numerical techniques.
What is new is that computers have allowed us to attack nonlinear problems
numerically, in the process highlighting patterns of instability that
have captured scientific and popular imaginations alike. The various fields
of "nonlinear science"-such as those that deal with solitons, fractals,
cellular automata, and self-organization systems far from thermodynamic
equilibrium-have been stimulated and enhanced by powerful computer graphics
techniques for scientific visualization or "mathematical experiments."
Their shared aesthetic conceptions about the positive value of complexity
create multiple connections among them. (14)
On of the most visible aspects of nonlinear science is the portion of
nonlinear dynamics popularly known as "Chaos Theory." "Chaos" results
when a system is nonlinear and "sensitive to initial conditions." This
is the case even in a deterministic system for which the analytical laws
and variables are known. (15) Such sensitivity is exactly
what Maxwell meant: Immeasurably small differences in input can produce
entirely different outcomes for the system, yielding various behavior
routes to a degree of complexity that exhibits characteristics of randomness-hence
the term "chaos." For persons accustomed to expecting linear behavior,
it is disconcerting that regions of deterministic chaos and predictable
order can coexist for the same system. Furthermore, the very nature or
definition of the system can change, and can do so rather abruptly, with
transitions that usually depend on the parameters of the system more than
on the variables within the system. In effect, parameters set the context,
and the idealized boundaries they represent often contrast starkly with
the indistinctness of boundaries in the real world. (16)
In a chaotic regime, a system is dynamically unstable, so that nearly
all input values for the variables lead to unpredictable, irregular behavior
by the system.
Chaotic systems have raised some fundamental questions about relationships
among order, randomness, and predictability, especially since the equations
that represent them can be surprisingly simple. One of the first contemporary
examples of chaos was encountered in meteorology in the early 1960s when
the applied mathematician Edward Lorenz set up three linked first-order
differential equations in a computer model of weather development. With
certain parameters, the system proved so sensitive to the initial conditions
that it was estimated that quite literally a butterfly flapping its wings
in one part of the world would be sufficient to cause a major storm to
emerge somewhere else. An arbitrarily small change could generate an entirely
different history for the system. Obviously, acquisition and management
of the precision and the amount of input data necessary for exact prediction
pose an impractical problem, but the large scale of the atmospheric system
is actually not the issue. The difficulty arises merely from multiplying
pairs of the variables in two of the three coupled equations. (17)
The heart of the matter is that the system's variables cannot be effectively
isolated from each other or from their context; linearization is not possible,
because dynamic interaction is one of the system's defining characteristics.
The question is whether, according to Clausewitz, wars are also nonlinear
systems.
Is War Nonlinear for Clausewitz?
In Chapter I of Book One, Clausewitz engages the reader with three increasingly
sophisticated definitions of war, each one of which is prominently marked
by nonlinearity. The first definition is that war "is nothing but a duel
[Zweikampf] on a larger scale....an act of force to compel our enemy to
do our will." (18) Because each opponent has the same
intent, war is inherently an "interaction" (Wechselwirkung): it "is not
the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total nonresistance would
be no war at all) but always the collision of two living forces." (19)
For Clausewitz, the interactive nature of war produces a system driven by
psychological forces and characterized by positive feedback, leading "in
theory" to limitless extremes of mutual exertion and efforts to get the
better of one another. The course of a given war becomes thereby not the
mere sequence of intentions and actions of each opponent, but the pattern
or shape generated by mutually hostile intentions and simultaneously consequential
actions. The contest is not the presence or actions of each opponent added
together. It is the dynamic set of patterns made in the space between and
around the contestants. This may not be immediately evident if we think
of a duel with swords or with pistols. But it is obvious in a match between
two wrestlers, which is how Clausewitz himself suggests we imagine the Zweikampf
(literally "two-struggle") between opponents in war: the bodily positions
and contortions that emerge in wrestling are often impossible to achieve
without the counterforce and counterweight of an opponent. (20)
Clausewitz stresses that the logic of war in the abstract, with its limitless
escalation of cost and effort, contradicts human experience; there are
always constraints on human action. Only if war were some hermetically
sealed phenomenon could its fundamental nature rage on unchecked. This
would require that war (a) be an isolated and sudden act without prelude,
(b) consist of a single decisive act or set of simultaneous ones, and
(c) achieve a result perfectly complete in itself. But Clausewitz contends
that an actual war never occurs without a context; that it always takes
time to conduct, in a series of interactive steps; and that its results
are never absolutely final-all of which impose restrictions on the analytically
simple "pure theory" of war. Any specific war is subject to historical
contingencies; thus he concludes that the theoretical basis for prediction
of the course of the war dissolves from any analytical certainties into
numerical possibilities. (21) Wars, therefore, are
not only characterized by feedback (a process distinctly involving nonlinearities),
but inseparable from their contexts.
The unique political situation is the context that bounds the system
constituted by a given war. It must be considered carefully, Clausewitz
argues, for
- the same political object can elicit differing reactions from different
peoples, and even from the same people at different times....Between
two peoples and two states there can be such tensions, such a mass
of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a
wholly disproportionate effect-a real explosion. (22)
Note the nonlinear image of combustion, and the view that the prevailing
political conditions rather than the intended "political object" constitute
the parameters that determine fundamental regimes of behavior in the system.
(23) The emphasis on the changeable political context
also contrasts sharply with the view held by many theorists (then and in
our own time) that the parameters of war must be readily quantifiable military
categories such as logistical factors, characteristics of weaponry, etc.
(24)
Consideration of the political environment leads Clausewitz to generate
his famous second definition of war as "merely the continuation of policy
[Politik, which also means "politics" in German] by other means." (25)
He claims that war is never autonomous, for it is always an instrument
of policy. Yet the relationship is not static; it implies neither that
the instrument is unchanging nor that the political goal or policy itself
is immune to feedback effects. Using another image of explosion, he argues:
- War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore
variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy.
War moves on its goal with varying speeds; but it always lasts long
enough for the influence to be exerted on the goal and for its own
course to be changed in one way or another....That, however, does
not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself
to its chosen means, a process that can radically change it; yet the
political aim remains the first consideration. (26)
The ends-means relationship clearly does not work in a linear fashion. The
constant interplay is an interactive, feedback process that constitutes
an intrinsic feature of war. Clausewitz's conception is that the conduct
of any war affects its character, and its altered character feeds back into
the political ends that guide its conduct. War is, he says, a "true chameleon"
that exhibits a different nature in every concrete instance. (27)
To reach an understanding of the character of war in general is a purpose
of theory and, to describe how that theory functions, Clausewitz resorts
to a third definition that he elucidates in terms of a striking metaphor
of nonlinearity. In the last section of Chapter 1, Book One, he claims
that war is "a remarkable trinity" (eine wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) composed
of (a) the blind, natural force of violence, hatred, and enmity among
the masses of people; (b) chance and probability, faced or generated by
the commander and his army; and (c) war's rational subordination to the
policy of the government.(28) Clausewitz compares
these three tendencies to three varying legal codes interacting with each
other (the complexity of which would have been obvious to anyone who lived
under the tangled web of superimposed legal systems in the German area
before, during, and after the upheavals of the Napoleonic years). Then
he concludes with a visual metaphor: "Our task therefore is to develop
a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like
an object suspended between three magnets." (29)
What better image could he have conjured to convey his insight into the
profoundly interactive nature of war than this emblem of contemporary
nonlinear science? (30)
Although the passage is usually taken to mean only that we should not
overemphasize any one element in the trinity, Clausewitz's metaphor also
implicitly confronts us with the chaos inherent in a nonlinear system
sensitive to initial conditions. The demonstration usually starts with
a magnet pendulum hanging over one magnet; when the pendulum is pulled
aside and let go, it comes to rest quickly. Positioned over two equally
powerful magnets, the pendulum swings toward first one, then the other,
and still settles into a rest position as it is captured by one of the
points of attraction. But when a pendulum is released over three equidistant
and equally powerful magnets, it moves irresolutely to and fro as it darts
among the competing points of attraction, sometimes kicking out high to
acquire added momentum that allows it to keep gyrating in a startlingly
long and intricate pattern. Eventually, the energy dissipates under the
influence of friction in the suspension mountings and the air, bringing
the pendulum's movement asymptotically to rest. The probability is vanishingly
small that an attempt to repeat the process would produce exactly the
same pattern. Even such a simple system is complex enough for the details
of the trajectory of any actual "run" to be, effectively, irreproducible.
My claim here is not that Clausewitz somehow anticipated today's "chaos
theory," but that he perceived and articulated the nature of war as an
energy-consuming phenomenon involving competing and interactive factors,
attention to which reveals a messy mix of order and unpredictability.
His final metaphor of Chapter 1, Book One captures this understanding
perfectly. The pendulum and magnets system is orderly, because it is a
deterministic system that obeys Newton's laws of motion; in the "pure
theory" (with an idealized frictionless pendulum), we only need to know
the relevant quantities accurately enough to know its future. But in the
real world, "a world like this" in Maxwell's phrase, it is not possible
to measure the relevant initial conditions (such as position) accurately
enough to replicate them in order to get the same pattern a second time,
because all physical measurements are approximations limited by the instrument
and standard of measurement. And what is needed is infinitely fine precision,
for an immeasurably small change in the initial conditions can produce
a significantly different pattern. Nor is it possible to isolate the system
from all possible influences around it, and that environment will have
changed since the measurements were taken. Anticipation of the overall
kind of pattern is possible, but quantitative predictability of the actual
trajectory is lost.
There are a number of interconnected reasons for the pendulum and magnets
picture to be emblematic for Clausewitz, and all of them go to the heart
of the problem of understanding what he meant by a "theory" of war. First
of all, the image is not that of any kind of Euclidean triangle or triad,
despite its understanding as such by many readers. Given his attacks on
the formulation of rigidly "geometric" principles of war by some of his
contemporaries, such an image would have been highly inapt. (31)
Clausewitz's message is not that there are three passive points, but three
interactive points of attraction that are simultaneously pulling the object
in different directions and forming complex interactions with each other.
In fact, even the standard translation given above is too static, for
the German original conveys a sense of on-going motion: "Die Aufgabe ist
also, dass sich die Theorie zwischen diesen drei Tendenzen wie zwischen
drei Anziehungspunkten schwebend erhalte." (32) Literally:
"The task is therefore that the theory would maintain itself floating
among these three tendencies as among three points of attraction." The
connotations of schweben involve lighter-than-air, sensitive motion; a
balloon or a ballerina "schwebt." The image is no more static than that
of wrestlers. The nature of war should not be conceived as a stationary
point among the members of the trinity, but as a complex trajectory traced
among them.
Secondly, Clausewitz's employment of magnetism is a typical resort to
"high-tech" imagery. The relationship of magnetism to electricity was
just beginning to be clarified in a way that made it a cutting-edge concept
for its time. It is quite possible that he actually observed a demonstration
of a pendulum and three magnets as envisioned in the metaphor, for he
was a man of considerable scientific literacy. (33)
His famous incorporation of the notion of "friction," also a high-technology
concept for his day, is another example of this characteristic of his
thought.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the metaphor offers us insight
into a mind realistically willing to abandon the search for simplicity
and analytical certainty where they are not obtainable. The use of this
image displays an intuitive grasp of dynamic processes that can be isolated
neither from their context nor from chance, and are thus characterized
by inherent complexities and probabilities. It encodes Clausewitz's sense
of war in a realistic dynamical system, not an idealized analytical abstraction.
The image of the interactive "remarkable trinity" is thus a densely rich
metaphor, but is it only a literary device? A stylistic trick? Or is it
fundamental to understanding Clausewitz? Raymond Aron thought it representative
of a major shift from dualism to a form of triadism that constituted the
final state of Clausewitz's thought. (34) Michael Howard
ended his excellent short biography with this trinity, and suggested that
it formed both Clausewitz's conclusion and a good starting place for any
contemporary strategic thinker. (35)
But the pendulum-and-magnets metaphor reveals more than Clausewitz's
concluding thought. If the metaphor can bear the burden of my contention,
On War ought to be filled with insights intended to identify and
cope with nonlinearities. Clausewitz ought to display a deep and abiding
concern for unpredictability and complexity, and consequently to search
for ways to express the importance of such matters as context, interaction,
effects disproportionate to their causes, sensitivity to initial conditions,
time-dependent evolutionary processes, and the serious limitations of
linear analysis. If he does, we will have a viable explanation for the
compelling nature of On War and many of its difficulties for readers,
because the intuition needed to investigate nonlinear dynamical systems
runs counter to much of what has constituted scientific theory since the
time of Galileo and Newton.
How Does Nonlinearity Manifest Itself in On War?
Clausewitz's emphasis on unpredictability is a key manifestation of the
role that nonlinearity plays in his work. This emphasis links widely recognized,
fundamental, enduring elements of On War. A look at what Clausewitz
says about "interaction," "friction," and "chance" may allow us to explore
his understanding of the nonlinear nature of war.
Unpredictability From Interaction
It may seem obvious that war is an interactive process, yet Clausewitz was
at great pains to emphasize the point and to assail his contemporaries for
ignoring this basic aspect of reality. That war is profoundly interactive
is underscored by each of the definitions of the phenomenon in Chapter 1,
Book One. The question is whether Clausewitz related this concept to the
unpredictability that characterizes nonlinear systems. The answer is unequivocally
yes. In Chapter 3 of Book Two, Clausewitz considers whether the study of
war is an art or a science. He concludes that it is neither:
- The essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the
will directed at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical
arts, or at matter which is animate but passive and yielding, as is
the case with the human mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war,
the will is directed at an animate object that reacts. (36)
A military action produces not a single reaction, but dynamic interactions
and anticipations that pose a fundamental problem for any theory. Such patterns
can be theorized only in qualitative and general terms, not in the specific
detail needed for prediction:
- The second attribute of military action is that it must expect
positive reactions, and the process of interaction that results. Here
we are not concerned with the problem of calculating such reactions-that
is really part of the already mentioned problem of calculating psychological
forces-but rather with the fact that the very nature of interaction
is bound to make it unpredictable. (37)
Clausewitz thus understood an essential feature of nonlinearity and applied
its consequences in his understanding of war: the core cause of analytical
unpredictability in war is the very nature of interaction itself.
Interaction occurs not just between adversaries, but also in processes
that occur on each side as a consequence of the contest. This is demonstrated
in Book Four, as Clausewitz discusses the differing effects of victory
or defeat on the battlefield. The consequences are often disproportionately
felt:
- As we have already mentioned in Chapter Seven, the scale of victory
does not increase simply at the rate commensurate with the increase
in the size of the defeated armies, but progressively. The outcome
of a major battle has a greater psychological effect on the loser
than on the winner. This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of
material strength [through abandonment of weapons in a retreat or
desertions from the army], which is echoed in loss of morale; the
two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the
other. (38)
Such an amplifying feedback process is as nonlinear as those in any field,
from turbulence in the atmosphere to the optics of the laser.
Clausewitz's concern for interaction permeates On War, and it
has certainly commanded the attention of commentators. The crucial importance
of interaction is usually framed in terms of Clausewitz's "dialectical"
method, although his non-Marxist adherents have usually been at pains
to distinguish the dialectic in Clausewitz's work from Hegel's method.
(39) Aron, in particular, devoted an entire section
of his two-volume study to Clausewitz's dialectic. He argued that the
categories termed "moral-physical," "means-ends," and "defense-attack"
formed the "three conceptual pairs around which the system develops."
(40) He recognized better than many commentators that
Clausewitz does not demand binary opposites and is willing to live with
ambiguity:
- [Clausewitz] explicitly recognizes that the clear opposition of
two poles risks becoming confused in the intermediate zones....In
reality, the distinctions, conceptually clear-cut, give way to doubtful
cases or even to mixed cases. Clausewitz does not see real objections
in these remarks: the distinction, conceptually valid, does not preclude
uncertain boundaries in reality. (41)
Aron's use of the word "risks" (risque), however, perhaps betrayed discomfort
with the analytical ambiguity that comes with taking interaction seriously.
Clausewitz himself displays no unease with ambiguity in the passages
under discussion. He appears, on the contrary, to relish the complexity
of the relationship between tactics and strategy:
- The art of war in the narrower sense must now in its turn be broken
down into tactics and strategy. The first is concerned with the form
of the individual engagement, the second with its use....Admittedly
only the rankest pedant would expect theoretical distinctions to show
direct results on the battlefield. ...Tactics and strategy are two
activities that permeate one another in time and space but are nevertheless
essentially different. Their inherent laws and mutual relationship
cannot be understood without a total comprehension of both. (42)
The purpose of theory is to untangle confusion by creating distinctions,
but to do so in order to understand the whole better, not for the sake of
pedantic analytical compartmentalization.
What interests Clausewitz, I argue, is not so much either pole in any
of his analytical pairs, nor even either opponent in war, but the tangled
dynamics occurring between them. This is consistent with the wrestlers'
image of the Zweikampf. Many theorists tend, for the sake of analytical
simplicity, to force war into the model sequence of move-countermove.
But any good commander will seek to take advantage of the disproportionate
effects or unpredictable situations generated by nonlinearities. Furthermore,
war is not chess; one's opponent is not always playing by the same rules,
and is often, in the effort to win, attempting to change what rules there
are. This is a major reason that how war is conducted can and does change
its character, and that any war is (in Maxwell's sense) structurally unstable.
Capturing the essence of this "true chameleon" is Clausewitz's aim. He
is therefore willing to accept uncertainty and complex interaction as
major factors in order to cope with what is happening along the hazy boundaries
where the opposing forces in war, or contending categories in theory,
are actually engaged. Facing up to the intrinsic presence of chance, complexity,
and ambiguity in war is imperative. For Clausewitz, this is preferable
to the risk of being blind-sided by the strictures of a theory artificially
imposed on the messiness of reality in the name of clarity.
Unpredictability From Friction
A key element of reality for Clausewitz is the ubiquity of "friction," the
"only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish
real war from war on paper." (43) This concept is
usually interpreted as a form of "Murphy's Law": whatever can go wrong,
will, and at the worst possible moment. That interpretation is not bad as
far as it goes, but its presentation is usually skewed. The implication
is that things go right until some exogenous factor ruins the situation.
But for Clausewitz friction is neither extrinsic nor abnormal:
- Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.
The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction
that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war....Countless
minor incidents-the kind you can never really foresee-combine to lower
the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of
the intended goal....The military machine-the army and everything
related to it-is basically very simple and therefore seems easy to
manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is
of one piece: each part is composed of individuals,. . . .the least
important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them
go wrong....This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics,
be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance,
and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they
are largely due to chance. (44)
The concept of friction is not just a statement that in war things always
deviate from plan, but a sophisticated sense of why they do so. The analytical
world, epitomized by the "frictionless pendulum" or the "perfectly spherical
billiard ball on a frictionless surface" or "low-amplitude vibrations" so
common in elementary physics, is one of linear rules and predictable effects.
The real world and real war are characterized by the unforeseeable effects
generated through the nonlinearity of interaction.
"Friction" as used by Clausewitz entails two different but related notions
that demonstrate the depth of his powers of observation and intuition.
One meaning is the physical sense of resistance embodied in the word itself,
which in Clausewitz's time was being related to heat in ways that would
lead ultimately to the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the concept of
entropy. (45) Friction is a nonlinear feedback effect
that leads to the heat dissipation of energy in a system. The dissipation
is a form of increasing degradation toward randomness, the essence of
entropy. Even in peacetime, the degradation of performance in an army
is a continual problem. In war, the difficulties are amplified. Military
friction is counteracted by training, discipline, inspections, regulations,
orders, and other means, not the least of which, according to Clausewitz,
is the "iron will" of the commander. (46) New energy
and effort are sucked into the open system, yet things still never go
as planned; dissipation is endemic due to the interactive nature of the
parts of the system.
The second meaning of "friction" is the information theory sense of what
we have recently come to call "noise" in the system. Entropy and information
have some interesting formal similarities, because both can be thought
of as measuring the possibilities for the behavior of systems. According
to information theory, the more possibilities a system embodies, the more
"information" it contains. Constraints on those possibilities are needed
to extract signals from the noise. Clausewitz understands that plans and
commands are signals that inevitably get garbled amid noise in the process
of communicating them down and through the ranks even in peacetime, much
less under the effects of physical exertion and danger in combat. His
well-known discussion of the difficulty in obtaining accurate intelligence
presents the problem from the inverse perspective, as noise permeates
the generation and transmission of information rising upward through the
ranks. (47) From this perspective, his famous metaphor
of the "fog" of war is not so much about a dearth of information as how
distortion and overload of information produce uncertainty as to the actual
state of affairs.
Clausewitz's basic intuition here is that organizations are always slower
and more inflexible than the natural events they are intended to control.
Seen in this light, training, regulations, procedures, and so on are redundancies
that enhance the probability of signal recognition through the noise.
On the basis of linear assumptions, one expects major obstacles to produce
proportionately serious errors in responding to the message. Clausewitz
emphasizes, however, the disproportionately large role of the least important
of individuals and of minor, unforeseeable incidents. "Friction" conveys
Clausewitz's sense of how unnoticeably small causes can become amplified
in war until they produce macroeffects, and that one can never anticipate
those effects. (48) The issue is not just that "for
want of a nail the shoe was lost....," but that one can never calculate
in advance which nail on which shoe will turn out to be critical. Due
to our ignorance of the exact initial conditions, the cause of a given
effect must, for all intents and purposes, often be treated as unavoidable
chance.
Unpredictability From Chance
How are we to understand "chance," which Clausewitz finds pervasive? It
is one of the three points of attraction in his definition of war as a remarkable
trinity, and he emphasizes that "no other human activity is so continuously
or universally bound up with chance" as is war. (49)
It is associated also with the fog of uncertainty in war, which obscures
or distorts most of the factors on which action is based. Yet he nowhere
provides a succinct definition of chance.
The connection between chance and uncertainty provides a means of understanding
both, if we draw on the insights of the late nineteenth-century mathematician
Henri Poincaré, whose understanding of the matter was powerful
enough that he is a frequently cited source in nonlinear science today.
Poincaré argued that chance comes in three guises: a statistically
random phenomenon; the amplification of a microcause; or a function of
our analytical blindness. He described the first as the familiar form
of chance that can arise where permutations of small causes are extremely
numerous or where the number of variables is quite large. This form of
chance can be calculated by statistical methods. The very large number
of interactions produces a disorganization sufficient to result in a symmetrical
(i.e., Gaussian or bell curve) probability distribution. Nothing significant
is left of the initial conditions, and the history of the system no longer
matters. (50) It is possible that Clausewitz was aware
of this general line of reasoning. As with magnetism and friction, important
developments in probability theory were occurring in Clausewitz's time,
and we know that he read intensely in mathematical treatises. (51)
Of course On War does not present this statistically tractable
form of chance in exactly the way Poincaré explained it later,
although commentators have noted that Clausewitz often refers to the role
of probability in a commander's calculations. (52)
In Chapter 1, Book One, he notes that "absolute, so-called mathematical
factors" are not sound bases for such calculations due to the "interplay
of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad" that are endemic in
war. The "games of chance" most amenable to statistical treatment are
those like dice and coin tossing, but when Clausewitz compares war to
a gamble, he does not use either. For him, "in the whole range of human
activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards." (53)
This analogy suggests not only the ability to calculate probabilities,
but knowledge of human psychology in "reading" the other players, sensing
when to take risks, and so on. Clausewitz certainly understands that the
number of variables in war can be enormous, and that a rather special
aptitude is needed to cope with the chance and complexity involved:
- Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable,
that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated-mostly in the light
of probabilities [Wahrscheinlichkeitsgesetze] alone. The man responsible
for evaluating the whole must bring to his task the quality of intuition
that perceives the truth at every point. Otherwise a chaos of opinions
and considerations would arise, and fatally entangle judgment. Bonaparte
rightly said in this connection that many of the decisions faced by
the commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the
gifts of a Newton or an Euler. (54)
Since a mathematician of the likes of Newton or Euler is unlikely to be
making military decisions, those in command have to rely on judgment rooted
in intuition, common sense, and experience. Statistical laws of probability
alone will never suffice, because moral factors always enter into real war,
and it is possible for the results of any given action to defy the odds.
This is one of the most important facts that experience indeed provides.
(55)
A second form of chance described by Poincaré is deeply embedded
in On War, but commentators have not usually distinguished its
nature from that of the first. (56) In contrast to
the statistical form characterized above, this type of chance-amplification
of a microcause-is inherent in the system itself. It arises from the fact
that in certain deterministic systems small causes can have disproportionately
large effects at some later time. Because the history of the system matters,
the initial conditions remain significant. In a passage often cited by
researchers working on nonlinear dynamics, Poincaré explained:
- A very slight cause, which escapes us, determines a considerable
effect which we can not help seeing, and then we say this effect is
due to chance. If we could know exactly the laws of nature and the
situation of the universe at the initial instant, we should be able
to predict exactly the situation of this same universe at a subsequent
instant. But even when the natural laws should have no further secret
for us, we could know the initial situation only approximately. If
that permits us to foresee the subsequent situation with the same
degree of approximation, this is all we require, [and] we say the
phenomenon has been predicted, that is ruled by laws. But this is
not always the case; it may happen that slight differences in the
initial conditions produce very great differences in the final phenomenon;
a slight error in the former would make an enormous error in the latter.
Prediction becomes impossible and we have the fortuitous phenomenon.
(57)
Poincaré thus linked the crucial importance of the initial conditions
to the idea that in the real world the precision of our information concerning
causes is always limited. This is a root explanation for unpredictability
in those nonlinear phenomena that exhibit chaotic regimes of behavior.
This is exactly how Clausewitz perceives the role of chance in relation
to friction in real war. Unnoticeably small causes can be disproportionately
amplified. Decisive results can often rest on particular factors that
are "details known only to those who were on the spot." (58)
Attempts to reconstruct cause and effect always face the lack of precise
information:
- Nowhere in life is this so common as in war, where the facts are
seldom fully known and the underlying motives even less so. They may
be intentionally concealed by those in command, or, if they happen
to be transitory and accidental, history may not have recorded them
at all. (59)
We can never recover the precise initial conditions even of known developments
in past wars, much less developments in current wars distorted by the fog
of uncertainty. Interactions at every scale within armies and between adversaries
amplify microcauses and produce unexpected macroeffects. Since interaction
is intrinsic to the nature of war, it cannot be eliminated. The precise
knowledge needed to anticipate the effects of interaction is unattainable.
Unpredictability in war due to this second form of chance is thus unavoidable.
There is yet a third type of chance discussed by Poincaré that
is prominently displayed in Clausewitz's work. Poincaré argued
that this kind is a result of our inability to see the universe as an
interconnected whole:
- Our weakness forbids our considering the entire universe and makes
us cut it up into slices. We try to do this as little artificially
as possible. And yet it happens from time to time that two of these
slices react upon each other. The effects of this mutual action then
seem to us to be due to chance. (60)
Thus the drive to comprehend the world through analysis, the effort to partition
off pieces of the universe to make them amenable to study, opens the possibility
of being blind-sided by the very artificiality of the partitioning practice.
This form of chance is a particularly acute problem when our intuition is
guided by linear concepts.
Clausewitz has a profound sense of how our understanding of phenomena
around us is truncated by the bounds we place on them for our analytical
convenience. The assertion from On War quoted above, that "circumstances
vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable," makes this point explicitly
in the German original. A literal translation refers to the "diversity
and indistinct boundary of all relationships" ("die Mannigfaltigkeit und
die unbestimmte Grenze aller Beziehungen") with which a commander must
cope. Clausewitz repeatedly stresses the failure of theorists, such as
his contemporaries Jomini and Bulow, to obtain effective principles because
they insist on isolating individual factors or aspects of the problems
presented in war. One indictment is particularly well known:
- Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with principles,
rules, or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people
failed to take an adequate account of the endless complexities involved.
As we have seen, the conduct of war branches out in almost all directions
and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite
nature of a synthesis [in the sense of synthetic or man-made]. An
irreconcilable conflict exists between this type of theory and actual
practice....[These attempts] aim at fixed values; but in war everything
is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities.
They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas
all military action is entwined with psychological forces and effects.
They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of continuous
interaction of opposites. (61)
For Clausewitz, the generation of any system of principles for the conduct
of war is a desirable goal but an unattainable one. Such an act of synthesis
is indeed attractive, because it becomes so easy to forget the filters we
have imposed on our view of the phenomenon.
But his concerns, like those of many scientists wrestling with nonlinear
phenomena today, are open systems which cannot be isolated from their
environments even in theory, which are characterized by numerous levels
of feedback effects, and which need to be grasped realistically as an
interactive whole. Traditional analysis that aimed at breaking the system
into simpler parts fails now just as surely as it did in Clausewitz's
time, and for the same reasons. As Clausewitz writes of critical analysis
and proof:
- It is bound to be easy if one restricts oneself to the most immediate
aims and effects. This may be done quite arbitrarily if one isolates
the matter from its setting and studies it only under those conditions.
But in war, as in life generally, all parts of the whole are interconnected
and thus the effects produced, however small their cause, must influence
all subsequent military operations and modify their final outcome
to some degree, however slight. In the same way, every means must
influence even the ultimate purpose. (62)
nterconnectedness and context, interaction, chance, complexity, indistinct
boundaries, feedback effects and so on, all leading to analytical unpredictability-it
is no wonder that On War has confused and disappointed those looking
for a theory of war modeled on the success of Newtonian mechanics.
The Role of Linearity
It is important to emphasize that Clausewitz does not hold the view that
linearity is nowhere valid in war. As much as any military professional,
he clearly wants to find or generate conditions under which outcomes may
be guaranteed. His attention to situations characterized by direct, sequential
cause-effect relationships or proportionality makes Clausewitz's understanding
of the consequences of nonlinearity more supple-and credible-than if he
ignored linearities entirely. But he is aware that linear relations and
the predictability they offer are the exceptions in the real world, so he
usually surrounds a linear effect with a discussion of the constraints needed
to achieve it.
For Clausewitz, the parameters that make linear approximations possible
are the political-military analogs of shallow waves or low-amplitude vibrations.
In Chapter 1, Book One, for instance, he notes that political objectives
come to the fore as the limitations of the real world dampen the theoretical
tendency of pure war to be driven to absolute extremes. "The smaller the
penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to
try to deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need
make yourself." (63) This offers an example of linearity.
Yet, Clausewitz in the next paragraph restricts such a relationship:
- The political object-the original motive for the war-will thus
determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount
of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself
provide the standard of measurement. Since we are dealing with realities,
not with abstractions, it can do so only in the context of the two
states at war. The same political object can elicit differing reactions
from different peoples, and even from the same people at different
times. [Here follows the nonlinear image of combustion noted on p.
68 above]....The less involved in the population and the less serious
the strains within states and between them, the more political requirements
in themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive. Situations can
thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant.
(64)
The context in which a war begins thus sets an initial range of possibilities
for the relationship between political objective and military exertion.
Situations "can" exist in which a single variable "almost" solely determines
the outcome. But this requires that one of the magnetic attractions in the
"remarkable trinity"-the primordial passions of the people-be diminished
so greatly as to be effectively removed.
The embedding of linearity in a general environment of nonlinearity is
thoroughly characteristic of On War. This awareness of the full
range of the system's behavior prevails not only when Clausewitz considers
the outbreak of war, but also when he assesses the impact of a single
battle in war. In a chapter where he discusses the disproportionate, nonlinear
effects of a victory, Clausewitz relates other processes in clearly linear
terms: "Our argument is that the effects of victory that we have described
will always be present; that they increase in proportion to the scale
of the victory; and they increase the more the battle is a major one."
(65) Yet he encompasses this remark within assertions
that the effects of victories still depend very much on the context, including
the character of the victorious commander, whether moral forces will be
aroused on the other side that "would otherwise have remained dormant,"
and so on. (66) It is even possible, therefore, for
a victory to have the entirely unexpected effect of rallying the losing
side.
Seen from this perspective, the best-known and most popular of the linearities
identified by Clausewitz-the offensive thrust at the enemy's "center of
gravity"-looks quite different than it is usually depicted. Defeat of
the enemy, he holds, involves "chances and incidents so minute as to figure
in histories simply as anecdotes," but out of the dominant characteristics
of each belligerent "a center of gravity [Schwerpunkt] develops, the hub
of all power and movement, on which everything depends." (67)
Practicing soldiers may warm to the idea of focusing one's efforts on
the most critical concentration of the enemy's fighting forces in order
to strike the most telling blow. But they balk when Clausewitz goes on
to suggest that under specific circumstances the center of gravity could
be a city, or a community of interest among allies, or the personality
of a leader or even public opinion. (68) Furthermore,
he urges an awareness of the restraints imposed by considerations of economy
of force: an excess of force is worse than a waste, for it means unnecessary
weakness elsewhere (69) Even more unsettling for
some readers, he says that he is only describing what has been done in
the past and wants "to reiterate emphatically that here, as elsewhere,
our definitions are aimed only at the center of certain concepts; we neither
wish [to] nor can give them sharp outlines." (70)
Even this most Newtonian-sounding analogy of a "center of gravity" becomes
swamped in qualifications and caveats intended to convey the complexity
of war.
No wonder that, in an effort to cut through the maddening maze of qualification,
students of On War tend to linearize and simplify what is said,
The upshot is often an implicit and even explicit claim that, if Clausewitz
were only less confused and understood his own concepts better, he would
sound like Jomini. In a recent example, the military authors of an article
rehearsed the above passages, but were clearly relieved when they could
finally report that Clausewitz goes on to say that no matter what the
center of gravity may be, "defeat of the enemy fighting force remains
the best way to begin," For them, this strategy retrieved the analogy
from the region "beyond its applicability" in the psychological realm
and "reestablishes the analogy of the center of gravity in its proper
physical domain." (71) They then immediately proceeded
to contrast Clausewitz's terminology with that of Jomini, whose crisply
stated maxims about the "decisive point" were held to be much more clear.
But the continual twisting about that fills On War is just not
the case of Clausewitz's being ponderous and wordy. Instead, the apparently
irresolute to and fro of his prose conforms fully to his metaphor of theory
floating among competing points of attraction.
Clausewitz's partisans, who agree with him that a theory of war cannot
be axiomatic, nevertheless have also labored under the implicit imperative
that a good theory must conform to a linear intuition. Examples can be
found even among the most articulate and sensitive interpreters of his
work. Two essays by Bernard Brodie, long an influential member of the
American defense analysis community, were included by Howard and Paret
in their 1976 translation of On War. It is striking that even Brodie
sometimes attempted to legitimize Clausewitz's ideas by linearizing them.
For example, when Clausewitz states that the events of a war can change
policy, according to Brodie Clausewitz cannot really mean this, "for to
admit even a high probability of such a feedback effect would be to destroy
his basic contention that war is an instrument of policy and not the reverse."
But Clausewitz not only admits this feedback effect he specifically underscores
it in the passage under discussion, and it is typical of his conception
of war. (72) The relationship between policy and war
cannot be that of a discrete independent variable and a discrete dependent
variable, for it is impossible to isolate the ends from the means used
to pursue them.
Once identified as such, Clausewitz's perception that war is a profoundly
nonlinear phenomenon seems so obvious that the natural question is why
this has not been clearly understood all along. The answer is that what
is meant by "theory" has been profoundly linear, to some extent already
in Clausewitz's time and increasingly so since. Simplicity achieved by
idealized isolation of systems and of variables within systems, deterministic
laws, clearly delineated boundaries, linear causal trains, and other tools
with which to forge analytical prediction have become the hallmarks of
good theory. By using such techniques, rooted in the parsimonious and
deductive power of logic, we have searched for-and therefore overwhelmingly
found-static equilibria, consistent explanations, periodic regularities,
and the beauty of symmetry.
Of course, as Ian Stewart noted, all this comes at a price, namely the
restriction of our vision to low-amplitude vibrations, shallow waves,
small perturbations, and their analogs. We have trained our imaginations
to be fundamentally linear. We have been able to devise analytical equations
that offer prediction, but only by implicitly requiring that the system
not be allowed to change too much in the meantime. We artificially require
that our systems be stable in the sense expressed by Maxwell, and then
are surprised by the manifest instability we encounter in the real world.
A scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory has summed up our situation:
- That a system governed by deterministic laws can exhibit effectively
random behavior runs counter to our normal intuition. Perhaps it is
because intuition is inherently 'linear'; indeed, deterministic chaos
cannot occur in linear systems. (73)
The realization that we have been wearing analytical blinders is becoming
widespread. Looking to the future relationship between basic and applied
physics, a National Research Council panel lamented the general lack of
an adequate intuition: inheritance of experience with simple systems is
strikingly empty of images, intuitions, and methods for dealing with nonlinear
problems of complexity. We know almost nothing of the workings and accustomed
regularities of such systems. And to proceed we must come to know them intimately."
(74) Working over one hundred and fifty years ago with
the requisite intuition, Clausewitz had no precise and commonly accepted
vocabulary with which to express his insights into nonlinear systems. He
thus wrestled for years with formulations of his insights, unwilling to
abandon realism for idealization.
It seems clear that in On War Clausewitz also senses that any
prescriptive theory entails linearization, which is why he holds a dim
view of such theory in the real world in which war actually occurs. Only
an idealized "pure theory" of war could be predictive with universal prescriptions.
In our world of probabilities, rather than axiomatic certainties, by contrast,
any useful theory must instead be heuristic, for each war is "a series
of actions obeying its own peculiar laws." (75)
The purpose of theory in our world is to expand the range of personal
experience that is the best aid to judgment in war; it is "meant to educate
the mind of the future commander, or more accurately, to guide him in
his self education." (76) Since war evolves over
time, the best techniques are historical, which offer an indication only
of what is possible, not what is necessary, in the future.
Clausewitz is quite explicit: it is impossible "to construct a model
for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander
can rely on for support at any time." (77) Since
the opponent is a reacting, animate entity, "it is clear that continual
striving after laws analogous to those appropriate to the realm of inanimate
matter was bound to lead to one mistake after another." (78)
The notion of law does not apply to actions in war, "since no prescriptive
formulation universal enough to deserve the name of law can be applied
to the constant change and diversity of the phenomena of war." (79)
Thus theory must be based on a broader sense of order rooted in historical
experience, leading to descriptive guidelines. Theorists must not be seduced
into formulating analytically deductive, prescriptive sets of doctrines
that offer poor hope and worse guidance.
Implications
I have demonstrated that Clausewitz perceives war as a profoundly nonlinear
phenomenon that manifests itself in ways consistent with our current understanding
of nonlinear dynamics. Furthermore, I have suggested that the predominance
of a linear approach to analysis has made it difficult to assimilate and
appreciate the intent and contribution of On War. The concepts and
sensibility recently emerging in nonlinear science can be used to clarify
not his confusion, but our truncated expectations for a theory of war-namely
that it should conform to the restrictions of linearity. At the very least,
such a sensibility may help us explore the stubborn intractability of prediction
in war. (80) Only a few other implications can be noted
here. (81)
One implication is that full comprehension of the work of Clausewitz
demands that we retrain our intuition. For historians, who have often
been attracted rather than repelled by the subtleties of On War,
this may not be too unsettling a task. But for those trained in the engineering
and scientific fields, as are so many military officers and analysts,
this retraining is likely to be a more wrenching and unwelcome experience.
As the various scientists and mathematicians cited above have suggested,
the predominance of a linear intuition is endemic. Such an intuition guides
value judgments and choices, with real world consequences:
- We would emphasize that in many areas of science and technology
a large effort has traditionally been made to model a physical system
or process. Yet once the mathematical model has been constructed,
only a few rather cursory computer simulations are sometimes made.
Lulled into a false sense of security by his familiarity with the
unique response of a linear system, the busy analyst or experimentalist
shouts "Eureka, this is the solution" once a simulation settles onto
an equilibrium or steady cycle, without bothering to explore patiently
the outcome from different starting conditions. To avoid potentially
dangerous errors and disasters, industrial designers must be prepared
to devote a greater percentage of their effort to exploring the full
range of dynamic responses of their systems. (82)
Here, Michael Thompson and Bruce Stewart speak of modeling physical systems
and processes that are much simpler than the social systems engaged in warfare,
yet surveys of military applications of modeling indicate the predominance
of the same analytically linear intuition despite the loss of realism it
entails. (83) And, of course, the "potentially dangerous
errors and disasters" take on added dimensions when the task is to prepare
for or conduct a war.
A consequent necessity is a reevaluation of Clausewitz as an authority
in military manuals and training. The simplicity of a set of "principles
of war" will surely remain attractive, not least because they are so easy
to comprehend and memorize. But we should understand that Clausewitz's
concerns are to such principles as nonlinearity to linearity (or fractals
to Euclidean objects, or the real numbers to the integers). The elegance
of military axioms is a mirage shimmering above the distinct abstractions
of implicitly idealized, isolated systems; the denseness of Clausewitz's
forest of caveats and qualifications more faithfully represents the conditions
and contexts we actually encounter.
Another implication of the nonlinear interpretation of Clausewitz is
the need for a deepening of our understanding of his dictum on the relationship
of war to politics. That "war is merely the continuation of policy by
other means" is often taken to mean the primacy of a temporal continuum:
first politics sets the goals, then war occurs, and then politics reigns
again when the fighting stops. But such a view categorizes politics as
extrinsic to war, and is an artifact of a linear sequential model. Politics
is about power, and the feedback loops from violence to power and from
power to violence are an intrinsic feature of war. It is not simply that
political considerations weigh upon military commanders. War is inherently
a subset of politics, and every military act has political consequences,
whether or not these are intended or immediately obvious. In the grip
of battle, it is hard to remember that every building destroyed, every
prisoner taken, every combatant killed, every civilian assaulted, every
road used, every unintentional violation of the customs of an ally ultimately
has political import. It is crucial to understand that Clausewitz, who
was for many years on the losing side before the tide turned against Napoleon,
embeds the long-term view and the full range of a system's behavior into
the structure of On War. Such considerations often make soldiers
impatient with his presentation, but the variables in war cannot be isolated
from the parameters constituting the political context. And that environment
itself evolves dynamically in response to the course of the war, with
the changed context feeding back into the conduct of hostilities.
Yet another implication is that chance is also not extrinsic to war,
because the interactive nature of military action itself generates chance.
Single-valued, analytically exact solutions achieved by idealization that
conveniently excise all but a few variables derive from a linear intuition.
Clausewitz understands that war has no distinct boundaries and that its
parts are interconnected. What is needed is to comprehend intuitively
both that the set of parameters for "the problem" is unstable, and that
no arbitrarily selected part can be abstracted adequately from the whole.
The work of Clausewitz indicates that knowing how the system functions
at this moment does not guarantee that it will change only slightly in
the next. Although it may remain stable, it might also suddenly (although
perhaps subtly) pass a threshold into a thoroughly different regime of
behavior. And the causes of such changes in a complex system can be imperceptibly
small. Production of an unchanging set of laws or even principles to be
employed in all "similar" contexts is not merely useless, it can become
counterproductive and lead to the kind of fixed, inflexible, mechanical
mentality that is overwhelmed by events. Adaptability is as important
in doctrine as on the battlefield.
The overall pattern is clear: war seen as a nonlinear phenomenon-as Clausewitz
sees it-is inherently unpredictable by analytical means. Chance and complexity
dominate simplicity in the real world. Thus no two wars are ever the same.
No war is guaranteed to remain structurally stable. No theory can provide
the analytical short-cuts necessary to allow us to skip ahead of the "running"
of the actual war. No realistic assumptions offer a way to bypass these
uncomfortable truths. Yet these truths have the virtue that they help
us identify the blinders we impose on our thinking when we attempt to
linearize. And what Clausewitz says about the conduct of war applies to
the study of war: "once barriers-which in a sense consist only in man's
ignorance of what is possible-are torn down, they are not so easily set
up again." (84)
Notes
1) Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. I use
this edition for all quotations unless otherwise indicated. For the German,
see Vom Kriege, 18th ed. (complete
edition of original text), ed., Werner Hahlweg. Bonn: Dummlers, 1973. For
other works in English, see von Clausewitz, Historical and Political
Writings, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992.
2) Hans Rothfels, "Clausewitz" in Edward Mead Earle,
ed., Makers of Modern Strategy. New York: Atheneum, 1969: 93. Christopher
Bassford offers one impression of the reception of Clausewitz's work in
his study Clausewitz in English: The
Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
3) Raymond Aron. Clausewitz: Philosopher of War,
trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1983: 6. Original Penser la guerre, Clausewitz, 2 vols. Paris:
Gallimard, 1976. The suggestion has recently been made that the text was
actually much more finished than has hitherto been thought: Azar Gat,
"Clausewitz's Final Notes," Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen,
Vol. 45, No. 1, 1989: 45-50.
4) Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man,
His Theories and His Times. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1983: 8-9 (originally published by Oxford University Press, 1976). Azar
Gat's argument that Clausewitz's work is best understood as part of the
Romantic backlash against the Enlightenment, also belongs to this approach.
See Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to
Clausewitz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
5) Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence.
London: Frank Cass, 1989: 60.
6) Alan Beyerchen, "Nonlinear Science and the Unfolding
of a New Intellectual Vision," Papers in Comparative Studies, Vol.
6 (1988-89): 26-29.
7) The principle of proportionality means that if f
is a function or an operator, a is a constant, and u is the system input
(either a variable or itself a function), then f(au) = af(u). A more precise
way of stating the principle of additivity is that the effect of adding
the system inputs together first and than operating on their sum is equivalent
to operating on two units separately and then adding the outputs together,
so that f(u1 +u2) = f(u1) + f(u2). If f does not meet both of these conditions,
it is nonlinear. In effect, if a system can be described adequately by
the mathematical operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication,
by a constant, integration with respect to time or differentiation with
respect to time, it can appropriately be thought of as linear. If it is
necessary to multiply or divide variables by each other, raise to powers,
extract roots, or integrate or differentiate with respect to dependent
variables (that is, variables other than time), then the system is nonlinear.
8) The meaning of "synergistic" interaction is indicated
by the contrast between a common linear operation and a common nonlinear
one. A linear operation such as multiplying by a constant obeys the principle
of additivity: let f(u) = au, then f(u1+u2) = a(u1+u2) = au1+au2, which
is just f(u1)+f(u2) again. A nonlinear operation such as squaring, however,
is different: let f(u) = u2, then f(u1+u2) = (u1+u2)2, which equals not
just u12+u22 again, but u12+u22 plus the interaction term 2u,u2.
9) The mathematician Stanislaw Ulam suggested that calling
natural phenomenon nonlinear is like referring to the bulk of the animal
kingdom as "non-elephant animals." David Campbell, "Nonlinear Science:
From Paradigms to Practicalities," Los Alamos Science, Vol. 15,
Special Issue, 1987: 218.
10) See for example, Larry Smarr, "An Approach to Complexity:
Numerical Computations," Science, Vol. 228, April 26, 1985: 403-408;
and Norman Zabusky, "Grappling with Complexity," Physics Today,
October 1987: 25-27.
11) Ian Stewart, Does God Play Dice? The Mathematics
of Chaos. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989: 83.
12) See the treatment of Jomini and Bulow in Paret,
Clausewitz and the State, passim; also Clausewitz On War:
134, 136, and 158.
13) James Clerk Maxwell, "Science and Free Will," in
Lewis Campbell and William Garnett, with a new preface and appendix by
Robert H. Kargon, The Life of James Clerk Maxwell [1882]. New York:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1969: 440-442.
14) See Beyerchen, "Nonlinear Science and the Unfolding":
31. A very good brief discussion of the mathematics and physics involved
is in Campbell, "Nonlinear Science": 218-262. The Santa Fe Institute is
one of the key research centers where the implications of complexity across
these fields is explored; see, for example, Daniel L. Stein, ed., Santa
Fe Institute Lectures in the Sciences of Complexity, Vol. 1. Redwood
City, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1989.
15) For a readable, popular account of the development
of this field, see James Gleick, Chaos: The Making of a New Science.
New York: Viking, 1987, whose notes on sources indicate many of the seminal
papers, yet notably lack the Russian achievements. For a more mathematically
sophisticated, yet still accessible overview, see John Casti, Reality
Rules, 2 vols. New York: Wiley, 1992. As dissipative systems, wars
also exhibit characteristics of nonlinear self-organization, but space
does not here permit an exploration of this topic in Clausewitz's work.
On self-organization, see Gregoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine, Exploring
Complexity: An Introduction. New York: W.H. Freeman, 1989; and Peter
Coveney and Roger Highfield, The Arrow of Time: A Voyage through Science
to Solve Time's Greatest Mystery. New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1990.
16) Parameters are, after all, just certain variables
treated as constants for the duration of the problem. The crucial role
played by the parameters is readily apparent in contrasting the commonly
studied motion of the simple pendulum for small oscillation amplitudes,
with that of the damped, driven pendulum under more realistic conditions.
See G.L. Baker and J.P. Gollub, Chaotic Dynamics: An Introduction.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
17) The Lorenz equations indicate the simplicity directly:
dx/dt = Py-Px, dy/dt = -xz+rx-y, dz/dt = xy-bz
where P, r, and b are adjustable parameters relating to fluid flow, thermal
convection, etc. See the discussion in Celso Grebogi, Edward Ott, and
James A. Yorke, "Chaos, Strange Attractors, and Fractal Basin Boundaries
in Nonlinear Dynamics," Science, Vol. 238, October 30, 1987: 633-636;
and a readable and more extended treatment in J.M.T. Thompson and H.B.
Stewart, Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos: Geometrical Methods for Engineers
and Scientists. New York: Wiley, 1986: 212-234.
18) On War: 73. All emphases are in the original
unless otherwise indicated.
19-22) On War: 77, 75, 77-80, 81 respectively.
23) On War: 600-610, the tone of which is set
on p. 602: "Still, as we have argued in the second chapter of Book One
(purpose and means in war), the nature of the political aim, the scale
of demands put forward by either side, and the total political situation
of one's own side are all factors that in practice must decisively influence
the conduct of war."
24) See for example, the works of T.N. Dupuy, Numbers,
Prediction, and War. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979; and Dupuy,
Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat. New York: Paragon
House, 1987.
25-29) On War: 87, 87, 89, 89, 89 respectively.
30) See, for example, the PBS "Nova" program entitled
"The Strange New Science of Chaos," which aired in January 1989.
31) On War: 214-215.
32) Vom Kriege:
213.
33) The experiment requires only simple apparatus.
During the time Clausewitz was composing On War he attended the
lectures of physicist Paul Erman at the Kriegschule for an entire year
without missing a single lecture. Erman was publishing on the new field
of electricity, and emphasized precision of observation over the then-fashionable
intuitive approach to nature. Erman's son was also studying physics in
these same years with a special interest in magnetism. See Paret, Clausewitz:
310.
34) Aron, Clausewitz: 2.
35) Michael Howard, Clausewitz. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983: 73.
36-38) On War: 149, 139, 253 respectively.
39) See, e.g., Aron, Clausewitz: 225-228; Howard,
Clausewitz,: 84, note 13. Engels and Lenin, however, praised On
War largely because they read the Hegelian dialectic into it; see
Martin Kitchen, "The Political History of Clausewitz," Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 1988): 27-30.
40) Aron, Clausewitz: 90.
41) Ibid., 98-99; Penser la guerre, Vol. 1:
166
42-44) On War: 132, 119, 119-120, respectively.
45) See D.S.L. Cardwell, From Watt to Clausius:
The Rise of Thermodynamics in the Early Industrial Age. London: Heinemann,
1971: esp. 186-294. On the relationships of nonlinearity and entropy,
see the works of Ilya Prigogine, esp. with Isabelle Stengers, Order
Out of Chaos. New York: Bantam, 1984, and Arthur Peacocke, "Thermodynamics
and Life," Zygon, Vol. 19, No. 4 (December 1984): 395-468.
46) On War: 119. See also p. 153: "Routine apart
from its sheer inevitability, also contains one positive advantage. Constant
practice leads to brisk, precise and reliable leadership, reducing natural
friction and easing the working of the machine."
47) Ibid., 101 and 117-118.
48) On how simple nonlinear systems exhibiting chaotic
behavior can similarly be viewed as "information pumps" that amplify immeasurably
small differences, see Robert Shaw, "Strange Attractors, Chaotic Behavior,
and Information Flow," Zeitschrift der Naturforschung, Vol. 36a,
1981: 80-112.
49) On War: 85.
50) Henri Poincaré, "Chance," in Science
and Method, reprinted in Foundations of Science, trans. George Bruce
Halsted [1913] Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982: 400-406.
51) On Clausewitz's interest in mathematics, see Paret,
Clausewitz: 127 and 130; and Clausewitz to his future wife, February 28,
1807, in K. Linnebach, ed., Karl und Marie von Clausewitz: Ein Lebensbild
in Briefen und Tagebuchblattern. Berlin: Martin Warneck, 1925: 94.
On the history of probability theory in the period, see Lorraine Daston,
Classical Probability in the Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton
University Press: 1988: esp. 226-295.
52) Katherine Herbig has remarked that analysis of
statistical probability depends on large numbers of events to be valid,
while Clausewitz stressed the unique and distinctive events in war. Raymond
Aron has noted the emphasis that Clausewitz placed on an intuitive rather
than calculative grasp of probabilities. However, the relevance of Pioncare
here relates to the generation of statistical chance rather than how to
cope with it. Katherine Herbig, "Chance and Uncertainty in On War,"
in Michael I. Handel, ed., Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. London:
Frank Cass, 1986: 107 (originally published in Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol. 9, No. 23, June-September 1986); Aron, Clausewitz: 185.
53-55) On War: 86, 112, 136-140, respectively.
56) An exception is Barry D. Watts, who had explored
Clausewitz's concept of friction from this perspective. See Watts, The
Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1984); and James G. Roche and Barry D.
Watts, "Choosing Analytic Measures," Journal of Strategic Studies,
Vol. 14, No. 2, June 1991: 191-194. See also Bassford's manuscript (note
2 above), chap. 2.
57) Poincaré, "Chance": 397-398.
58-59) On War: 595 and 156, respectively.
60) Poincaré, "Chance": 403.
61) On War: 134 and 136.
62-65) On War: 158, 81, 81, and 256, respectively.
66) Ibid.: 256-257. This outcome is certainly exceptional,
but hardly unknown; the German victory at Dunkirk and the Japanese victory
at Pearl Harbor provide obvious twentieth-century examples.
67-70) On War: 595-596, 596, 486, and 486,
respectively.
71) James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo, "Clausewitz's
Elusive Center of Gravity," Parameters, Vol. 17, No. 3 (September
1987): 50
72) Brodie, "A Guide to the Reading of On War,"
On War: 647. The passage in Clausewitz that Brodie discusses reads: "One
point is purposely ignored for the moment-the difference that the positive
or negative character of the political ends is bound to produce in practice.
As we shall see, the difference is important, but at this stage we must
take a broader view because the original political objects can greatly
alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since
they are influenced by events and their probable consequences." On
War: 92. For a statement by Clausewitz that the means always affect
the ends, see On War: 158. On Brodie's overall appreciation of
Clausewitz, see Barry H. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations
of American Nuclear Strategy. Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas,
1991: esp. 210-225.
73) Campbell, "Nonlinear Science": 231.
74) U.S. National Research Council, Physics Survey
Committee, Scientific Interfaces and Technological Applications (Physics
through the 1990's). Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1986:
132.
75-79) On War: 80, 141, 140, 149 and 152,
respectively.
80) Such an exploration would have immediate consequences.
As Joshua Epstein has mused, "If by a series of empirically and theoretically
defensible assumptions, we are led to mathematical models that, over certain
ranges, exhibit highly sensitive, even chaotic, behavior, that may reveal
a fundamental fact about war and its inherent volatility, a fact with
which policy makers, scholars, and soldiers may have to come to terms."
Epstein, " The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of
Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring
1989): 119.
81) A parallel examination has begun in economics.
In contrast to the negative-feedback idealizations of conventional theory,
W. Brian Arthur has argued that positive feedbacks can make the history
of an economic system matter. Thus, "to the extent that small events determine
the overall path always remain beneath the resolution of the economist's
lens, accurate forecasting of an economy's future may be theoretically,
not just practically, impossible." Arthur. "Positive Feedbacks in the
Economy," Scientific American, February 1990: 99. See also the
essays in Philip W. Anderson, Kenneth J. Arrow, and David Pines, eds.,
The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, in Santa Fe Institute
Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Vol. 5. Redwood City: CA: Addison-Wesley,
1988.
82) Thompson and Stewart, Nonlinear Dynamics and
Chaos: xiii.
83) See John Battilega and Judith K. Grange, The
Military Applications of Modeling. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force
Institute of Technology Press, 1979: esp. Appendix A: 516-543; and Battilega
and Grange, Models, Data, and War: A Critique of the Foundation for
Defense Analyses. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office,
1980.
84) On War, 593.
Return to The Clausewitz Homepage
|